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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability in light of 
the developing peace and security architecture of the relatively new continental body, the 
African Union (AU). The primary aim is to determine the nature and severity of those 
challenges that currently face the organization’s ambition of realizing this Pan-African 
dream. This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises both descriptive and exploratory 
aspects. 
 
The thesis begins by discussing the development of peacekeeping in conflict management. It 
establishes that peacekeeping emerged as an ad hoc response by the UN to address the 
growing issue of inter-state conflict during the Cold War, but has evolved into one of the 
primary tools used by the international community to manage complex crises. The advent of 
new security threats in the post-Cold War era, spurred on by the dynamic process of 
globalization, necessitated that peacekeeping adapt and is commonly perceived in 
contemporary discourse as a multidimensional practice. Central to this development was the 
shift in focus from international to human security and the recent development of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
 
The study then goes on to explore the process that has ultimately led to the establishment of 
the AU’s proposed peacekeeping capability, the African Standby Force (ASF). With a 
dramatic increase in incidences of violent conflict across the globe in the 1990s, the UN’s 
limited resources were pushed to the limit, thus paving the way for regional organizations to 
play a more important role in ensuring international peace and security. The establishment of 
the AU in 2002 was meant to put to bed the inability of its forerunner, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), which had suffered from limited financial, logistical and structural 
competence, while its political and institutional authority was hampered by dissent and the 
qualified support of member states. However, as the African Union Mission in the Darfur 
region of Sudan (AMIS), highlights, the AU’s peacekeeping capacity is hamstrung by a lack 
of political will on the part of African leaders, weak institutional capacity, severe financial 
constraints as well as an overly militaristic approach that neglects the essential 
multidimensional nature of peacekeeping. 
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The study concludes with four key findings. First, given its structural shortcomings, the AU 
is unlikely to be able to implement the ambitious peacekeeping framework that it has laid out. 
Second, any hope of ever doing so is wholly dependent of continued support from the 
international community - although, this would undermine the notion of African ownership. 
Thirdly, despite these issues, the theory underlying the AU’s peace and security architecture 
is of a relatively high quality and has the potential to make a significant contribution to peace 
in Africa. That being said, the most viable solution going forward would be to formally 
incorporate the ASF and related structures within the overarching network of the UN. Finally, 
the issue of political will was identified as the most significant challenge currently facing the 
establishment of an African peacekeeping capability, as Africa’s elite are unwilling to see a 
strong continental body capable of interfering in their affairs. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die tesis ondersoek die vooruitsigte van ‘n effektiewe Afrika vrede-bewaringsmag, binne die 
konteks van die huidige Afrika Unie (AU) se raamwerk vir vrede en sekuriteit. Die primêre 
navorsingsdoel is om vas te stel wat die AU se belangrikste uitdagings is, om die die strewe 
na Pan-Afrikanisme te bewerkstellig in die area van vrede-instandhouding op die kontinent. 
 
Eerstens word ‘n oorsig gegee oor die ontwikkeling van vrede-instandhouding binne die 
konteks van konflikbestuur. Die afleiding word gemaak dat vrede-instandhouding ontstaan 
het as ‘n ad hoc proses binne die Verenigde Nasies ten einde inter-staat konflik tydens die 
Koue Oorlog, te besleg. Dit is later binne die internasionale gemeenskap aanvaar as die 
primêre strategie vir die oplossing en hantering van internasionale konflik. Na die einde van 
die Koue Oorlog, en tesame met die dinamiese proses van globalisering, het vrede-
instandhouding egter verder ontwikkel en ’n multi-dimensionele proses geword. Hierdie 
ontwikkeling is hoofsaaklik gekenmerk deur ’n fokus wat wegbeweeg het van tradisionele 
soewereiniteits-sekuriteit na menslike sekuriteit. Dit het gepaardgegaan met die gelyktydige 
ontwikkeling van die Verantwoordelikheid om te Beskerm doktrine. 
 
Die studie ondersoek verder die prosesse wat bygedra het tot die AU se voorgestelde 
vredesmag – die Afrika Bystandsmag (ASF). As gevolg van ’n toename in internasionale 
konflik tydens die 1990s is die Verenigde Nasies se vermoeëns tot die uiterste beproef. Dit 
het die weg gebaan vir die opkoms van kontinentale en streeks-organisasies om ‘n meer 
prominente rol te speel in internasional vrede-instandhouding en sekuriteit. Die stigting van 
die AU in 2002, was veronderstel om die finansiële, logistieke en strukturele tekortkominge 
van sy voorganger, die Unie vir Afrika Eenheid (OAU) aan te spreek, aangesien 
laasgenoemde se politieke en institusionele hoedanigheid ondermyn is deur sy lidlande.  Daar 
word bevind – met behulp van ’n gevalle-studie analise van die AU se Sending na Soedan 
(AMIS) dat die AU se kapasiteit nie na wense is nie, as gevolg van die gebrek aan 
samewerking tussen leiers, finansiële tekortkominge en ’n neiging om militaristiese 
benadering te volg, ten koste van die multi-dimensionele aspek van vredes-instandhouding. 
 
Die studie sluit af met vier bevindings. Eerstens is daar bevind dat as gevolg van die AU se 
strukturele tekortkominge dit onwaarskynlik is, dat die organisasie sy ambisieuse 
vredesraamwerk sal kan implimenteer. Tweedens, word daar bevind dat selfs al beskik die 
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AU oor die vermoëns die raamwerk te implimenteer, dit steeds die samewerking van die 
internasionale gemeenskap sou benodig, wat noodwendig die  organisasie se gesag as 
kontinentale leier sal ondermyn. Ongeag van hierdie struikelblokke is daar egter ook bevind 
dat die AU se vredesinisiatiewe in Soedan wel meriete getoon het en dat dit wel die 
potensiaal het om die vrede- en sekuriteitsprobleme binne die Afrika konteks aan te spreek. 
Die toekomstige sukses hiervan is grootliks afhanklik van die AU se vermoëns en 
bereidwilligheid om die ASF en gepaardgaande inisiatiewe saam met die Verenigde Nasies 
aan te pak. Laastens is dit bevind dat die grootste struikelblok vir die ontwikkeling van ’n 
effektiewe Afrika vrede-instandhoudingskapasiteit die politieke wil van gesaghebbende 
Afrika leiers is om ‘n sentrale beheerliggaam toe te laat om in te meng in die sake van 
soewereine Afrika-state. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The modern state system is relatively new to Africa and unfortunately enjoyed a 
rather short-lived honeymoon. Prior to 1950 only South Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia and 
Egypt were recognized as independent political entities; the vast majority of states in 
the region having only achieved independence from their respective colonial powers 
after 1960 (ACPP, 2006:5). The overwhelming sense of optimism characteristic of 
this period soon vanished, however, as one conflict after another seemingly erupted 
across the continent. Indeed, conflict and political instability are problems that 
continue to plague Africa to this day. Over the last fifty years there have been more 
than seventy episodes of major armed conflict, many of which are either currently still 
in progress or have recently ended but are at risk of reigniting, with an estimated 
death toll well into the tens of millions (ACPP, 2006:41-44). Moreover, this figure 
says nothing of the countless millions more refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), roughly 37 million worldwide, whose lives have been irrevocably altered by 
war, or the devastating impact that such conflicts have on efforts to ensure the 
continent’s long-term stability and prosperity (Annan, 2005:4). 
 
Whilst this scenario is by no means unique to Africa, the sheer magnitude and 
intensity of the crisis facing the continent is unparalleled. Approximately one-quarter 
of Africa’s fifty three states were engaged in some form of major armed conflict every 
year from the mid-1960s through to the late 1980s, peaking at a total of eighteen 
afflicted states in 1993 (ACPP, 2006:8); while it is estimated that more than half of all 
war-related deaths now occur in Africa (Annan, 1998:Para. 4). Meanwhile, two of the 
continent’s most prolonged and bloody armed conflicts continue to rage in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan respectively. These crises are 
placing immense strain on the socio-economic and political institutions in the region 
and merely serve to destabilize an already precarious situation even further. 
 
It is abundantly clear and has now become commonly accepted that there exists a 
pressing need to register further progress in efforts to address, manage and resolve the 
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issue of conflict in Africa (Cleaver & May, 1998:29). In recent times, however, the 
trend has been the devolution of this responsibility from the international community 
to Africa itself. As Juma (2006:1) points out, during the Cold War era “Africa 
assumed a central position in the geo-strategic interests and calculus of both the 
Western and Eastern blocs” and therefore received substantial attention and support 
from the superpowers. Yet, with the easing of East-West rivalry in the early 1990s, 
the continent seemed to lose its importance and slipped off the international radar to a 
large degree. This, coupled with the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping debacles in 
Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), prompted powerful Western actors to rather 
abandon Africa to its own fate (Adebajo, 2008:131). As Ambassador Sam Ibok (cited 
in Powell, 2005:17) writes: 
 
“The UN has a [self-proclaimed] global responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. In spite of this, genocide took place in 
Rwanda. It took place in Rwanda because Africans had to wait for more 
than six months for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. The same 
thing happened in Somalia, in the DRC, in Burundi, in Liberia, and in Cote 
d’Ivoire”. 
 
This so-called “Africa fatigue” has both motivated and necessitated that the 
continent’s leaders step-up to the plate and devise African solutions to African 
problems (Malan, 1999a:1). During his term as Chairman of the African Union (AU) 
2002/3 then South African President Thabo Mbeki urged member states to prioritize 
this issue, stating that “recent international events have confirmed the need for us 
Africans to do everything we can to rely on our own capacities to secure our 
continent’s renaissance” (cited in Neethling, 2006:94). To this end, the AU has 
developed and begun to implement the framework of a comprehensive continental 
peace and security architecture, described by commentators as “the most ambitious 
continental project Africa has ever seen within the areas of peace and security” 
(Bogland, Egnell & Largerström, 2008:12). At the heart of this strategy is a proposed 
African Standby Force (ASF), the modalities of which were agreed upon by the 
African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) at a meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 
May 2003 (de Coning, 2005a:84). Essentially, it is envisaged that the ASF will 
 - 3 - 
 
provide the AU with a multinational peacekeeping force capable of intervening in and 
bringing an end to serious conflicts around the continent. 
 
That being said, this new initiative is by no means the first attempt at developing an 
all-African response in this regard. Early African leaders made some effort towards 
conflict resolution though on a rather limited scale. Indeed, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration constituted a 
guiding principle of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor to the 
AU, since its inception in 1963 (OAU, 1963:Art. 3.4). However, burdened by its own 
structural incompetence and undermined by the extremely hostile context into which 
it was born, the organization enjoyed little success and was unable to firmly dictate 
the course of Africa’s development. Indeed, whatever the appeal of African solutions 
to African problems, neither the OAU nor individual African states or sub-regional 
organizations had the resources required to implement such solutions (Clapham, 
1999:28). According to Akokpari (2008:372), “unable to locate itself at the centre of 
African politics for nearly 40 years … the demise of the OAU became inevitable”. 
 
The fundamental question, then, is whether or not the AU is better placed than its 
predecessor to make a significant contribution to ensuring peace, security and stability 
on the continent. The ASF concept undoubtedly represents a major step in the right 
direction. Reflecting on decades of UN peacekeeping experience, the Report of the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000:Para. 3), otherwise known as the 
Brahimi Report, makes the important point that “no amount of good intentions can 
substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force”. That is to say, it is the 
practice of peacekeeping that creates the space within which political settlements can 
be reached and lasting peace can be built. Indeed, contemporary understandings of 
peacekeeping tend to perceive it as a multidimensional practice that incorporates a 
wide spectrum of conflict-related activities. Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004:5), for 
example, differentiate between five broad ‘types’ of peacekeeping operation that 
include tasks such as: monitoring ceasefires, implementing political settlements, 
providing humanitarian aid, enforcing the peace by military means, as well as 
assisting in the post-conflict reconstruction of affected communities. Seen from this 
perspective, peacekeeping operations form a critical component of the broader 
conflict management and resolution framework. 
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It is for this reason as well as the simple fact that the AU itself has decided to place so 
much emphasis on the development of its own peacekeeping capability vis-à-vis other 
potential conflict management mechanisms that the prospects of the ASF are so 
significant for the future of the continent in general. This is especially true given the 
extremely high incidence of violent conflict in Africa and the international 
community’s unwillingness to engage the issue directly – i.e. putting boots on the 
ground. The research question for this thesis is therefore formulated as follows: in 
light of the many potential challenges facing the organization, what is the likelihood 
that the AU will be able to implement an effective African peacekeeping capability? 
Answering this question satisfactorily necessarily entails addressing three related 
points. First, can the AU give substance to what it has committed itself to in principle? 
Second, the AU’s peace and security architecture is grounded on the notions of 
African leadership and ownership (Juma, 2006:47). Therefore, can this be a truly 
African endeavor free of dependence on the international community? Finally, can the 
ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and prove successful in tackling 
the scourge of conflict on the continent? 
 
To this end, the study will discuss three separate yet intimately related issues. First, 
what is the role of peacekeeping in conflict management? Indeed, understanding how 
and why the practice emerged, what it entails and how exactly it is practiced at 
present bear both contextual and analytical importance for a study aimed at critiquing 
the AU’s peacekeeping capability. Second, how does the AU plan on implementing 
peacekeeping to tackle the scourge of conflict? Understanding how the organization’s 
peace and security architecture is intended to function and why this is the case is a 
fundamental requirement. Finally, how have the organization’s structures and strategy 
fared during an actual peacekeeping operation? Comparing actual performance 
against the envisioned standards is the clearest method of determining the nature and 
gravity of those challenges that face the AU’s ambition of addressing conflict in 
Africa. 
 
1.2 THE PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
According to the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby 
Force and the Military Staff Committee (AU, 2003:Para. 3.11), the AU’s 
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peacekeeping capability is to be implemented over the course of two phases: Phase 1 
expired on 30 June 2005, while Phase 2 is due to be completed by 30 June 2010. This 
is an exceptionally ambitious timeframe given the complexity of the task at hand, a 
reality which is further exacerbated by the fact that, up until this point, Africa has 
never had a continental peacekeeping force or any other comparable conflict 
management structures. With the final deadline rapidly approaching, it is only logical 
that the question be asked as to whether or not the ASF will be fully operational as 
planned? Reporting on the progress made by 2008, Cilliers (2008:4) argues “it is 
unlikely that the AU will be able to meet more than the nominal targets in the two 
years that remain, without a change in the capacities that member states are prepared 
to devote to the ASF and much greater leadership and action”. 
 
With the timeline steadily shifting to the right, what does the picture look like in the 
medium- to long-term? Whether or not the AU is able to meet its short-term targets is 
not the only concern here, as projects such as this one will inevitably face myriad 
problems that delay progress. Rather, taking a more pragmatic approach, the primary 
purpose of this study is to explore a number of key issues that will likely influence the 
operationalization of the ASF concept both now and in the future. Tentatively 
assuming that all the necessary arrangements will be finalized at some point, will 
Africa be in a position to prevent and address violent conflict with recourse to its very 
own multinational peacekeeping operations? If not, why is this so? 
 
Neethling (2006:99-101) has identified a number of key challenges that the AU will 
likely have to overcome if it is to have any hope of succeeding in ensuring peace, 
security and stability in Africa. Firstly, peacekeeping is a costly undertaking and 
financial constraints pose a major concern. Even the relatively small observer 
missions deployed by the OAU in the 1990s were so expensive that they were wholly 
dependent upon donor funding (de Coning, 2005a:92). Secondly, the logistics 
involved in establishing and managing a rapid-deployment, multidimensional, and 
multinational peacekeeping capability are immense. As Cilliers (2008:4) argues, “as a 
general rule, the more multinational a force, the more difficult it is to train and 
operate. Multinational forces also take longer to deploy”. Finally, and very much 
related to the previous point, do African leaders have the political will and fortitude to 
translate political statements into reality and take action when necessary? The real 
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tragedy of what occurred in Rwanda is that it could have so easily been prevented had 
the international community or other African states truly been willing to do so. A 
further potential concern is the overwhelming emphasis placed on the military 
component of the ASF framework, potentially to the detriment of the police and 
civilian dimensions so crucial to multidimensional peacekeeping operations (de 
Coning, 2005a:86). 
 
Amidst the ongoing process to bring the ASF into fruition events on the continent 
have continued apace, merely serving to highlight the importance of the work that is 
being done. In 2003, for example, major fighting broke out in Sudan’s western region 
of Darfur and by May 2004 the number of “war-affected” civilians, the UN definition 
for those killed, raped, displaced, malnourished etc., reportedly stood at over 1 
million. The international community’s response to this crisis was muted and, given 
the growing call for the organization to take the lead in conflict-stricken areas under 
its auspices, the AU signaled its intention to establish the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) (Williams, 2006:175). Although this was not the first peacekeeping 
operation undertaken by the AU – the OAU/AU has been actively involved in 
Burundi since 1993 and these efforts were further enhanced with the deployment of 
the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in February 2003 (Powell, 2005:34) – 
commentators argue that Darfur has become the single most important regional setting 
for AU peacekeepers in recent times and has brought to light a number of lessons that 
require careful analysis and study (Neethling, 2006:101). 
 
This, then, is the primary point of departure in the study’s attempt to determine the 
prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability. As the saying goes, ‘the 
devil is in the detail’ and it is the assertion of this study that the clearest indication of 
what the future may possibly entail can best be obtained by scrutinizing the manner in 
which the theory has been put into practice in the present. Despite the fact that AMIS 
was deployed well in advance of the scheduled implementation deadline for the ASF, 
the analysis thereof can nonetheless provide valuable information looking forward. 
Indeed, the challenges faced by the AU in Darfur are likely to be generic and 
applicable elsewhere. As de Coning (2004, 26) argues: 
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“More research on the type of peacekeeping missions African institutions 
are likely to undertake will enable all stakeholders in the international 
peacekeeping system to position and adjust their own capacities 
accordingly. It will enable the AU, the various sub-regional organizations, 
the individual African countries, the UN and the various donor countries 
that have an interest in building African capacity in the peacekeeping field, 
to focus their policy development and capacity-building efforts on those 
modalities, mechanisms, equipment, training and preparations that will 
best enable Africa to undertake missions within its chosen framework and 
scope. This should result in a much more focused approach, which in a 
resource-weak continent like ours, will have a bigger impact and result … 
in increasing the chances of success.” 
 
This point is echoed by Bogland et al (2008:45), who assert that: 
 
“One obvious study that will be of great interest is the illustration and 
evaluation of the peace-support missions that the AU has carried out and 
those that are ongoing. These studies also provide an increased 
understanding of the AU’s capacity development, as any shortcomings 
soon become obvious when the organization is forced out into the field.” 
 
It is hoped, therefore, that this study will contribute in some way to the growing 
international debate surrounding peace and security on the continent and Africa’s 
ability to ensure its own future prosperity and development. Indeed, the findings from 
this research could help those in relevant government, military and bureaucratic 
positions of authority in their quest to establish an effective African peacekeeping 
capability. In addressing some of the major challenges that are likely to impede this 
process, as well as tentatively highlighting a possible way forward in this regard, the 
findings presented here may, at a minimum, be able to point to those areas that require 
further attention and conceptual development by those better placed to do so. 
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1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is a qualitative analysis that comprises both descriptive and exploratory 
aspects. It is based upon an extensive review of related literature in the fields of peace 
and security, peacekeeping and conflict management more broadly, conflict in Africa, 
as well as the situation in Darfur. Both primary and secondary sources have been 
utilised, although emphasis has undoubtedly been placed on incorporating primary 
texts. Indeed, the research question, whether or not the AU will be able to implement 
an effective African peacekeeping capability, necessarily entails adopting an 
organizational level approach. Therefore, key UN, OAU and AU documents as well 
as other official sources have been consulted where appropriate. Secondary sources 
consist primarily of academic journal articles, publications and books containing 
commentaries on and analyses of those topics introduced above, produced by 
respected authors in their respective fields. No questionnaires, interviews, focus 
groups or similar forms of fieldwork were conducted in order to support this research. 
 
The notion that peacekeeping forms an integral part of wider conflict management 
and resolution strategies is the central analytical framework of this study. In terms of 
the research question, then, this argument is duly considered and further extended to 
the African context. The AU deployment in Darfur has been specifically chosen as a 
case-study as it is the organization’s first large-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping 
operation and an assessment thereof is arguably well-placed to shed light on those 
issues which are likely to influence the AU’s capacity to engage in similar endeavours 
both in the short- and in the long-term. The unit of analysis is therefore the 
continental/regional peacekeeping capability, while the level of analysis is the AU as 
an organization. In terms of the time dimension, this study is very much cross-
sectional. While the period of analysis stretches back to the formation of the OAU in 
1963 and further looks ahead to what the future may hold for the AU’s peacekeeping 
capability, the findings are written from the perspective of the present (2009). 
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The remaining sections in this study are presented over the course of four chapters. As 
the title would suggest, Chapter 2 aims to highlight the primacy of peacekeeping as a 
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practice in conflict management strategies. To this end, the notion as it is understood 
in this study is first conceptualized. Thereafter, a brief introduction as to how and why 
peacekeeping emerged as well as its intended purpose is offered. Special attention is 
given to the pioneering role played by the UN in this regard. The chapter further 
attempts to explain how the evolving security context since the end of the Cold War 
era has precipitated an evolution in peacekeeping’s role. Here, the notions of 
international security and non-interference are juxtaposed with human security and 
the emerging responsibility to protect doctrine. The chapter then concludes with a 
description of peacekeeping in its contemporary, multidimensional guise. The 
underlying purpose, then, is to contextualize the discussions that follow in Chapters 3 
and 4. 
 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to addressing the AU’s emerging peace and security 
architecture. Before this, however, the chapter begins by looking at the relatively 
recent trend of regional organizations and other similar actors taking on ever 
increasing responsibility in ensuring international peace and security vis-à-vis the UN. 
The development of African conflict management mechanisms and peacekeeping 
endeavours is then traced from the formation of the OAU in 1963 to the present. 
Thereafter, the salient features of the AU framework, including the Common African 
Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and 
the ASF, are described. Finally, Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the role 
envisaged for the international community within this ambitious strategy to address 
African problems with African solutions. 
 
In many respects, Chapter 4 represents the crux of the study. Having identified the 
central issues relevant to peacekeeping and laid-out the AU’s proposed peace and 
security architecture in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, Chapter 4 aims to shed some 
light on the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability. To this end, the 
AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur is assessed. The chapter therefore begins by 
providing a brief historical introduction to the conflict in that region. This is followed 
by a discussion of the AU mission, from AMIS I through to AMIS II and eventually 
the end of the operation’s mandate in December 2007. Finally, the various issues that 
the AU experienced during the course of this operation, such as political will, 
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institutional capacity, financial constraints, and the organization’s own limited scope, 
are all addressed. 
  
Chapter 5 is an evaluation of the study. It presents a summary of what has been 
discussed within the previous chapters and then aims to highlight the key findings that 
were made. Most notably, reference is made to those challenges that are likely to 
constrain the AU’s ability to successfully conduct large-scale, multidimensional 
peacekeeping operations looking forward. The chapter seeks to answer the questions: 
can the AU give substance to what it has committed itself to in principle; can this be a 
truly African endeavor free of dependence on the international community; and, can 
the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and prove successful in 
tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent? The extreme significance of political 
will in this regard is also emphasized. 
 
 
 
 - 11 - 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 THE PRIMACY OF PEACEKEEPING IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For better or worse, the notion of peacekeeping is inextricably linked in common 
perceptions with war, violent conflict and other similar crises. Central to such 
perceptions is the role played by the UN in this regard. As Bellamy et al (2004:45) 
argue, “although peacekeeping is an activity undertaken by many different actors, its 
history and development is intimately tied to the UN. Indeed, peacekeeping is often 
seen as being synonymous with UN operations”. The basic image of a contingent of 
soldiers donning the famous blue beret or distinctive blue helmet with the initials 
‘UN’ emblazoned on the side as they dutifully keep watch in some or other conflict-
ravaged territory is extremely well known. In reality, however, the notion of 
peacekeeping is far more complex. According to Bellamy et al (2004:4), 
“peacekeeping, in all its guises, reflects a desire to limit the scourge of war”.  Yet, 
given the many differing conceptions regarding the nature and causes of violent 
conflict and variable levels of political will to address these issues, debate about what 
peacekeeping is for and what strategies should be employed continue to rage. 
 
Indeed, there has been very little agreement regarding the desired role, if any, that 
peacekeeping should play. The concept cuts to the core of many issues which lie at 
the heart of our contemporary society and purportedly matter a great deal to the 
world’s major powers – peace and security; justice; state sovereignty and political 
independence; socio-economic development; and, human rights – and is therefore 
rather controversial. Writing on the state of peacekeeping in the early 1980s, Indar Jit 
Rikhye (1984:1), a former Indian Army officer who played a central role in the very 
first UN peacekeeping operations, notes: “in spite of several attempts, the term 
‘peacekeeping’ has still not been formally defined. This lack of clear definition 
provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes. But, 
there are corresponding disadvantages in that the term can be loosely used and 
vaguely understood”. More than twenty years on, this statement is as true today as it 
was then. 
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Perhaps the single most significant point when considering the development of 
peacekeeping, however, is the fact that it was ultimately born of necessity as an 
improvised response on the part of the international community to address conflict 
(UN, 1996:3). As Marten (2004:25) quite rightly points out, the concept of 
peacekeeping does not appear in the Charter of the United Nations and it was only in 
February 1965, after eight peacekeeping missions had already been deployed by the 
world body, that the term was finally formalized with the establishment of the UN’s 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Rikhye, 1984:1). As the UN 
(2008:8) itself acknowledges, peacekeeping has for the longest time been conducted 
according to a largely unwritten body of principles informed by the experiences of the 
many thousands of individuals who have served on such operations throughout the 
world. Simply put, peacekeeping is a case-in-point of learning by doing. 
 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to provide a descriptive insight into the 
development of the complex notion of peacekeeping. This will hopefully serve to 
contextualize as well as aid in the understanding of the technical and practical 
discussions that follow in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. With this in mind, the 
chapter begins by first conceptualizing peacekeeping itself. Thereafter, the significant 
role played by the UN in the modern development of peacekeeping is addressed. This 
is followed by a discussion of the contemporary shift in perceptions of security, with 
particular emphasis on human security and the emergence of the new international 
norm known as the responsibility to protect. The chapter then concludes by focusing 
on the role played by so-called multidimensional peacekeeping and how this differs 
from the first generation operations originally undertaken by the world body and other 
actors. 
 
2.2 PEACEKEEPING DEFINED 
 
Peacekeeping is a notoriously difficult notion to conceptualize. This is due, in part, to 
the fact that the practice has evolved so significantly over the course of its six-decade 
history and has therefore been used as somewhat of a ‘catch-all’ or umbrella term for 
an exceptionally wide spectrum of activities. This reality is reflected in the abundance 
of definitions that is presented in the literature and the fact that the term has never 
been given a fixed and detailed meaning. The most common way of thinking 
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conceptually about peacekeeping is to identify it broadly in terms of its 
characteristics, functions and types (Quinn cited in Jett, 1999:14; Lewis cited in Jett, 
1999:15). As has already been mentioned, this approach is epitomized by Bellamy et 
al (2004:5) who identify five different ‘types’ of peacekeeping operation, each 
conceptualized independently of one another. These are: traditional peacekeeping; 
managing transition; wider peacekeeping; peace enforcement; and, peace-support 
operations. 
 
Other commentators have adopted a chronological approach. Francis, Faal, Kabia & 
Ramsbotham (2005:14), for example, seek to distinguish in broad terms between first 
and second generation peacekeeping conducted during and after the Cold War 
respectively. Richmond (2001:34) goes one step further and includes the recent 
development of so-called “third generation quasi-enforcement” operations to the mix. 
Moreover, Wiseman (cited in Francis et al, 2005:15) traces the development of the 
practice through five separate phases: the nascent phase, the assertive phase, the 
dormant phase, the resurgent phase, and the maintenance phase. In contrast, some 
have chosen to be far more specific in how they define the practice (Links, 2000:7; 
Goulding cited in Links, 2000:8; Mboma cited in Links, 2000:7). The International 
Peace Academy (cited in Rikhye, 1984:1), for example, defined peacekeeping as: 
 
“the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities 
between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party 
intervention organized and directed internally, using multinational forces 
of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace”. 
 
Heldt & Wallensteen (2006:11), on the other hand, offer the following definition 
of peacekeeping: 
 
“a third-party state intervention that involves the deployment of military 
troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state … 
established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring 
ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the 
security situation … between formerly, potentially, or presently warring 
parties”. 
 - 14 - 
 
 
While these various approaches and definitions undoubtedly possess their own merits 
and shortcomings, a fuller discussion of this issue is simply beyond the scope of this 
study. Suffice it to say that the most appropriate definition for the current purpose is 
one that adequately encapsulates peacekeeping’s many permutations. Indeed, the UN 
(2008:18) notes that “over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily 
military model … to incorporate a complex model of many elements … working 
together to lay the foundation for sustainable peace”. This point is echoed by O’Niell 
& Rees (2005:6) who argue that, “categorization also creates the impression that 
operations had clear, specific objectives” when in reality mandates were, and are, 
fluid. As such, and following Diehl (cited in O’Niell & Rees, 2005:5), this study 
conceptualizes peacekeeping as: any international effort involving an operational 
component – i.e. putting boots on the ground – that aims to prevent or terminate any 
conflict or dispute. 
 
Breaking with convention, this definition is intentionally broad and lacks reference to 
various phases in the development of peacekeeping. Rather, it identifies three key 
elements central to the practice of peacekeeping. Firstly, peacekeeping is conducted 
by international actors, thus differentiating it from domestic law enforcement or 
similar activities conducted by a government within its own borders. Secondly, it 
involves deploying troops or other individuals on the ground and is therefore 
altogether different than employing diplomacy in a peacemaking role. Finally, 
peacekeeping involves a wide array of activities, which may require military, police 
and civilian staff. 
 
2.3 ORIGINS & EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Established in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the UN’s principle 
aim is to “maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (UN, 1945:Art. 1.1). 
As the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (1945), hereafter simply 
referred to as the UN Charter, rather more succinctly notes, the organization’s 
founders were determined to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, 
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which … has brought untold sorrow to mankind”. Bellamy et al (2004:70) argue, that 
“the catastrophic loss of life and physical devastation caused by the war, coupled with 
the invention of the atomic bomb, convinced international leaders that international 
organization was more necessary than ever”. Reflecting this commitment to the 
promotion and maintenance of peace and security across the globe, the UN’s 
overriding concern is that all disputes between states be settled by peaceful means. 
Indeed, Article 2.3 (UN, 1945), relating to the organization’s underlying principles, 
states that, “all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”. 
 
More importantly, Chapter VI of the UN Charter (1945) makes provision for such 
matters to be settled through internal mechanisms. According to Article 34 (UN, 
1945), the UN Security Council, the organ tasked with the primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security (UN, 1945:Art. 24.1), may investigate 
any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction; while both 
member and non-member states alike may bring any dispute or similar situation to the 
attention of the world body (UN, 1945:Art. 35). The Security Council is further 
empowered to call upon parties to settle their dispute by means of negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement; or to recommend 
any other appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment with a view to the pacific 
settlement of the dispute (UN, 1945:Art. 33; Art. 36; Art. 37; Art. 38). 
 
Although peaceful relations between states was and remains the UN’s primary aim to 
this day, its founders had envisaged that the organization should nonetheless represent 
a strong and viable military force capable of combating any threat. According to 
MacQueen (2002:3), the intention at this stage was that the UN “would deploy 
military power as a forceful instrument in a global system of collective security”, 
exercising direct control over international armed forces. Central to these plans was 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945), pertaining to “Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. As per Article 39 (UN, 
1945), the Security Council is responsible for determining the existence of any such 
threat requiring collective security action as well as deciding what measures shall be 
taken in order to maintain or restore the peace. As MacQueen (2002:4) further notes, 
the enforcement options available to the UN follow an escalating scale. At one end of 
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the spectrum are non-military measures, such as the complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of all means of communication as well as the severance of 
diplomatic relations (UN, 1945:Art. 41); while, at the other end of the spectrum, 
Article 42 (UN, 1945) empowers the Security Council to restore international peace 
and security forcefully with recourse to the air, sea and land forces of member states. 
 
The high ambition of a global collective security arrangement was, however, simply 
incompatible with the bipolarity that came to characterize international relations in the 
post-war years (MacQueen, 2002:4). Indeed, during the early days of the UN the Cold 
War between East and West prevented the Security Council from fully developing 
and employing its potential to enforce the peace. The major stumbling block in this 
regard was the use of the veto accorded to the five permanent members – China, 
France, the USSR, the UK and the USA (UN, 1945:Art. 23) – which blocked a 
number of such efforts and all but paralyzed the Security Council (Rikhye, 1984:3). 
As Rikhye (1984:3) notes, the UN Charter had envisaged that unanimity of purpose, 
namely the desire to avoid a reoccurrence of the extreme levels of violence and 
destruction witnessed during the two World Wars, would provide sufficient political 
will to empower the organization to keep and enforce the peace when necessary. Yet, 
this common goal soon succumbed to the pressure of competing ideological interests. 
With the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, at 
opposite ends of this spectrum any hope of viable collective security was severely 
undermined. In such a divided international system virtually all crises were seen 
through the opposed ideological lenses of the two sides and neither consensus nor 
cooperation could be achieved (MacQueen, 2002:4). 
 
Given this state of affairs the Security Council was forced to resort to other measures 
to promote and preserve the peace, such as the good offices of the UN Secretary-
General, conciliation, mediation and the like (UN, 1996:4). Such measures could be 
considered classic Chapter VI-type initiatives; yet, used in isolation, these often 
proved wholly inadequate and the ability to project viable military strength remained 
crucial. By the early 1950s, however, it was clear that if the UN was to have any 
meaningful security role during the Cold War it would have to be in a form other than 
that of collective security enforcement as had originally been envisaged (MacQueen, 
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2002:5). As the organization’s experience in Korea highlights, the situation had 
simply become untenable.1 
 
It was in the aftermath of this fiasco that the notion of peacekeeping was born. Former 
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, a central figure in the development of the 
practice, famously described peacekeeping as characterizing Chapter VI ½ of the UN 
Charter. That is, lying somewhere between the peaceful techniques of Chapter VI, 
such as mediation and fact-finding, and the more robust methods of Chapter VII, 
including military intervention (Francis et al, 2005:9-10). As Francis et al (2005:15) 
rightly point out, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was the first force-
level mission specifically characterized as a peacekeeping operation. Deployed in 
November 1956, UNEF was a military operation tasked with securing and supervising 
the cessation of hostilities after the British and French invasion of and Israeli attack 
on Egypt, as well as acting as a buffer between Egypt and Israel after the latter 
withdrew its armed forces from the territory of the former (UN, 1996:37).2 
 
Significantly, the official view of the UN is that two earlier missions to the Middle 
East and the Indian sub-continent respectively should also be classed as peacekeeping 
operations – despite the fact that the concept had yet to be explicitly developed (UN, 
1996:v). The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was deployed 
to Palestine in June 1948 and consisted of unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs) 
dispatched by the Security Council in order to supervise the truce during the first 
Arab-Israeli War. A similar group – the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) – was deployed a few months later in January 1949 
in order to supervise a cease-fire between the two countries following their conflict 
over the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir (O’Niell & Rees, 2005:23). Although 
                                                 
1 The Korean War (1950 – 1953) was fought between North Korea and eventually China against a so-
called UN collective security force that sought to actively defend South Korea from forced unification 
with the North. In reality, however, this so-called UN force was a Western coalition dominated and led 
by the United States. Its UN identity was only possible because the Soviet Union had been absent from 
a crucial Security Council meeting and could therefore not veto the action. The USSR’s proposal that 
communist China, not a member of the UN at this time, be allowed to participate in the debate 
pertaining to Korea had earlier been rejected, thus prompting a walk-out by the Soviet delegation. 
 
2 The two European powers had invaded Egypt after it had nationalized the Suez Canal, previously 
owned by an Anglo-French company, in retaliation for the withdrawal of Western funding for the 
ambitious Aswan Dam irrigation project; while Israel had earlier been prompted to attack Egypt in 
order to provide a pretext for the Anglo-French intervention. 
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these two operations did not comprise peacekeeping forces as such, they were 
nonetheless based on methods of observation and interposition that were to become 
characteristic of the classic peacekeeping model that later emerged (MacQueen, 
2002:5). 
 
Peacekeeping, as represented by UNEF and already suggested by UNTSO and 
UNMOGIP before it, took a markedly different approach to addressing conflict than 
that of enforcement by means of collective military action. This model is based on 
three fundamental principles. Namely: the consent of the protagonists to a UN 
mission, political impartiality on the part of the UN forces, as well as the non-use of 
armed force except in self-defence (Francis et al, 2005:10). Moreover, such operations 
are further characterized by their multinational composition. UNEF, for instance, 
consisted of contingents from thirteen different countries (UN, 1996:42). Underlying 
this traditional model of peacekeeping is the premise that an impartial presence on the 
ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political 
negotiations to occur (UN, 2003:1). Simply put, by facilitating an opportunity for the 
belligerents to cease fighting, peacekeeping allows for fresh avenues towards peace to 
be explored (UN, 1996:4). According to Bellamy et al (2004:5) such traditional 
peacekeeping does not propose or enforce particular political solutions; rather, such 
operations by and large serve as interposal buffers between warring parties, acting in a 
confidence-building capacity as visible deterrents (Francis et al, 2005:14). 
 
2.4 TOWARDS A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH 
 
Peacekeeping is ultimately a matter of security. As the discussion up to this point as 
well as the term itself would suggest, the principal aim of peacekeeping is simply that 
– to keep the peace. According to the UN Human Development Report (1994:1), 
however, “the world will never be secure from war if men and women have no 
security in their daily lives”. The distinction attempting to be drawn at this stage is 
between aim and method, between one’s goal and how one intends on achieving said 
goal. As such, the practice of peacekeeping can best be described as precautions or 
measures taken to provide security and thus ensure peace. Central to such efforts, 
then, is what is understood by the notion of security as well as the normative debate 
regarding how it can best be achieved. For current purposes, the most important point 
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to recognize is that the understanding of security has evolved from the longstanding 
state-centric model predominant during the two World Wars as well as the Cold War, 
to a far more holistic and people-centred approach. 
 
Intimately linked to this debate is the issue of peace enforcement and the international 
community’s ‘right’ to intervene in conflict situations. The form of intervention 
referred to here is that conducted for the ‘right reasons’ – specifically, for 
humanitarian purposes or in defence of human security more generally. So-called 
humanitarian intervention is one of the single most contentious issues in the debate 
regarding peacekeeping. Indeed, there have been many calls for such action over the 
last two decades and the practice has courted controversy both when it has happened 
(i.e. Kosovo and Somalia) as well as when it has failed to happen (i.e. Rwanda and 
Bosnia) (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.1). Disagreement continues to rage as to whether or not 
such a right exists, as well as how and when it should be exercised, and under whose 
authority (ICISS, 2001:vii). 
 
2.4.1 Human security 
 
The conventional approach to security was based upon the notion of international 
security. While our world is characterized by a host of states that constitute the greater 
political order, this has not always been the case. The state system as we know it 
today is a relatively modern invention and it was largely only since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 that the state itself became the predominant form of political 
organization in Europe, from where it continued to spread across the globe, 
culminating in the process of decolonization and state formation at the end of the 20th 
century (van Creveld, 1991; 49 - 50). Essential to the state model’s rise to prominence 
was the success of government – the administrative face of the state – in acquiring 
five monopolies. Namely: control over the instruments of violence and the legitimate 
use thereof; the sole right to tax citizens; the prerogative of ordering the political 
allegiances of citizens, as well as enlisting their support during times of war; the right 
to adjudicate in disputes between citizens; and, exclusive representation in the 
international community, thus binding society to international law (Bellamy et al., 
2004; 22). With the rise of states as the single most important and powerful political 
entity a host of new issues emerged, such as the formal or legal status of states 
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themselves as well as the relationships that exist between them. As van Creveld 
(1991; 49) notes, “states are artificial creations; corporate bodies that possess an 
independent legal existence separate from the people to whom they belong and whose 
organized life they claim to represent”. 
 
International security, then, refers to the security of states as actors in their own right. 
It takes a predominantly militaristic outlook and is concerned with defending the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the state. Indeed, these 
very principles are enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 2.1 (UN, 1945), for example, 
proclaims that “the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of 
all its members”; whilst Article 2.4 (UN, 1945) states that “all members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state”. Reflecting these two principles, the 
UN Charter (1945:Art. 2.7) goes on to assert that no part thereof authorizes the UN to 
intervene in matters that essentially fall within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, 
nor shall member states be required to submit such matters to the organization for 
settlement. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, however, the international community began to face a 
considerably different security environment. As has been widely recognized, the 
dynamic forces of globalization taking hold at the time served to highlight a number 
of pressing issues that had otherwise been neglected, calling the traditional focus on 
international security into serious doubt. Paraphrasing former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s groundbreaking report An Agenda for Peace, Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992:Para. 11; Para. 12; Para. 13), the 
rapid diffusion of technology; the development of advanced means of communication; 
the growth in global commerce and financial interdependence; as well as the decisions 
of states to yield sovereign prerogatives to regional and international political and 
economic associations all served to blur previously steadfast national boundaries. 
Moreover, the status and cohesion of the state was further challenged by fierce new 
assertions of nationalism and sovereignty; an exponential growth in brutal ethnic, 
religious, socio-cultural and linguistic intra-state conflicts; as well as acts of terrorism; 
and, the proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. Added 
to these concerns was a new found appreciation of the devastating effects to peace and 
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security of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to free trade, 
drug trafficking, the growing disparity between rich and poor, disease, environmental 
degradation, and famine. 
 
It is here that the notion of human security vis-à-vis international security comes to 
the fore. Proponents of the former argue that the latter simply ignores the root causes 
of conflicts and also fails to take account of the security of individuals and non-
military threats, which are the dominant form of insecurity especially in the 
developing world. The UN Human Development Report (1994:22) tackles this issue 
head-on and sets out in no uncertain terms what exactly the concept of entails. First 
and foremost, it notes that the concept of security has for far too long been narrowly 
interpreted in terms of threats to a country’s borders and the potential for conflicts 
between states; that the interests of nation-states were prioritized, whilst the legitimate 
concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their everyday lives was forgotten. 
 
Central to these most basic concerns are whether or not individuals and their families 
will have enough to eat; whether they will lose their jobs; whether their streets and 
neighborhoods will be safe from crime; whether they will be persecuted by a 
repressive state; whether they will become a victim of violence because of their 
gender; or whether their religion or ethnic origin will make them a target for 
discrimination. That being said, four important characteristics of human security can 
be identified (UN, 1994:22). First, it is a universal concern, in that the types of threats 
that it entails are common to all people in all parts of the world. Second, the 
components of human security are interdependent: when the security of people is 
endangered anywhere in the world it affects us all, as the likes of famine, disease, 
pollution, drug trafficking, economic recession and terrorism are not contained by 
national boundaries. Third, it is far easier to ensure human security through preventive 
action then through later intervention. And, finally, human security is a people-
centered concept that prioritizes the wellbeing of individuals and communities. 
 
The underlying hypothesis of this new understanding of security is neatly summarized 
by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2000:17), who rather eloquently argues 
that more must be done to ensure the freedom of all people – freedom from fear as 
well as freedom from want. Therefore, while it may be true that peace is a necessary 
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precondition for effective development, it is also true that the absence of development 
severely threatens the long-term sustainability of peace. This point is echoed by the 
Brahimi Report (UN, 2000:Para. 28), which states that “history has taught that 
peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners … while the peacebuilders 
may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have 
no exit without the peacebuilders’ work”. The argument being that human deprivation 
is the root cause of conflict and violence – particularly when disparities, whether real 
or perceived, exist between distinct communities. As such, it is argued that 
successfully meeting the objective of spreading peace around the globe requires the 
integration of the peace and development agendas (UN, 1994:iii). 
 
That is not to say, however, that these are altogether new ideas.3 Yet, once again, the 
ideological rivalry of the Cold War era and the associated antagonism between East 
and West meant that human security was obscured as national interest came to trump 
all other concerns (Alkire, 2003:38). As the Human Development Report (1994:22) 
echoes, “the superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle – fighting a Cold 
War all over the world [and] the developing nations, having won their independence 
only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national 
identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives”. As such, it was only the rapidly changing security 
context that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War that forced fresh 
issues and ideas on to the international agenda. 
 
2.4.2 The responsibility to protect 
 
One of the most unsettling trends associated with contemporary conflict has been the 
dramatic increase in the vulnerability of civilians, whom are often deliberately 
targeted by combatants. Indeed, the number of human rights abuses related to such 
conflicts is almost unthinkable. In some instances the permanent displacement and/or 
extermination of civilian populations has been the primary objective of the conflict; 
whilst rape has deliberately and systematically been used as weapon of terror in order 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, the Premable to the UN Charter (1945), which addresses the notions of human 
rights and socio-economic development; as well as, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 
1945). 
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to provoke exclusion. Moreover, regimes themselves have launched campaigns of 
terror on their own populations, in the name of ideology, racial, religious or ethnic 
hatred as well as simply for personal gain and plunder; whilst in other cases they have 
supported campaigns of terror aimed at the populations of other countries, resulting in 
massive destruction and loss of life (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.19). Thus, the question 
arises: when, if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular 
military – action against another state for the purpose of protecting human security 
(ICISS, 2001:vii)? The point is simply that, no matter how noble or necessary the 
ends may be, does the international community have a right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state? 
 
Central to this debate is Annan’s report We the Peoples, more commonly referred to 
as the UN Millennium Report, in which he considers the desired role of the 
organization at the dawn of the 21st century. As he (2000:47) notes, although 
intervention necessarily comprises a wide continuum of responses ranging from 
diplomacy to military action, it is the prospect of the latter that has sparked untold 
controversy. It is argued that such coercive action would set a dangerous precedent 
and undermine one of the central tenets underpinning the world in which we live. The 
primary concern being that that just pretexts may be used as cover to disguise far 
more selfish motives and lead to gratuitous interference in the affairs of sovereign 
states.4 In considering this dilemma, the former Secretary-General (Annan, 2000:48) 
posed the extremely difficult question that “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every 
precept of our common humanity”? He (Annan, 2000:48) further continues that, while 
“humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not 
susceptible to easy answers … surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can 
ever shield crimes against humanity”? 
 
It was in response to this challenge that the Canadian government, together with a 
group of major international foundations, announced at the UN General Assembly in 
September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention 
                                                 
4 The recent US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are possible examples in this regard. 
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and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (ICISS, 2001: vii). Broadly speaking, the commission 
sought to “build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention 
for human protection purposes and sovereignty … to try to develop a global political 
consensus on how to move from polemics – and often paralysis – towards action 
within the international system” (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.7). The eventual outcome of this 
process was a momentous report entitled The Responsibility to Protect, which has 
come to form the basis of the so-called R2P doctrine. As the title would suggest, the 
primary contribution the ICISS sought to make was to shift the terms of the debate, 
focusing on both the responsibilities as well as the rights of states. 
 
The underlying argument presented in the report revolves around the rather difficult 
concept of state sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, sovereignty has traditionally been 
understood in Westphalian terms – as comprising the legal identity of a state in 
international law (ICISS, 2001:Para. 2.7). For many states, however, it is more than a 
simple functional principle of international relations. Rather, it is “recognition of their 
equal worth and dignity, a protection of their unique identities and their national 
freedom, and an affirmation of their right to shape and determine their own destiny” 
(ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.32). However, the conditions in which the world now finds itself 
and the challenges that it therefore faces have changed dramatically since the Cold 
War era. This point is echoed by Annan (2000:11) who argues that, “our post-War 
institutions were built for an inter-national world, but we now live in a global world. 
Responding effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge for world leaders 
today”. (Original emphasis) 
 
It is in this light that The Responsibility to Protect (2001:Para. 2.14) sought to re-
characterize the notion of sovereignty, “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as 
responsibility”. As the report (ICISS, 2001: Para. 2.15) continues, thinking of the 
concept in this manner bears a threefold significance. Firstly, it implies that the state 
and its agents are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of 
citizens and the promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it implies that national political 
authorities are both responsible to their citizens internally as well as to the 
international community externally, via institutions such as the UN. And finally, state 
authorities are responsible for their actions and can be held accountable for both their 
acts of commission and omission. Following this logic, the R2P doctrine holds that 
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the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. This 
fact reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the 
practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive contribution (ICISS, 
2001:Para. 2.30). 
 
It is further argued, however, that a residual responsibility also lies with the broader 
community of states. This argument is based on both moral and practical grounds and 
is underpinned by the notion of human security discussed above. As the report (ICISS, 
2001:Para. 1.28) notes, “there is a growing recognition worldwide that the protection 
of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the 
fundamental objectives of modern international institutions”. Linked to this point is 
the recognition that “human security is indeed indivisible [and that] there is no longer 
such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring in ‘in a faraway country of 
which we know little’” (ICISS, 2001:Para. 1.21). Rather, in a world as interdependent 
as ours, the existence of fragile and failed states as well as those, who through 
weakness or ill-will, harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only 
maintain order by means of gross human rights violations, constitute a risk to people 
everywhere. It is therefore argued that, where a population is suffering serious harm 
as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in 
question is either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect or is itself 
the actual perpetrator of such crimes, the responsibility to act falls to the international 
community (ICISS, 2001:Para. 2.31). 
 
Thus, it was proposed that the responsibility to protect entails three integral and 
essential components. Firstly, there exists a responsibility to prevent, by means of 
addressing both the root causes as well as the direct causes of internal conflicts and 
other man-made crises threatening populations. Secondly, there is a responsibility to 
react. This entails responding to situations of compelling human need with 
appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures such as sanctions, 
international criminal prosecution, as well as military force. Thirdly, the international 
community bears the responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military 
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intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation in order 
to address the original causes of the crisis and prevent a relapse (ICISS, 2001:xi).5 
 
This stated willingness to embrace the concept of humanitarian intervention is 
reinforced by its inclusion in the recent United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
Principles and Guidelines (UN, 2008), otherwise known as the Capstone Doctrine. 
Reminiscent of the collective security role originally envisaged for the world body at 
its inception, the notion of peace enforcement is referred to along side preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as an integral component 
of the broader framework of peace operations. It is conceptualized as “the application, 
with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, 
including the use of military force” (UN, 2008:18), intended to restore international 
peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the 
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. According 
to the UN (2008:34), one should be careful not to confuse robust peacekeeping with 
peace enforcement.6 In practice, however, such theoretical distinctions are often 
blurred in practice. As Furley & May (1998b:7) argue: 
 
“There is always a danger that a peacekeeping mission will find itself 
converted into a peace enforcement operation … Peace enforcement is 
a different kind of intervention, yet in Africa this type of ‘mission 
creep’ has been seen so often.” 
 
2.5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING 
 
As has already been observed, peacekeeping emerged as a pragmatic and somewhat 
ad hoc response by the UN to address the growing issue of inter-state conflict. In a 
                                                 
5 The findings and recommendations of The Responsibility to Protect were those of the ICISS alone 
and are therefore not binding. However, the R2P doctrine ultimately formed an integral part of the 
larger UN reform package that was agreed upon at the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly in 
2005. For further information, see the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change (UN, 2004:Para. 200; Para. 201) and the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (2005:Para. 
138; Para. 139) 
 
6 Whilst the former is authorized to use force at the tactical level in order to deter forceful attempts at 
disrupting the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat and assist local authorities in 
maintaining law and order; the latter, does not require the consent of the main parties to the conflict and 
involves the use of force at the strategic level in order to bring about an end to hostilities.  
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time of intense confrontation, peacekeeping allowed the world body to take some 
form of action towards achieving its mandate of maintaining international peace and 
security – albeit with one hand tied behind its back. As the UN Under Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéheno (cited in UN, 2008:8), 
notes, over the last sixty years this rudimentary technique has evolved into one of the 
primary tools used by the international community to manage and resolve complex 
crises. Three key points relating to peacekeeping’s contemporary role can be drawn 
from this statement. Firstly, peacekeeping as a practice has evolved from the 
traditional model already discussed; secondly, the focus of peacekeeping operations 
has broadened beyond inter-state conflict; and, finally, peacekeeping has grown from 
humble beginnings into a complex, global undertaking. As Johnstone, Tortolani and 
Gowan (2005:56) argue, the underlying principles of traditional peacekeeping have 
been thrown into question by a rapidly changing security environment and the 
practice has been significantly adapted over the years in order to meet the various 
challenges posed by a number of extremely different conflict situations. Indeed, 
peacekeeping in the 21st century has in many ways surpassed the traditional model of 
monitoring cease-fires and creating space. According to the UN (2003:1), it is now a 
multidimensional activity. 
 
The turning point came with the abrupt end of the Cold War and the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In An Agenda 
for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992:Para. 2; 
Para. 8), otherwise known as the Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged that 
the adversarial decades of the Cold War had made the original promise of the UN 
almost impossible to fulfil. Yet, with the fall of the Iron Curtain the immense 
ideological barrier that had given rise to the extreme levels of distrust and hostility 
between East and West collapsed, presenting an unprecedented opportunity to once 
again commit to the principles of the UN Charter and work toward achieving its 
purpose. In many ways the first years after the end of the Cold War seemed to point 
towards a new role for the UN and the unprecedented accord within the Security 
Council provoked a quantum leap in peacekeeping operations (Francis et al, 2005:15). 
Between 1988 and 1992, for example, a total of 13 new operations were launched, as 
many as had been undertaken during the previous 40 years of the UN’s existence 
(Francis et al, 2005:16). More importantly, however, this changing global context also 
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presented a number of new challenges to and insights regarding the promotion and 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
The most obvious and disconcerting trend at this time was the exponential growth in 
the number of intra-state conflicts. Although such conflicts have historically been 
more common than the inter-state variety, the difference between the two increased 
dramatically in the periods leading up to and directly following the end of the Cold 
War.7 As was already mentioned in the introduction to this paper, in Africa alone a 
total of 18 states were afflicted by some form of major internal conflict in one year 
during this period (ACPP, 2006:8); while, worldwide, this figure is close to 50 states. 
According to the UN (2004:Para. 5), the rise of intra-state conflict as the single most 
significant form of warfare during this period was symptomatic of the crises of 
capacity and legitimacy that many states around the world came to experience as the 
political landscape that had characterized international relations for the best part of a 
century seemingly crumbled beneath them. 
 
Whilst peacekeeping may have initially been developed as a means of dealing with 
inter-state conflict, the international community simply could not ignore the realities 
on the ground and was forced to take action. Indeed, peacekeeping has increasingly 
been used in intra-state conflicts and civil wars – the number of such operations rising 
from less than 10 in the late 1980s to a peak of more than 30 in little more than a 
decade.8 As Johnstone et al (2005:57) argue, peacekeeping emerged from this period 
as the primary tool tasked with managing the chaos and confusion associated with the 
aftermath of the Cold War – most notably in Africa, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Significantly, this shift in the nature of conflict necessitated a breach of the previously 
sacred principles of state sovereignty and traditional consent-based peacekeeping, as 
the UN and other actors were forced to intervene in internal crises – crucially 
involving deployment within the borders of often outright hostile host states. Indeed, 
                                                 
7 This fact is clearly highlighted by Figure 1 in the Appendix, based on data from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), which shows trends in inter- and intra-state conflicts as well as peacekeeping 
operations for the period 1948 – 2004. 
 
8 See Figure 1. 
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the Agenda for Peace (1992:Para. 20) ambitiously sought to redefine peacekeeping as 
“the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of 
all the parties concerned” (emphasis added); whilst, faced with the choice of adopting 
a far more robust approach or going home, the international community increasingly 
began to choose the former (Johnstone et al, 2005:55). As the Brahimi Report 
(2000:Para. 20), points out, peacekeeping operations have to a greater extent tended to 
deploy where conflict has yet to cease and where at least some of the parties to the 
confrontation are not seriously committed to ending hostilities. Rather than deploying 
into post-conflict situations, peacekeepers have often had to create them. 
 
Moreover, these conflict situations are often subject to significant cross-border effects 
by both state and non-state actors alike, whilst also preciptating such effects 
themselves. Political patrons in other states; international arms dealers; those who 
trade in illict commodities such as so-called conflict diamonds; regional powers and 
other third parties that send their own armed forces into the fray; as well as 
neigbouring states that host refugees who are often systematically forced to flee their 
homes, simply exacerbate the extremely complex prospect posed by many 
contemporay conflicts (UN, 2000:Para. 18). According to former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan (2000:9), “this is the world of globalization – a new context for 
and a new connectivity among economic actors and actvities throughout the world”, 
in which threats to peace and security faced by the people of the world have have 
become distinctly transnational in nature. 
 
The development of these trends has further given rise to a greater appreciation on the 
part of the international community of those issues which ultimately lie at the heart of 
conflict, which cause people go to war with one another as well as prolong the 
conflicts themselves. In the Agenda for Peace (1992:Para. 5), Boutros-Ghali argued 
that the sources of conflict are both pervasive and deep and that successfully meeting 
the challenges facing peace and security would require concerted effort on a number 
fronts. Namely: enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
promoting sustainable economic and social development; alleviating human suffering; 
as well as, curtailing the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. Simply 
put, the changing strategic context highlighted the fact that a much broader and far 
more structured approach to conflict management than had previously existed under 
 - 30 - 
 
the guise of the traditional peacekeeping model was required. According to Johnstone 
et al (2005:59), the Agenda for Peace reflected a sense that a comprehensive strategy 
was needed to guide peacekeepers in doing what they had previously been 
undertaking on an ad hoc basis. 
 
As such, it was proposed that the aims of the UN in this regard should comprise the 
Four Ps9: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding – a 
formula which continues to form the basis of the organization’s approach to conflict 
management (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:Para. 15). According to this approach, prevention 
represents the first step in responding to a conflict situation, whilst peacebuilding 
represents the last – these two mechanisms being juxtaposed at opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Simply put, the UN’s primary aim is to prevent conflict from occurring by 
means of diplomacy; should this fail, the next step is to bring the hostile parties 
around the negotiating table and engineer peace; if some sort of agreement is 
successfully meted-out, a peacekeeping force comprised of military, police and 
civilian elements may be deployed in order to monitor and otherwise assist in the 
implementation there of; and, lastly, the UN will assist in rebuilding the country once 
the situation has been stabilized, with a specific focus on addressing the root causes of 
the conflict so as to prevent a relapse in the long-term (de Coning, 2008:6).10 
 
Practice has shown, however, that the distinctions between conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are in fact rather 
blurred and a number of linkages and so-called grey areas do exist.11 Whilst 
peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of 
agreements achieved by peacemakers, they are often required to play an active role in 
peacemaking efforts as well as further peacebuilding activities. Indeed, the Five P’s 
rarely occur in a linear or sequential manner. Rather, they are mutually reinforcing 
and if used in isolation fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address 
the root causes of conflict (UN, 2008:20). As de Coning (2008:14) argues, 
“preventive diplomacy … does not only occur in the phase before violent conflict 
                                                 
9 The Four P’s concept is introduced by De Coning (2004). 
 
10 As was highlighted in the previous section, a fifth aspect, peace enforcement, has also been identified 
as constituting a vital part of this overarching framework of peace operations. 
11 As is illustrated by Figure 2, peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. 
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breaks out. In most cases tensions persist even after peace agreements have been 
entered into and there will be a need for a range of preventive measures far into the 
peace transition”. Moreover, “many conflicts are not singular events. Instead they go 
through cyclical phases that see peace agreement after peace agreement relapse into 
conflict … Peacebuilding may thus be ‘post-conflict’ in theory, but in reality it is also 
‘preventative’ in that it is aimed at trying to prevent the re-occurrence of the conflict 
by addressing the root causes” (de Coning, 2008:15). 
 
That being said, the second generation or multidimensional peacekeeping operations 
that evolved out of the end of the Cold War and which have continued to this day are 
generally deployed as one part of a much larger international effort to assist countries 
emerging out of conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace. As is noted in the 
Capstone Doctrine (2008:23), the primary functions of multidimensional 
peacekeeping within this broader context are to: 
 
(a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the 
state’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law 
and human rights; 
(b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and 
reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and 
effective institutions of governance; and 
(c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all international actors pursue 
their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated 
manner. 
 
Indeed, over and above the primarily military tasks of monitoring and observing 
cease-fires characteristic of traditional peacekeeping, these multidimensional 
operations are frequently mandated to provide support to national law enforcement 
agencies; provide security at key government installations, ports and other vital 
infrastructure; establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, 
goods and humanitarian assistance; as well as, providing direct protection to civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence (UN, 2008:23 - 24). Moreover, such 
operations are often tasked by the Security Council to play a leading role in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; mine clearance 
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action; security sector reform (SSR); the protection and promotion of human rights; 
electoral assistance; and supporting the restoration and extension of government 
authority (UN, 2008:26). Although the military component remains the backbone of 
the majority of peacekeeping operations to this day, the multidimensional nature of 
contemporary operations has necessitated the inclusion of administrators and 
economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and election observers, 
human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian 
workers as well as experts in communications and public information, to mention but 
a few. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter sought to provide a descriptive insight into the complex notion of 
peacekeeping as well as address a number of related issues. It commenced by 
conceptualizing peacekeeping as: any international effort involving an operational 
component that aims to prevent or terminate any conflict or longstanding dispute. This 
was followed with a discussion of the origin of peacekeeping and the pioneering role 
played by the UN in this regard. It was emphasized that peacekeeping ultimately 
emerged as an ad hoc response to particular problems of peace and security facing the 
international community during the Cold War, which led to the establishment of the 
traditional or first generation peacekeeping model. Thereafter, the significance of 
security to the peacekeeping debate and how it is understood was introduced. More 
specifically, we highlighted the manner in which the shift in focus from international 
to so-called human security changed the way peacekeeping was envisaged by the 
international community. Related to this issue is the recent development of the R2P 
doctrine, which has further altered the terms of the peacekeeping debate and possibly 
pointed a return to the enforcement role originally envisaged for the international 
community. Finally, the development of and contemporary role played by today’s so-
called multidimensional peacekeeping operations, based on the five pillars of 
preventive action, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, 
was also discussed 
 
The common thread running through all of these discussions, and arguably the single 
most important point one should take away from this chapter, is the manner in which 
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the post-Cold War security environment necessitated the profound shift in how 
peacekeeping is both conceptualized and put into practice. As has been shown, the 
ideological rivalry between East and West and the immense influence of the two 
superpowers during this period acted like a time machine and virtually froze 
international relations in their 1940s format. For the next four decades a host of 
issues, including the rise of international criminal networks, global climate change, 
internal conflict and mass poverty, went unattended. Thus, with the abrupt end of the 
Cold War, the international community was jolted back to reality and found a world 
far different and in a much worse state than they had realized. 
 
The world was no longer simply black and white – ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’. As Annan 
(2000:11) acknowledges in the UN Millennium Report, it was previously taken for 
granted that “external aggression, an attack by one state against another, would 
constitute the most serious threat; but in recent decades far more people have been 
killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing and acts of genocide fuelled by weapons widely 
available in the global arms bazaar. Technologies of mass destruction circulate in a 
netherworld of illicit markets, and terrorism casts shadows on stable rule. We have not 
yet adapted our institutions to this new reality”. As such, the international community 
was forced to re-evaluate the way in which it perceives threats to peace and security 
as well as their strategies for tackling such threats. The net result was the development 
of the Five P’s doctrine and the marriage of the developmental and peacekeeping 
agendas in today’s multidimensional peacekeeping model. Simply put, addressing a 
multidimensional problem requires a multidimensional approach. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
On 9 July 2002 African leaders gathered in Durban, South Africa in order to lay the 
foundation of what then South African President Thabo Mbeki proclaimed will be the 
“African Century” (cited in Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba, 2008:1). Indeed, it was at 
this summit that the AU was inaugurated as the paramount continental organization, 
succeeding the OAU, which had been in existence since 1963. Whilst the transition 
from the OAU to the AU has been characterized by a proliferation of new ideas and 
initiatives in almost every sphere, arguably the most significant development to come 
out this process has been the new organization’s dramatic shift in approach to 
ensuring peace, security, and stability on the continent vis-à-vis its predecessor (Juma, 
2006:45). Central to this new approach is an elaborate peace and security architecture 
that aims to provide the AU with both the legal framework and logistical and 
operational capacity to effectively respond to any conflict situation that may arise. In 
reference to the AU, de Coning (2005a:83) argues, “Africa now has a more 
comprehensive peace and security architecture in place than at any other time since 
regional cooperation started on the continent in 1963”. 
 
It is important to note, however, that this new initiative is far from being the first 
attempt at establishing a continental conflict management capability. Rather, the 
notion of collective defence and security has long been at the heart of African politics 
and was one of the principal concerns that ultimately prompted African leaders to 
establish the OAU in 1963. According to Touray (2005:637), this organization “was 
looked upon to offer a platform on which African leaders could together settle inter-
African disputes, promote common defence as well as economic and social 
programs”. Despite the best intentions and multiple attempts at addressing the scourge 
of conflict, the OAU simply proved incapable of guaranteeing peace and security on 
the continent. The sheer intensity and magnitude of the crises which plagued Africa 
transcended the organization’s limited financial, logistical and structural competence, 
while its political and institutional authority was hampered by dissent and the 
qualified support of member states (Wiseman, 1984:135). 
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Whether or not the AU is in actual fact better placed than its predecessor to ensure 
peace, security, and stability in Africa is of vital importance. Violent conflict remains 
the number one threat to Africa’s future development and prosperity not least because 
of the direct consequences thereof, but also because of the innumerable negative 
knock-on effects associated with war. Indeed, these costs include not only “the visible 
and immediate – death, injury, destruction, displacement – but also the distant and 
indirect repercussion for families, communities, local and national institutions and 
economies, and neighboring countries. They are counted not only in damage inflicted 
but also in opportunities lost” (UN, 2001:6). In order for the AU to have any real hope 
of bringing about a significant change in Africa’s prospects and improving the lives of 
its people, it will have to do what neither the OAU nor UN has thus far been able to 
achieve and implement an effective conflict resolution capability for the continent. 
 
Before one can speak of implementation, however, the first step is necessarily 
creating a framework within which to operate. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to 
explore the development of the AU’s comprehensive peace and security architecture 
as it has been envisaged by the continent’s leaders. The chapter shall begin with a 
discussion of the manner in which regional organizations and the like have come to 
take on far greater responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in recent years, hopefully answering the question as to why it is so necessary 
for Africa to be able to look after itself so-to-speak. Thereafter, the history of 
peacekeeping initiatives on the continent, beginning with the OAU and ending with 
the migration to the AU, is addressed. This is followed by a discussion of the salient 
features of the AU’s peace and security architecture, including: the Common African 
Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the 
ASF. The chapter then concludes by examining the role of the international 
community within this overarching framework. 
 
3.2 THE DEVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Although the UN is undoubtedly the single most significant actor in terms of 
peacekeeping operations, it is by no means the only actor. A number of multilateral 
and regional organizations have played a very important role in addressing major 
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conflicts throughout the world. The most infamous example in this regard is 
undoubtedly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) involvement in the 
Balkans during the mid-1990s (Bellamy et al, 2004:43).12 Other bodies which have 
conducted significant peacekeeping operations over the years include, but are not 
limited to: the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua; the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in Albania, Moldova and the Ukraine; as well as, the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone (OAS, 
1991; OSCE, 2008; ECOWAS, 2005). Indeed, in what was originally designed as a 
hierarchical relationship, regional bodies and other actors have become increasingly 
visible partners with the UN in many areas of conflict management. 
 
The modalities of cooperation between the UN and so-called regional arrangements 
are clearly spelled out in the UN Charter. Chapter VIII (UN, 1945:Art. 52.1) states: 
“nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations”. It goes on to emphasize the obligation of regional 
organizations to seek peaceful settlement of conflicts before bringing such incidents to 
the attention of the Security Council (UN, 1945:Art. 52.2), apparently limiting such 
organizations to Chapter VI-type actions. Moreover, Article 53.1 (UN, 1945) 
empowers the Security Council, where appropriate, to “utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority”. Thus, unless 
taken in self-defence as is provided for under Article 51 (UN, 1945), a military 
operation conducted by a regional organization requires an explicit Security Council 
mandate. This, then, would seem to preclude proactive peacekeeping independent of 
the UN. 
 
                                                 
12 In Operations Deliberate Force (Bosnia 1995) and Allied Force (Kosovo 1999), NATO  was 
instrumental in bringing an end to humanitarian suffering, ostensibly in support of UN Security 
Council resolutions; while, at the end of 1995, NATO took over management of the military 
component of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia outright, which later led to the NATO mission 
in Kosovo 
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According to McKenzie (2001:151), however, developments in the greater security 
environment since then end of the Cold War have necessitated an increased role for 
regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
increasing scale and dynamics of conflicts across the globe has prompted the UN to 
undertake a number of wide-ranging peacekeeping operations and this, in turn, has 
resulted in the world body being vastly overburdened as its resources are stretched to 
the limit (Francis et al, 2005:1). Indeed, as Bellamy et al (2004:44) argue, the increase 
in demand for the UN to be proactive in global conflict management since the mid-
1990s has pushed the organization’s inadequately funded bureaucracy and limited 
physical resources to the edge, thus prompting the organization to encourage 
increased involvement by regional bodies and other agencies. The Agenda for Peace 
(1992:Para. 64), for example, states that regional arrangements in many cases posses a 
potential that should be utilized in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding; and, regional action as a 
matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the UN could significantly 
lighten the burden of the Security Council in terms of maintaining international peace 
and security. 
 
Burden-sharing, as opposed to the hierarchical structure originally envisioned by the 
UN Charter, may therefore be a more appropriate concept for understanding the 
contemporary pattern in UN-regional relations. Whilst, in absolute numbers, the 
incidence of both UN- and non-UN peacekeeping operations has risen sharply since 
the early 1990s; over the last decade or so, the difference between the number of 
operations carried out by the UN and other actors has diminished to the point of being 
negligible (Heldt & Wallensteen, 2006:14). Moreover, with the rise of intra-state 
conflict as the predominant form of warfare in the aftermath of the Cold War there has 
not only been dramatic growth in the number of intra-state peacekeeping operations, 
but also a discernable trend towards greater reliance on non-UN operations from the 
mid-1990s onwards.13 
 
Heldt & Wallensteen (2006:18) argue that in instances of intra-state conflict states are 
more willing to engage their neighbours for assistance, while neighbouring states 
                                                 
13 This trend is clearly highlighted in Figure 3. 
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themselves are also more willing to take action when trouble is brewing in their 
backyard. A number of arguments in support of this point have been made. First, 
regional organizations can sometimes provide greater legitimacy and sensitivity to the 
situation, borne of a greater working knowledge of the relevant local circumstances. 
Second, their geographic proximity allows regional actors to deploy and supply troops 
relatively quickly. Finally, regional intervention may be the only realistic option in 
conflicts where the UN has declined or is simply unable to intervene (Bellamy et al, 
2004:214). As McKenzie (2001:152) recognizes, “regional norms of behaviour may 
be perceived as more legitimate than global ones. From the perspective of the United 
Nations, too, there could be many benefits to intensified cooperation with regional 
organizations: increased flexibility and efficiency, more thorough information, greater 
acceptance and legitimacy in conflict mediation, and reduced costs”. 
 
There are, of course, a number of counter-arguments that one can level against 
regionalization in conflict management – a phenomenon Frank (2006:2) has termed 
“regioscepticism”. First, regional organizations are particularly susceptible to the pull 
of partisan national interests, especially those associated with a regional hegemon 
such as South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
arguably the United States in NATO. Their impartiality could thus be called into 
question. Second, compared to the UN whose infrastructure has been frequently 
tested, many regional organizations lack the experience of conducting peacekeeping 
operations and thus sometimes also the relevant provisions within their respective 
charters. Third, with the possible exceptions of the European Union (EU) and NATO, 
regional organizations tend to operate with relatively small bureaucracies and budgets 
and lack the administrative, logistical and command structures necessary to manage 
complex operations of the multidimensional type (Bellamy et al, 2004: 215). 
 
Despite these legitimate concerns, the African experience would seem to point 
towards what McKenzie (2001:153) describes as a “new security regionalism”, in 
which regional organizations play an increasing role in maintaining peace and security 
in partnership with the UN. Indeed, Africa has not only been the single greatest 
recipient of UN operations, accounting for more than three-quarters of all authorized 
peacekeepers worldwide, but it is also in Africa where the world body has registered 
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its worst peacekeeping fiascos (Francis et al, 2005:96).14 Speaking specifically of 
Africa, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1998:Para. 41) noted that the UN 
simply “lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all the problems that 
may arise” and should therefore provide support for, as well as strive to complement 
rather than supplant, regional and sub-regional initiatives. 
 
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CONTINENT: 1963 - 2002 
 
The road leading to the establishment of a significant peacekeeping capability under 
the auspices of the AU has followed an exceptionally long and torturous path – a path 
littered with good intentions, failed endeavors, and far too many lives lost while 
African leaders dithered when they should have taken action. Considering the rather 
short history of the state as a political model in Africa, the first major step towards 
regional cooperation and addressing the issues of peace and security on the continent, 
the formation of the Organization of African Unity, was taken exceptionally quickly. 
As Naldi (1999:1) notes, there were only four independent states in Africa in 1945 – 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa – yet, Pan-African demands for political, 
economic and cultural self-determination in the wake of the Second World War 
became a flood that the colonial powers could not dam. Within less than twenty years 
a total of thirty-two states put pen to paper and brought the new continental 
organization into being. 
 
Unfortunately, this was as much as African leaders appeared willing to commit to, as 
the unprecedented wave of optimism and cooperation which made such a remarkable 
feat possible seemed to dissipate shortly thereafter. According to van Walraven 
(1999:148), the OAU was a weak regime that merely “represented a consolidation of 
Africa’s political status quo”. Indeed, up until the establishment of the AU in 2002 
very little had been achieved that promised to address the challenges of peace and 
security on the continent directly and that could potentially bring an end to conflict in 
Africa. Indicative of this point is the fact in the three decades 1963 – 1993, the 
                                                 
14 Most notable among these: Somalia, the first UN operation to be withdrawn before fulfilling its 
mandate, where no political progress could be made due to a lack of commitment on the part of key 
Somali factions not interested in peace; and Rwanda, where close on 1 million people were brutally 
slaughtered in the course of the genocide that was perpetrated in full view of the international 
community. 
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African continent was ravaged by close on ninety military coups and other violent 
conflicts; whilst at least 10 million people lost their lives, five times as many were 
wounded and more than 20 million became refuges or were displaced from their 
homes (Legum, 1999:31-32). 
 
3.3.1 The Organization of African Unity 
 
On 26 May 1963, thirty-two heads of state and government assembled in the City of 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia signed the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 
otherwise known as the OAU Charter. As Articles 2.1.c and 2.1.d (OAU, 1963) of 
said charter indicate, the organization was primarily committed to defending the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, as 
well as eradicating all forms of colonialism from the African continent. Whilst a 
number of other social and economic aims were also highlighted, state interest and 
security were overwhelmingly emphasized. Indeed, the guiding principles of the 
organization as identified in Article 3 (OAU, 1963) refer exclusively to such matters. 
These include: the sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states; as well as respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence. Yet, this 
is hardly surprising given the context in which the OAU was established. 
 
The decolonization of Africa literally multiplied the number of sovereign states 
tenfold; yet, this was by no means a straightforward process and the peoples of a 
number of African states including South Africa, the former Rhodesia, Angola and 
Mozambique were still caught-up in an often bloody fight for majority rule and self-
determination. Addressing the delegation in Addis Ababa, President Ben Bella of 
Algeria (cited in Červenka, 1977:7) declared “this Charter will remain a dead letter … 
unless we lend unconditional support to … these peoples still under the colonialist 
yoke”. As a collection of independent African states, the OAU saw itself as 
possessing a moral obligation towards its fellow Africans and therefore as the 
vanguard in the fight against colonialism. This so-called “spirit of Addis Ababa” 
(Červenka, 1977:8) was thus enshrined in the OAU Charter. 
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What is more, upon achieving independence, the vast majority of African states did 
not reflect natural divisions15 – an issue which was raised during the Addis Ababa 
conference (Naldi, 1999:1). After much heated debated, it was eventually agreed that 
the pre-existing borders should remain intact. As Malian President Modibo Keita 
(cited in Červenka, 1977:9) argued, “the colonial system divided Africa, but it 
permitted nations to be born. Present frontiers must be respected and the sovereignty 
of each state must be consecrated by a multilateral non-aggression pact”. The 
argument being, that without a commitment on the part of all member states to respect 
the equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to independent existence of all, 
Africa was likely to degenerate into utter chaos as a plethora of border conflicts over 
disputed territory and populations engulfed the continent. 
 
The net effect of these factors was that the continental body prioritized state security 
over all other considerations and was therefore significantly constrained in terms of its 
own conflict management capability – a reality highlighted by the terms of the OAU 
Charter. Article 2.2.f (OAU, 1963), for example, merely states in broad and 
ambiguous terms that members shall coordinate and harmonize their defense and 
security policies. Moreover, the OAU Charter (1963:Article 3.4) adopted the principle 
of the “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration”; whilst, as has already been mentioned, interference in the internal affairs 
of member states was also expressly prohibited by Articles 3.2 and 3.5 (OAU, 1963). 
In terms of actual conflict resolution mechanisms, the OAU Charter proved equally 
disappointing. Provision was made for the establishment of a Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) (OAU, 1963:Article 7.4); yet, the 
basic underlying principle was that of consent and the entire process was restricted to 
third-party political assistance (Wiseman, 1984:125). Moreover, the protocol only 
allowed for involvement in inter-state conflicts and so became redundant very quickly 
(Francis, 2006:121). As Wiseman (1984:125) notes, “no provision was made or 
inferred about any imposition of political settlement by the use of military force, 
excepting Article 20”. 
 
                                                 
15 Rather, African borders stem from the arbitrary partition of the continent agreed upon by colonial 
powers at the Conference of Berlin in 1885, the primary concern being that each European nation 
should receive their fair share of exploitable land, resources and people. 
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Article 20 (OAU,1963:Article 20.3), however, merely relates to the establishment of a 
specialized Defense Commission should the organization deem it necessary. No 
further details as to how or to what end this commission shall function are offered. 
Although the notion of a supranational African High Command was mooted – most 
notably by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah – the proposal fell short as the idea 
of an integrated continental army presupposed greater authority to be vested in the 
OAU than member states were willing to accede (Červenka, 1977:39).16 Ultimately, 
the Defense Commission was established in order to devise a formula for coordinating 
and harmonizing the defense policies of member states as called for by Article 2 of 
the OAU Charter (Imobighe, 1980:241). 
 
Significantly, not one dispute was ever handled by the organ specifically created for 
this purpose, the CMCA (van Walraven, 1999:274), as the organization had rather 
evolved a traditional African concept of mediation by respected elders and fellow 
heads of state on an ad hoc basis in order to diffuse conflicts (Červenka, 1977:67). In 
practice, the organization’s conflict management strategy lacked substance as there 
was neither mention of nor scope for effective, coercive measures to ensure 
compliance on the part of member states, while the crucial role of peacekeeping 
seemed to have been entirely overlooked. As Wiseman (1984:126) reiterates, “the 
concept and practice of peacekeeping, dramatically employed by the United Nations 
in the Suez crisis of 1956, and ongoing in the Congo at the time the OAU Charter was 
formulated, were not at all entertained for adoption by the OAU”17. 
 
That being said, the organization was not entirely inactive and was engaged in conflict 
resolution almost from its inception. Most notable amongst these efforts were: two 
failed attempts at resolving the 1963 Morocco-Algeria border dispute (Wiseman, 
1984:128); Nigeria’s successful opposition to OAU intervention during its civil war 
1967-76, on the grounds that such an act would represent an unacceptable violation of 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Červenka, 1977:97); and, the organization’s 
                                                 
16 Imobighe (1980) provides a detailed discussion of this issue. 
17On the contrary, a number of African states had objected to UNEF as a form of neo-imperialism; 
whilst they were even more critical of the United Nations operation in the Congo, Organisation des 
Unies au Congo (ONUC). The latter was perceived to reflect Western interests in support of pro-
Western Congolese factions and was unable to fulfill its mandate: to rid the country of foreign white 
mercenaries, maintain law and order and prevent the secession of a number of ‘rebellious’ provinces. 
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inability to resolve the conflict in Western Sahara, a dispute that deeply divided 
members and nearly precipitated the collapse of the continental body (Damis, 
1984:273). Other noteworthy incidences include: the 1964 border dispute between 
Ethiopia and Somalia; as well as the OAU attempt to intervene in the Congo after UN 
peacekeeping forces had pulled out in 1964 (Wiseman, 1984:128-129). The 
organization’s most infamous endeavor, however, was undoubtedly during the 1977 
Chad crisis. Although notable for the deployment of the first all-African peacekeeping 
force, the OAU operation was ultimately a disaster and failed to resolve the situation 
in that country (Pittman, 1984:297). 
 
The Chad fiasco18 and prior failings significantly diluted the organization’s interest in 
collective security arrangements (van Walraven, 1999:343); yet, the importance of a 
regional capability in this regard simply could not be ignored. The upsurge of violent 
conflicts in Africa after the end of the Cold War led the OAU to reappraise its 
position, and this set in motion a process that ultimately culminated with the 
formation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(MCPMR) at the 1993 OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt (Francis et al, 2005:100; Naldi, 
1999:31). Up until this point OAU efforts at addressing disputes between member 
states had been “remedial and reactive rather than preventive and proactive” and 
relied heavily on ad hoc arrangements in the absence of effective established 
structures (Naldi, 1999:31). It was hoped that this new mechanism would pave the 
way toward a more systematic conflict resolution strategy.19 The principle functions 
of this mechanism were: 
 
(a) to anticipate and prevent situations of potential conflict from developing into 
full-blown wars; and 
(b) to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts should such conflicts 
arise. (OAU, 1993:Art. 15) 
                                                 
18 The OAU operation did not keep the peace; it did not stabilize Chad, nor allow elections to be held as 
had been called for in numerous OAU resolutions. Rather, beset by financial constraints, limited 
operational know-how and a lack of political will, there was a gapping abyss between the OAU’s 
resolutions on Chad and the organization’s competencies on the ground. For a comprehensive account 
of this peacekeeping operation see Pittman (1984). 
19 Two main bodies were created under this new mechanism. Namely: the Central Organ and the 
Conflict Management Division, responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict 
at ground-level. 
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The MCPMR was nevertheless undermined by the organization’s original mandate 
and the principles enshrined within the OAU Charter.20 Furthermore, the concept of 
peacekeeping was once again notable in its absence. It was argued that “emphasis on 
anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peacemaking and 
peacebuilding will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding 
peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance” (OAU, 
1993:Art. 15). In the event of conflicts degenerating to the extent that collective 
international intervention was required, the UN would be called upon for financial, 
logistical and military assistance (OAU, 1993:Art. 16). 
 
Despite these constraints, the organization was undoubtedly more active following the 
establishment of the MCPMR. Although large-scale peace operations were out of the 
question, the mechanism did allow for the deployment of military observer missions 
and small operations of restricted scope and duration to stop or prevent hostilities as 
well as facilitate mediation efforts (OAU, 1993:Art. 15). The first mission of this kind 
was the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda 1992-1993.21 A 
number of similar operations were deployed to a host of conflicts under the guise of 
this mechanism, most notably: the OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB) 1994 and the 
organization’s mediation efforts in the Comoros (OMIC) 1997 (Francis et al, 
2005:103). 
 
The creation of this new mechanism was expected to boost the organization’s conflict 
resolution capability, but other than perhaps creating order where once there was 
chaos the MCPMR brought about very little change in practical terms. Reflecting on 
the OAU’s record Wiseman (1984:128) notes, “ventures in the practice of conflict 
resolution by [peaceful means were] many, the successes [were] relatively few. The 
ventures in peacekeeping [were] minimal, but without success”. Even more 
worrisome was the reality that conflict in Africa was becoming an ever increasing 
problem, as the 1990s were arguably the most devastating decade the continent had 
                                                 
20 Namely: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, as well as non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. 
 
21 Comprised of contingents from the Congo, Tunisia, Senegal and Zimbabwe, NMOG totaled only 
some 130 soldiers and was mandated to supervise the implementation of a cease-fire and demilitarized 
zone between President Habyarimana’s government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) prior to 
the genocide of 1994. 
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experienced since independence. Most notable were Somalia’s complete 
disintegration into civil war in 1991; the continuation of Africa’s so-called “first 
world war” in the Democratic Republic of Congo, involving six African states and 
myriad rebel groups; the outbreak of war in Sierra Leone; as well as the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994 (Callaghy, Kassimir & Latham, 2001a:3; Juma, 2006:17). 
 
3.3.2 Migration to the African Union 
 
Van Walraven (1999:346) makes the important argument that, “while one cannot 
deny the OAU’s realism in embarking on limited [operations], it also means that the 
organization [was] wholly unprepared for high intensity conflicts. Thus, other 
institutions [were] still needed to handle such crises”. He goes on to cite the example 
of the Somali Civil War in the early 1990s, where, in the face of ever increasing 
violence, the OAU kept a painfully low-profile while calls for Western and/or UN 
intervention grew ever louder. In light of the organization’s shortcomings in ensuring 
peace, stability and security on the continent, African leaders were more determined 
than ever to tackle this issue head-on.22 As such, the heads of state and government 
assembled on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya for the fourth Extraordinary Session 
of the OAU in order to discuss the way forward. As Juma (2006:17) notes, the 
lukewarm response of the international community to the calamities taking place on 
the continent created an impetus for action and emphasized the need to engage in a 
search for African solutions to African problems. 
 
The eventual outcome of this process was the adoption the so-called Sirte Declaration 
(OAU, 1999), which paved the way toward the formation of the AU. The principal 
aim of these talks was to strengthen the OAU and make it more effective in dealing 
with the political, social and economic developments taking place within and outside 
                                                 
22 The process of reforming the OAU began in earnest in the early 1990s, but gathered momentum 
under the guidance of Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, the former Presidents of Nigeria and 
South Africa respectively. Upon assuming office in 1999, and guided by his precept of an ‘African 
Renaissance’, Mbeki foreswore the unilateralism characteristic of South Africa’s past and looked to 
adopt a new multilateral strategy to addressing peace and security in Africa. Likewise, Obasanjo 
identified four core principles or ‘calabashes’ – security, stability, development, and cooperation – as 
prerequisites for Africa’s future prosperity. The process that eventually led to the formation of the AU 
has been attributed to a temporary convergence of interests and ideas between these two nations, 
arguably the most powerful in Africa, as a result of their similar yet competing ambitions for 
continental leadership. For more on this subject see Tieku (2004) and Kagwanja (2006). 
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the continent at the time (OAU, 1999:Para. 2). With this declaration, African leaders 
once again expressed their continued desire to establish a body capable of effectively 
addressing conflict on the continent; as Paragraph 6 (OAU, 1999) highlights, the 
delegates were “determined to eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitute a 
major impediment to the implementation of [Africa’s] development and integration 
agenda”. The challenge, however, was to move past the stale rhetoric which had been 
repeated ad nasuem and implement real change. Indeed, the selfsame commitments 
had been made with the establishment of the OAU in 1963 and the MCPMR in 1993. 
In the words of the Sirte Declaration (1999:Para. 6), African leaders were convinced 
that the “continental organization [needed] to be revitalized in order to be able to play 
a more active role and continue to be relevant to the needs of [Africa’s] peoples and 
responsive to the demands of the prevailing circumstances”. 
 
Central to what Juma (2006:45) has described as this “New African Vision” was the 
eventual decision that the OAU would be succeeded by a new continental 
organization known as the African Union (OAU, 1999:Para. 8.i). Adopted at the 36th 
OAU Summit in Lomé, Togo on 11 July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union was formally brought into force on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa and 
launched a new era for African multilateralism in the process (Juma, 2006:45). 
According to Akopari (2008:371), the transformation of the OAU to the AU spawned 
considerable euphoria and optimism, informed by the hope that the new continental 
organization would mitigate Africa’s seemingly intractable challenges and thus 
succeed where its predecessor had failed. One should bear in mind, however, that this 
selfsame atmosphere surrounded the establishment of the OAU in 1963, only to be 
tempered by the harsh reality of the task which lay before it. For the AU to have any 
real expectation of ensuring peace, security and stability on the continent it would 
need be more than just a case of “old wine in new bottles” (Melber, cited in Akokpari, 
2008:373) and represent a sea change in how the scourge of conflict is addressed. 
 
3.4 SALIENT FEATURES OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND 
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 
In stark contrast to its predecessor, the AU is rather audacious and explicit in terms of 
its approach towards achieving the aims of peace, security, and stability on the 
 - 47 - 
 
continent. According to Field (2004:19), when African leaders formed the AU they 
sought to put to bed the inability of its forerunner, the OAU, in order to deal with 
continental instabilities by adopting new approaches to the maintenance of peace and 
security. Indeed, the transition to the new continental organization represented an 
opportunity to rectify those issues that had dogged the OAU in the past. Namely: a 
limited mandate within which to operate, limited resources, irresolute conflict 
management structures and a distinct lack of political will. This point is reinforced by 
the terms of the Constitutive Act of the African Union itself, hereafter referred to as 
the Constitutive Act. As the Preamble (AU, 2000) notes, successfully tackling the 
multifaceted challenges that confront the continent and its people in the light of the 
social, economic and political changes taking place in the world depends upon not 
only addressing the scourge of conflict, but also strengthening Africa’s common 
institutions and providing them with both the necessary powers and resources so that 
they may actually discharge this mandate effectively. 
 
3.4.1 The Common African Defence and Security Policy 
 
Central to this new approach is the so-called Common African Defence and Security 
Policy. It is arguably the single most important continental regime on peace and 
security and, according to Touray (2005:636), “holds considerable promise for a 
continent that tragically accounts for the bulk of the world’s war-induced deaths”. 
Adopted in February 2004 in accordance with Article 4.d of the Constitutive Act 
(2000), which calls for the “establishment of a common defence policy for the African 
continent”, the CADSP represents a common understanding among African states 
regarding the challenges which they face as well as how best to address said 
challenges. Most significantly, it is binding on all AU member states. As the Solemn 
Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004a:Para. 4) notes, 
the CADSP is premised “on a common African perception of what is required to be 
done collectively by African states to ensure that Africa’s common defence and 
security interests and goals, especially as set out in Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union, are safeguarded”. 
 
Reflecting due consideration for the principles and objectives of its predecessor as 
well as the notions enshrined in the UN Charter, the common interests and goals 
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referred to above include: defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of member states (AU, 2000:Art. 2.b); a commitment to the sovereign 
equality and interdependence among member states; respect for the borders existing 
on the achievement of independence; the peaceful resolution of conflicts among 
member states; the prohibition of the use of force or threat thereof among member 
states; as well as non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of 
another (AU, 2000:Art. 4). More importantly, however, the Constitutive Act 
(2000:Art. 4.j; Art. 4.h) further asserts the right of member states “to request 
intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”, as well as the 
organization’s right “to intervene in a member state … in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. 
Following the February 2003 amendment to the Constitutive Act, “serious threats to 
legitimate order” has also been included as grounds for such intervention (AU, 
2003:Art. 4.h). 
 
Clearly, this is a revolutionary development in African conflict management strategy 
and represents a major departure from the state-centric approach of the OAU. As 
Powell (2005:11) quite rightly argues, “the norms underpinning the AU’s emerging 
peace and security regime resonate closely with elements of the protection framework 
found in The Responsibility to Protect” and represents a shift in focus on the part of 
the continental organization to the notion of human security. In the words of 
Ambassador Säid Djinnit (cited in Powell, 2005:1), the AU Commissioner for Peace 
and Security: 
 
“Africans cannot … watch the tragedies developing in the continent and 
say it is the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. We 
have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We 
cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people”. 
 
Any doubt in this regard is easily dispelled with reference to the CADSP itself, which 
is based on a major reinterpretation of the fundamental notions of defence, security 
and common threats. Defence is broadly defined to encompass both “the traditional, 
military and state-centric notion of the use of armed forces of the state to protect its 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity” as well as “the less traditional, non-
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military aspects which relate to the protection of people’s political, cultural, social and 
economic values and ways of life” (AU, 2004a:Para. 5). Similarly, security is defined 
as a “multi-dimensional notion” that encompasses the act and the process of 
protecting individuals, families, communities and the state as well as all their 
associated interests. These include, human rights, the right to access to resources and 
the basic necessities of life, as well as the right to protection against environmental 
and ecological degradation, and the protection of the state from external aggression, to 
mention but a few (AU, 2004a:Para. 6). According to Touray (2005:642), “the notion 
of common threats is extrapolated from these broad definitions of defence and 
security and hinges firmly on the principle that the security of each African country is 
inextricably linked to the security of other African countries and the African continent 
as a whole”. As such, common threats are perceived as those that confront all, some, 
or one of the countries or regions of the continent (AU, 2004a:Para. 7). 
 
The types of threats envisaged by the CADSP are grouped under two broad 
categories: internal threats that emanate from within the continent as well as external 
threats, referring to those challenges that may arise from international sources. The 
former include, but are not limited to, inter- as well as intra-state conflicts; unstable 
post-conflict situations; war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; 
transnational crime, such as human and drug trafficking; disease; and, poverty (AU, 
2004a:Para. 8). The latter includes any external threat that may, either directly or 
indirectly, constrain individual and collective security, such as aggression towards an 
African state; international conflicts and crises; mercenarism; international terrorism; 
weapons of mass destruction; and, the adverse effects of globalization (AU, 
2004a:Para. 9). 
 
The underlying purpose of the CADSP, then, is to provide a platform from which 
prompt and effective collective action can be taken so as to address issues relating to 
peace and security and therefore enable the achievement of the AU’s many political 
and socio-economic objectives (AU, 2004a:Para. 13). To this end, it is further 
recommended that the organization engage in activity in a number of conflict-related 
areas, most notably: peacebuilding and peacekeeping as well as post-conflict 
rehabilitation and reconstruction (AU, 2004a:Para. 10). As Touray (2005:636) argues, 
the CADSP “is neither a mere political declaration [without] binding authority, nor a 
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simple continental military and police outfit. It is essentially a strategy based on a set 
of principles, objectives and instruments that aims at promoting and consolidating 
peace and security on the continent as well as at releasing energies and resources for 
development”. Simply put, the CADSP aims to address the scourge of conflict in 
Africa both directly and indirectly, through preventive measures as well as through 
rapid intervention in conflict zones. After tackling conflict situations, it is further 
expected that the CADSP will also facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding 
initiatives. 
 
3.4.2 The Peace and Security Council 
 
The organ tasked with the primary responsibility of lending credence to and 
implementing the CADSP is the Peace and Security Council. Once again, this body 
was established in accordance with the Constitutive Act (AU, 2000:Art. 5.2) and is 
intended to serve as the “standing decision-making organ for the prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts” (AU, 2002:Art. 2.1). As Mlambo (2006:43) 
points out, the PSC is the successor to and replacement for the now defunct MCPMR 
of the OAU. Following from Article 2.2 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU, 2002) the PSC is 
mandated to “facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations 
in Africa” (AU, 2002:Art. 2.2). Within this rather broad mandate a number of more 
specific objectives are identified, namely: 
 
(a) to promote peace, security and stability in Africa; 
(b) to anticipate and prevent conflicts; 
(c) to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions where conflicts have 
occurred as well as promote and implement post-conflict reconstruction; 
(d) to coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and 
combating of international terrorism; and 
(e) to promote and encourage democratic practices and protect human rights as 
part of efforts to prevent conflict (AU, 2002:Art. 3). 
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The council is composed of fifteen members, elected on the basis of equal rights and 
with due consideration for equitable regional representation.23 Ten of the members are 
elected for a term of two years, whilst the remaining five are elected for a term of 
three years in order to ensure continuity and preserve institutional memory (AU, 
2002:Art. 5)24. Unlike the UN Security Council, the PSC has no permanent members. 
Moreover, decisions of the PSC are guided by the principle of consensus and no state 
holds the power of veto. In cases where such agreement cannot be reached, decisions 
on procedural matters shall be carried by a simple majority while decisions on all 
other matters require a two-thirds majority (AU, 2002:Art. 8.13). In order to enable 
the council to carry out its mandate, the AU has extended the PSC extensive powers 
that far exceed those previously provided to any organ under the OAU (Touray, 
2005:544). Indeed, Murithi & Ndinga-Muvumba (2008:6) argue that the PSC’s ability 
to sanction military and diplomatic intervention in the affairs of African countries 
marks “a radical departure from the OAU’s four-decade-long obsession with non-
intervention and non-interference”. These powers include, amongst others, the 
authority: 
 
(a) to mount broad peace support missions, including peacekeeping, as well as lay 
down the general guidelines for the conduct thereof; 
(b) to recommend to the AU intervention in a member state in respect of grave 
circumstances as set forth in Article 4.h of the Constitutive Act, as well as 
approve the modalities for such intervention; 
(c) to institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government 
takes place in a member state; and 
(d) to take appropriate action within its mandate in situations where the 
sovereignty of a member state is threatened by acts of aggression (AU, 
2002:Art. 7). 
 
                                                 
23 The continent is divided into five regional economic communities (RECs): SADC, ECOWAS, East 
Africa’s Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), and the Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU), representing North Africa. These are 
identified in Figure 6. 
 
24 The PSC is currently composed of: Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa, elected for 
three years each; while DRC, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan 
and Togo are currently serving two-year terms. 
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The PSC shall further be supported in its work by four subsidiary bodies. These are, a 
Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, a Special Fund and an 
African Standby Force (AU, 2002:Art. 2).25 The first three of these bodies are touched 
upon below. However, the proposed African Standby Force, represents the AU’s most 
significant endeavor in terms of establishing an African peacekeeping capability. 
Quite simply, it is the organization’s centerpiece project and is therefore discussed in 
more detail in the next subsection (Adebajo, 2008:133). 
 
The Panel of the Wise is to be composed of five “highly respected” African 
personalities from various segments of society serving for three year periods.26 It is 
further required that these individuals have distinguished themselves and made an 
outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the 
continent at some point in the past (AU, 2002:Art. 11.1; Art. 11.2). In the interest of 
fair regional representation, the five members are to be selected from Africa’s the five 
RECs. Ultimately, the Panel of the Wise serves in a consultative capacity – advising 
the PSC on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security 
and stability (AU, 2002:Art. 11.3). Similarly, there is to be a Military Staff Committee 
(MSC), comprised of senior military officers from each of the countries represented 
on the PSC, advising the council on military and other security requirements (AU, 
2002:Art. 13.8). 
 
In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, Article 12.1 (AU, 
2002) of the protocol establishing the PSC calls for a Continental Early Warning 
System to be established. As Touray (2005:645) argues the effectiveness of the PSC 
“will … depend very much on the capacity to collect, process and act on 
                                                 
25 These various bodies are administered by the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). Briefly, the AU 
Commission is the executive/administrative branch or secretariat of the organization and the 
Commission chairman, his subordinate, the Commissioner for Peace and Security, and the latter’s 
Peace and Security Directorate provide support to the PSC. The PSD is itself further comprised of the 
Conflict Management Division (CMD), responsible for developing policy and coordinating 
peacekeeping operations, and the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), responsible for the 
conduct of missions at ground-level. See Figure 5 for an outline of these structures and how they relate 
to one another. Bogland et al (2008) provide a detailed description thereof. 
  
26 The Panel of the Wise is currently chaired by former Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella. The other 
members are: Elizabeth Pognon, the former President of Benin’s Constitutional Court; Dr. Salim 
Ahmed Salim, a former OAU Secretary-General; Miguel Trovodra, the former President of São Tomé 
and Príncipe; and, the former Chairman of the South African electoral commission, Ntombenhophe 
Brigalia Bam. 
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information”. This system is to be comprised of an observation and monitoring centre, 
otherwise known as the ‘Situation Room’, located at AU headquarters (HQ) in Addis 
Ababa and will be responsible for data collection and analysis, with similar units at 
the sub-regional level within the RECs linked directly to the Situation Room (AU, 
2002:Art.12.2). The Early Warning System is to be based on clearly defined and 
accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators and the 
analysis thereof according to predictive models (Mwanasali, 2008:48). It is envisaged 
that the information that arises from this process will be used timeously to advise the 
PSC on the existence of potential threats to peace and security on the continent and, 
therefore, allow swift corrective action to be taken. 
 
In considering the extremely ambitious peace and security architecture set forth by the 
AU, Kent & Malan (2003:77) make the very important point that, “the right to 
intervene must … be paralleled with the capacity to do so”. It is in this vein that the 
so-called Peace Fund has been established. Governed by the relevant financial rules 
and regulations of the AU, this fund will ostensibly provide the financial resources 
necessary for the organization to undertake peace support missions and other 
operational activities related to peace and security (AU, 2002:Art. 21.1). The Peace 
Fund shall be made up of “financial appropriations from the regular budget of the 
Union, including arrears of contributors, voluntary contributions from member states 
and from other sources … including the private sector, civil society and individuals, 
as well as through appropriate fund raising activities” (AU, 2002:Art. 21.2). In terms 
of operational deployment, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are expected to bear 
the cost of their participation for the first three months thereof and can expect to be 
reimbursed by the AU within six months (AU, 2002:Art. 21.6; Art. 21.7). 
 
3.4.3 The African Standby Force 
 
Just as the Peace and Security Council is the body tasked with implementing the 
provisions of the CADSP, so the African Standby Force, and the military capability 
that it represents, is the arrangement within the AU designed to give force to the 
council’s decisions relating to the deployment of peace support missions and 
intervention as permitted by the Constitutive Act (AU, 2002:Art. 13.1). The proposed 
force is mandated to perform the following functions: 
 - 54 - 
 
(a) observation, monitoring and other types of peace support missions; 
(b) intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the 
request of a member state in order to restore peace and security; 
(c) preventive deployment in order to prevent the outbreak, escalation, spread or 
resurgence of violent conflict; 
(d) peacebuilding, including post-conflict DDR; and 
(e) any other functions determined by the PSC (AU, 2002:Art. 13.3). 
 
To this end, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, at their 3rd meeting on 14 May 2003 
in Addis Ababa, adopted the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African 
Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (AU, 2003).27 It was recommended 
that the AU earmark a brigade-sized contribution of military personnel, as well as 
trained military and civilian observers, as a standby arrangement from each of the five 
African sub-regions.28 These arrangements are to be supported by small full-time 
Planning Elements (PLANELMs) based in their respective regions (AU, 2003:Para. 
3.12). Moreover, a sixth High Readiness Brigade (HRB) will be based at AU HQ 
(Neethling, 2005:11). The attached PLANELM is to be responsible for managing an 
Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control and information system 
infrastructure (Cilliers, 2008:2). It is envisaged that this structure would provide the 
organization with a combined capacity of 15000 – 20000 soldiers and 500 military 
observers. It was further recommended that the ASF include a centrally managed 
standby roster of at least 240 police officers, two company strength gendarmerie 
police units, as well as civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, 
humanitarian operations, governance and DDR (AU, 2003:Para. 3.13; Para. 3.14).29 
 
                                                 
27 Many of the modalities for the ASF as it exists today had already been discussed under the auspices 
of now defunct OAU. At the second meeting of the ACDS in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1997 an African 
Defence Force was agreed to in principle, while it was also agreed that the OAU should earmark a 
brigade-size contribution to standby arrangements from each of the continent’s five sub-regions. 
However, these plans remained at the exploratory stage until the ASF was approved at the Durban 
summit in 2002. 
 
28 The five proposed regional standby brigades are: the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG); the Eastern 
African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); the ECOWAS 
BRIGADE (ECOBRIG); and, from Central Africa, the Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale 
(FOMAC). 
 
29 The proposed ASF model is presented in Figure 4. 
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As de Coning (2005a:84) notes, however, “the concept of a ‘force’ is perhaps 
misleading, because what is in fact proposed is a standby system, where components 
remain in their countries of origin, but are organized and trained in a coordinated 
fashion so that they would be ready to be deployed” on relevant operations. Indeed, 
the ASF design was developed on the basis of six likely mission scenarios, set along a 
spectrum ranging from small observer missions to classic peacekeeping operations 
and, finally, large-scale interventions in response to grave human rights violations or 
major conflicts. These scenarios are: 
 
(a) scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission; 
(b) scenario 2: an AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission; 
(c) scenario 3: a stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; 
(d) scenario 4: an AU/regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and 
preventive deployment missions; 
(e) scenario 5: an AU PKF for complex multidimensional peacekeeping with low-
level spoilers; and 
(f) scenario 6: AU intervention, such as in the case of genocide, where the 
international community does not act promptly (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6). 
 
One of the greatest lessons one can draw from the tragedy of Rwanda with respect to 
peacekeeping operations is the importance of timing (Touray, 2005:645). According 
to Kent & Malan (2003:73), within the current UN framework, it can take anywhere 
between three and six months from the time the Security Council decides to establish 
a peacekeeping mission until the organization is actually able to deploy and support 
such an operation. This is a totally unacceptable timeframe given the human suffering 
and loss of life that is likely to ensue while politicians and bureaucrats slowly work 
their way through the red tape. As such, the ASF aims to operate according to the 
following time schedule: simple operations, as characterized by scenarios 1 through 4, 
should be deployed within thirty days; complex operations such as scenario 5 should 
be fully deployed within ninety days, with the military component having been 
deployed in thirty days; whilst scenario 6-type intervention, due to the nature of the 
situation, requires that robust military force be deployed within fourteen days (AU, 
2003:Para. 2.9). 
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It was further recommended that the ASF be developed in two phases. By the end of 
Phase 1, 30 June 2005, the AU should be able to deploy and manage scenarios 1 
through 3, while the individual regions should have developed their standby brigade 
capacity. Recognizing that some regions may take more time than others to achieve 
this target, the ACDS recommended that, as a stopgap arrangement, potential lead 
nations should be ready to form so-called coalitions of the willing. Phase 2, which 
extends to 30 June 2010, should see the AU capable of sustaining a complex 
peacekeeping operation of the type envisaged in scenario 5. The regional bodies are 
tasked with continuing to develop or maintaining their own capacity for rapid 
deployment as appropriate (AU, 2003:Para. 3.11). With regards to scenario 6 
intervention, the ACDS recognized that meeting the stringent fourteen day 
deployment target would require a capable lead nation that is prepared to assume 
control and therefore falls outside of the targets set for the ASF itself (AU, 2003:Para. 
2.10). As Cilliers (2008:4) notes, “scenario 6 … can only be performed by forces that 
are ready, assembled, fully equipped and exercised with transport available on 
immediate call and with logistic supplies pre-packed and ready for delivery by air” – a 
feat unachievable by a multinational force. 
 
For the most part, significant progress has been made by both the AU and the sub-
regions towards achieving the Phase 1 targets. As of 30 June 2005 both SADC and 
ECOWAS had established their HQs and PLANELMs, formalized overarching policy 
frameworks – a concept of operations, training doctrine and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) – secured troop pledges from member states, and finalized their 
standby deployment arrangements (Mlambo, 2006:41). Although East Africa is 
lagging somewhat behind, progress has still been registered. The absence of a truly 
inclusive sub-regional organization has been the primary cause for delay.30 However, 
troop pledges were secured and the policy framework for the creation of EASBRIG 
was adopted in February 2004 under the auspices of IGAD, while agreement was also 
reached on the establishment of the PLANELM and brigade HQ (Powell, 2005:16). 
 
                                                 
30 In 2004 East Africa first mandated IGAD, consisting of only seven TCCs to coordinate EASBRIG. 
This, however, was staunchly opposed by states not party to the regional body. As a result, it was 
proposed that an independent EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism (EASBRIGCOM) assume control 
from IGAD. This mechanism was to be co-located with the PLANELM in Nairobi, Kenya but a final 
agreement on this matter was only reached in 2007. 
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Progress in Central Africa, however, has been hard to come by. As Cilliers & Malan 
(2005:98) note, between July 2003 and December 2004, ECCAS held several 
meetings at the levels of experts, chiefs of defence staff and Ministers of the Peace 
and Security Council of ECCAS on developing a Central African standby brigade. 
Agreement was reached on the structure of the sub-regional HQ, the proposed 
strength and equipment requirements of the brigade, as well as a roadmap for the 
establishment of the PLANELM and the brigade itself. Indeed, the one sub-region 
which had truly failed to meet the Phase 1 deadline was North Africa. The AMU 
should arguably be taking the lead in this regard; however, the organization overlaps 
with the Community of Sahelian-Saharan states and some of its membership perceive 
the primary responsibility as contributing to ECOWAS rather than a North African 
standby arrangement. The continued tension regarding Western Sahara has also 
proved divisive.31 
 
3.5 PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
In light of the organization’s shortcomings, African leaders realized that partnering 
with other stakeholders would prove critical to ensuring the viability of the AU’s 
proposed peace and security architecture. Indeed, the Constitutive Act (2000:Art. 3.e) 
encourages international cooperation, in cognisance of the principles enshrined in the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; while Section V of the 
Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (AU, 2004a) 
asserts that the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for ensuring 
international peace and security and that the AU should therefore coordinate and 
harmonize its activities in this regard with the world body within the context of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (UN, 1945). This point is echoed by the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(2002:Art. 17.1), which goes on to state that “where necessary, recourse will be made 
to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military 
support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, 
security and stability in Africa”. 
                                                 
31 The political impasse regarding the status of that country, which began in earnest in the 1970s, has 
continued to this day and remains a highly divisive issue. Indeed, Morocco withdrew from the OAU in 
1984 because of this dispute and has remained outside of the AU to this very day. For more on this 
matter see Damis (1984) and the International Crisis Group (2007). 
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Indeed, the ACDS (AU, 2003:Para. 3.16) identified a number of areas where the ASF 
concept and the African peace and security architecture in general could be enhanced 
through direct co-operation with the world body. By employing on-call UN planning, 
liaison and advisory teams, the AU’s strategic HQ capacity could be reinforced; while 
sharing in the UN’s detailed requirements for military, police and civilian standby 
arrangements could significantly support the development of the AU’s own 
mechanisms in this regard. Other recommendations included: that training within the 
ASF framework be consistent with UN doctrine and standards; on site training be 
achieved by seconding AU staff to the UN; as well as, entering into cooperative 
agreements with the world body in terms of logistics support. Such measures would 
further ensure interoperability between the two organizations and allow for operations 
to be easily handed over to or incorporated within a broader UN peace operation. 
 
To this end, the UN has already provided considerable assistance to support the 
development of the AU’s peace and security architecture. The Departments of 
Political Affairs (DPA) and Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), for example, assisted 
in establishing plans for the ASF and MSC; while, in February 2005, the DPKO set up 
a liaison assistance cell within the AU in part to assist with the organization’s 
deployment to Darfur (Powell, 2005:24). Furthermore, the ASF concept is said to be 
loosely modelled on the UN’s Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade 
(SHIRBRIG) headquartered near Copenhagen, Denmark. SHIRBRIG has offered to 
provide support to the AU, including: strategic planning, technical advice, matching 
troops with equipment from member states, as well as securing strategic air and sea-
lift capabilities (Neethling, 2005:13). 
 
A number of other major international actors have and will continue to play a decisive 
role in shaping Africa’s emerging peace and security architecture. Indeed, the G8 has 
offered to provide direct support in this regard and in 2002 adopted the Africa Action 
Plan (AAP), according to which the G8 agreed to provide technical and financial 
assistance to enhance the capacity of African states and regional organizations to 
prevent and resolve violent conflict. The AAP further called upon G8 members to 
design a joint plan to develop the AU’s capacity to deploy peace support operations 
(Powell, 2005:25). This plan of action was reinforced the following year at the Evian 
Summit in 2003, where the G8 announced a joint undertaking with African partners to 
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establish, equip and train one of the standby brigades identified in the ASF model by 
2010 (Kent & Malan, 2003:78). 
 
The EU has also played a significant role in assisting the AU in the development of its 
peace and security agenda. This support has been spearheaded by two key 
instruments: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the Africa Peace Facility 
(APF). The former was established in 2001 in order to facilitate the provision of aid. 
Unlike humanitarian aid, however, the RPM is meant to be a crises management tool 
and it is under this guise that aid totalling €25 million in 2002 and €30 million in 2003 
was allocated to the operational activities of the AU’s PSC and other capacity-
building initiatives (Bach, 2008:362 - 363). The APF, on the other hand, was 
established in 2004 in response to requests made by African leaders and provided for 
€250 million over three years specifically in support of peace operations deployed by 
the AU or undertaken by regional organizations under is auspices (Powell, 2005:25). 
 
Over and above those contributions made by other international and regional 
organizations, the AU has also developed a number of partnerships with individual 
countries. France, for example, has continued to support its Renforcement des 
Capacités Africaines au Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) program. First established in 
1997, RECAMP provides African military personnel with training at French military 
academies and also provided for the creation of three equipment storage depots 
located in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti (Brady, Bihari, Lim, Scotland & Wu, 
2005:178). Britain has undertaken both ad hoc and institutional approaches to help 
provide transport and logistical support to peace operations in Africa; however, it 
continues to focus resources on training – primarily through the deployment of its 
British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATTs) (Williams, 2004:47). Most 
notable is the continued assistance provided by the British Peace Support Team 
(BPST) in Nairobi which is assisting with planning, training and structure in the 
creation of the EASBRIG; as well as the funding provided to the Kofi Annan 
International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana (Brady et al, 
2005:181). 
 
A number of other states have also made similar significant contributions in this 
regard. This includes: the creation of a C$500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA) 
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earmarked for capacity-building projects as well as to assist in funding the 
deployment of unarmed military observer missions (Powell, 2005:27); and, the United 
States’ African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), designed to enhance military 
capacity within selected units of national armed forces, as well as major financial and 
transport-related contributions (Hentz, 2004:33). Moreover, Italy has also provided 
African peacekeepers with both logistical and transportation assistance as well as 
making financial contributions to the abovementioned Kofi Annan centre; while 
Germany has provided funding, transport and communications equipment in support 
of African peacekeeping initiatives (Brady et al, 2005:179). 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to discuss the AU’s emerging peace and 
security architecture. This was done having first highlighted the extremely important 
role that regional organizations in general and the AU in particular are increasingly 
required to play in maintaining peace and security around the world. Indeed, it was 
agued that the UN is hard-pressed to adequately respond to all the demands placed on 
it and the world body has therefore prioritized the development of an African 
capability in this regard. In this light, the development of African conflict 
management and peacekeeping mechanisms was traced. The most significant point 
raised was that, throughout its forty-year history, the OAU proved largely 
unsuccessful in its attempts to secure peace, security and stability on the continent. Its 
own limited mandate, a lack of political will and ineffective institutions were among 
the chief factors that served to undermine the organization in this regard. In order to 
address the failings of the past and pave the way towards a better future, African 
leaders launched a new continental organization at the dawn of the new millennium. 
Central to these plans is an ambitious, continent-wide framework aimed specifically at 
providing the AU with an effective, multinational peacekeeping capability. 
 
As these discussions have shown, the ASF concept and the peace and security 
architecture represent a dramatic conceptual and practical shift for African conflict 
management strategy. Chief among these is an apparent commitment to the R2P 
doctrine and a willingness to intervene in the affairs of member states. Moreover, the 
AU has chosen to prioritize direct, force-orientated action in contrast to the OAU’s 
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preference for mediation and other peaceful means in addressing conflict. This latest 
initiative represents the most complex and considered approach the African continent 
has ever seen in the field of peace and security and is a far cry from the ad hoc 
arrangements of the past. 
 
However, with the end of Phase 2 and the original deadline for completion of the ASF 
rapidly approaching, a number of important questions remain. Firstly, will the final 
targets be achieved as planned or at some stage shortly thereafter? Second, can these 
structures and the ASF model more broadly be implemented effectively? And, finally, 
what are the future prospects of the AU’s peacekeeping capability – will the 
organization have the capacity to tackle the challenge of conflict through direct 
action? Indeed, although development in this regard continues apace and despite the 
invaluable assistance provided by the UN and the international community at large, as 
of 2008 only the Southern and West African brigades were on track to be deployed in 
the form of a scenario 5-type operation by mid-2010. Rather pessimistically, Cilliers 
& Malan (2005, 98) argue, these “dates have proven ambitious, and while substantive 
progress has been made in three of the five regions, will not be met”. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN DARFUR 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In transforming the old OAU into the AU, African leaders ostensibly sought to 
reinvigorate the quest to rid the continent of the scourge of violent conflict. As has 
already been discussed, a number of new initiatives and mechanisms were 
incorporated within the framework of the new continental organization to this very 
end. In the Common African Defence and Security Policy, the Peace and Security 
Council and the African Standby Force, the AU has both the mandate and the tools 
capable of making a significant impact in this regard. Indeed, in accepting the 
responsibility to protect as well as asserting the right of the organization to intervene 
in defence of populations at risk the Constitutive Act broke new ground in the field of 
peace and security. As Powell (2005:14) notes, it is “the first international treaty to 
identify a right to intervene in a state for humanitarian objectives in cases other than 
genocide. The AU’s revitalized peace and security commitments are intended to break 
with the OAU’s tradition of ‘non-interference’ to build a new culture of ‘non-
indifference’”. 
 
That being said, drafting policy documents and formalizing standby arrangements are 
by far the easiest aspects in establishing such a plan of action. The real test of the 
organization’s capacity for ensuring peace, security and stability in Africa is that of 
implementation. According to Adebajo (2008:136), “operationalizing the AU’s 
security mechanism will … require a political will and commitment that its leaders 
have not always demonstrated in the past”. Moreover, the organization also faces a 
number of financial and capacity-related hurdles that are likely to impact upon its 
ability to conduct effective peacekeeping operations. Even the UN, an organization 
with vastly more experience and resources, has faced such challenges in its own 
attempts at addressing conflict through direct means. In an oft-repeated statement, the 
Brahimi Report (UN, 2000:viii) emphatically argued: 
 
“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should 
not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when 
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the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be 
prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the 
ability and determination to defeat them … Without renewed 
commitment on the part of member states, significant institutional 
change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be 
capable of executing the critical … tasks member states assign to it”. 
 
In order to better assess the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping capability, 
this chapter therefore adopts an operational approach. That is to say, it addresses the 
practicality of the AU’s proposed peace and security architecture by exploring those 
issues that have impacted upon the organization at ground level – during the 
deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Although Burundi was the first operation 
conducted by the AU, the African Union Mission in Sudan was selected to be 
subjected to such analysis for a number of compelling reasons. 
 
First and foremost, the magnitude of the conflict is virtually unprecedented. Indeed, 
one commentator has described Darfur as Africa’s very own Palestine (Collins, 
2008:299); while the UN (cited in Powell, 2005:41) has gone so far as to label the 
crisis as “the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world”. Second, 
the level of human suffering and credible allegations of government complicity in this 
regard in particular highlight two important issues: the responsibility to protect and 
intervene for humanitarian purposes, as well as the deployment of a military operation 
in order to create conditions conducive to conflict resolution. Third, although similar 
in nature, AMIS was faced with a far more complicated and daunting task than the 
organization’s previous outing in Burundi.32 The latter is one of the smallest states in 
Africa while Darfur is roughly comparable in size to France. Moreover, the 
deployment of AMIB was more or less supported by all parties concerned. The 
Government of Sudan (GoS), however, was staunchly opposed to any interference in 
its affairs by the international community and has actively frustrated all such efforts. 
Finally, the response to the conflict in Darfur has seen substantial interaction and 
cooperation between the international community, the AU and the UN and therefore 
                                                 
32 AMIS is also the AU’s most recent operation. The current African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) is still underway and as such does not represent a suitable case study. Methodologically 
speaking, one can only undertake a fair and accurate assessment of an operation once it has run its 
course and its mandate has expired. 
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provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between Africa and its 
partners in an actual peacekeeping environment. 
 
As such, the chapter commences with a brief introduction to the current conflict, 
making sure to emphasize those aspects that have had a profound impact upon the 
AU’s peacekeeping operation. Thereafter, an overview of the AU’s response to the 
crisis is presented. This includes a discussion of the events leading up to the 
deployment of an African peacekeeping operation, the travails of AMIS I, its eventual 
expansion into AMIS II, and the end of the mission in 2007. The final part of the 
chapter provides a broad evaluation of the AU’s successes and failures in Darfur. The 
aim in this regard being to highlight those fundamental challenges that are likely to 
significantly undermine the organization’s prospects of representing a viable regional 
peacekeeping capability. Briefly, said challenges include a lack of political will; 
financial and other resource constraints; weak institutional capacity; as well as an 
overly limited scope in how such conflict situations are addressed. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT 
 
While it is commonly held that the Great Lakes region33 is the most conflict-ravaged 
on the continent, the scale of the crises in Sudan and its borderlands is at least 
comparable if not worse than the conflicts in those states. As de Waal (2007a:1) 
points out, “the war in Darfur is the most recent manifestation of a pattern of extreme 
political violence that has afflicted the peripheries of the Sudanese state over many 
generations … for twenty years it has afflicted most of the southern, eastern and 
western borderlands”. The harsh reality is that Sudan has been engulfed in some or 
other form of violent conflict, be it ethnic warfare, civil war, coup d’état or interstate 
war, for more than fifty years (ACPP, 2006:41). This point is as true of Darfur as it is 
of the country as a whole. According to Collins (2008:272) “few have understood that 
the disaster is not some spontaneous eruption … but the latest episode in the forty-
year tragic conflict for control of the great basin of Lake Chad”.34 
 
                                                 
33 Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC. 
34 See Figures 7 and 8 for maps of Sudan and Darfur respectively. 
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Most popular commentaries tend to vastly oversimplify the Darfur conflict and have 
tended to portray it as a polarized struggle between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ – racial 
labels uncritically cut and pasted from the concurrent north-south conflict in southern 
Sudan (de Waal, 2007a:2). In reality, the war in Darfur is rooted in a number of 
interconnected and longstanding issues, while that of ethnic identity is merely a 
tenuous by-product of these struggles. First, following major drought and famine in 
the mid-1980s the exhaustion of cultivable land caused disputes between farmers and 
herders/nomads in the region to become more common and more violent. Second, 
there were few effective government services capable of easing the struggle for 
diminishing resources. In Williams (2006:174) words, “the spasmodic functioning of 
Darfur’s systems of law and order left the region without consistent mechanisms to 
resolve disputes peacefully”. Consequently, weapons flowed into Darfur as both sides 
sought to protect themselves and their assets because the government was simply 
incapable, while tensions were merely exacerbated as a harsh Islamist regime took 
power in Khartoum in 1989. (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:3). 
 
Crucially, de Waal (2007a:3) further argues that “Sudan’s conflicts arise from the 
ruthless ways in which the centre preys on the peripheries, with racial, ethnic, and 
religious conflicts being secondary to these dynamics”. Simply put, the Darfur crisis 
is the most contemporary manifestation of Sudan’s post-independence history of 
centre-periphery tensions. The hyper-dominance enjoyed by Khartoum is arguably the 
single most important reality in the country. The capital and its surrounds consist of a 
middle-income enclave surrounded by provinces that are not only poor but are also 
suffering from development processes running in reverse. While the centre possesses 
immense private wealth, a class of skilled professionals and a political culture that has 
a strong liberal tradition, the peripheries are subject to processes of subjugation and 
exploitation (de Waal, 2007a:4). As was argued in Chapter 2, such a discrepancy 
between groups has been identified as one of the key causes of violent conflict. 
 
However, the current phase of the conflict was triggered in February 2003 when the 
Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), previously the Darfur Liberation Front 
(DLF), attacked government institutions in El Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state 
(Powell, 2005:41). At the time, the rebels’ demands included that the government 
bring an end to the political and socioeconomic marginalization of the region and, 
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most importantly, halt the activities of the livestock herders’ militias known as 
Janjawiid (Toga, 2007:214). As Mohamed (2007:208) notes, “it has become clearly 
evident that the government had an undeclared alliance with the nomads, who 
happened to be Arabs”. Perceiving the government as either unable or unwilling to 
protect their villages against raids by the nomads, the rebels accused the government 
of complicity and therefore declared it as the true enemy. 
 
Later that year, a second insurgency organization, the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM), joined with the SLA/M to wage a military offensive against the GoS and the 
militia groups. The JEM was very different from the secular SLA/M and proved to be 
more of a rival than an ally in the struggle against Khartoum. Unlike the indigenous 
African origins of the latter, the former had its beginnings amongst the so-called 
‘riverized’ Darfuris, a patronizing term used by traditionalists to describe those from 
Darfur living in Khartoum who had adopted many of the customs and characteristics 
of the Arabs – including Islam. Crucially, however, many had become increasingly 
embittered by marginalized treatment and discrimination toward them, despite their 
partial integration into the urban life of the centre (Collins, 2008:287). 
 
In retaliation to further rebel attacks on el Fashir and Mellit, the second largest city in 
North Darfur, the GoS forces launched a major land and air assault (Toga, 2007:214). 
Thereafter, major fighting broke-out throughout Darfur and a number of easy victories 
for the highly mobile rebels dramatically revealed that the several thousand 
government troops stationed in the region were ill-prepared and inadequate to contain 
such a significant insurgency campaign (Collins, 2008:288). Recognizing the army’s 
ineffectiveness, Khartoum hastily rearmed and unleashed the Arab Janjawiid militias 
in what de Waal (cited in Prunier, 2005:99) rather horrifyingly described as “counter-
insurgency on the cheap”. With military and political backing, the Janjawiid began 
intentionally targeting civilians from African tribes in reprisal for their perceived 
support of the rebels, but also to gain access to valuable land and water occupied by 
non-Arab farming communities (Powell, 2005:41). The typical pattern of attack has 
involved government aircraft bombing towns and villages followed by strafing from 
helicopter gunships. Ground assaults then ensue, often jointly between GoS troops 
and militia forces. The Janjawiid are then ‘rewarded’ with carte blanche to loot, rape, 
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plunder and kill indiscriminately in a manner reminiscent of medieval warfare 
(O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:7). 
 
Further complicating the crisis in Darfur is the oft over-looked regional dimensions of 
this conflict. Marchal (2007:173) argues that, “even though eastern Chad and northern 
Central African Republic (CAR) are increasingly the location of skirmishes, full-scale 
battles and abuses against the civilian population, Darfur’s war is still 
overwhelmingly seen as an internal Sudanese crisis”. Indeed, both Chad and Libya 
have historically been significant destabilizing factors in Darfur. Since 1965, Chad 
has been subject to one of the longest civil wars on the continent and Darfur has 
provided a natural hinterland for the rebel group Front de Libération Nationale du 
Tchad (FROLINAT), which was established in Nyala, Sudan in 1966. Moreover, 
Khartoum itself also provided support to FROLINAT in its war against the Chad 
government. This situation was further exacerbated when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 
developed a growing interest in the Chadian conflict. As early as 1969 FROLINAT 
was given rear bases in Libya and soon after Gaddafi revived an old border dispute by 
claiming the Aozou strip between the two states. Another dimension, little noted at the 
time, was Gaddafi’s racism. More than just a strident Pan-Arabist, the Libyan leader 
was an Arab cultural supremacist (Prunier, 2005:42-44). As O’Niell & Cassis 
(2005:3) point out, “not only guns were imported into Darfur, but also an increasingly 
racist ideology … Janjawiid leaders are among those said to have been trained in 
Libya”. 
 
This trend has continued over the years and merely served to further destabilize the 
region as a whole. Khartoum has been backing two Chadian rebel groups, the Front 
Uni Pour la Changement (FUC) and the Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques 
(RADF), both of which are vehemently opposed to President Idriss Déby whom the 
GoS originally helped bring to power in 1990 and are known to be operating in 
Darfur. Moreover, Chad’s armed forces have pursued these groups across the border 
and have been observed in Sudan; while Déby’s government has recruited fighters 
from among the Darfuri population as part of his own proxy war and also backed the 
SLA/M and JEM by providing shelter and other support within Chad. The crisis in 
Darfur has been further compounded by the rapidly deteriorating security situation in 
the fragile Central African Republic, as Chadian rebels based in Darfur often traverse 
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the CAR en route to attacking Chad’s capital N’djamena; whilst Sudan is reportedly 
supporting the rebellion in the CAR in an attempt to further complicate the crisis and 
frustrate international efforts aimed at engineering peace in the region and Darfur in 
particular (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:3 - 4). 
 
4.3 THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN 
 
For the world at large Darfur was and has remained the quintessential African crisis: 
distant, esoteric, extremely violent, rooted in complex ethnic and historical factors, 
and devoid of any identifiable practical interest for the rich nations. Once the 
international media got hold of the story, however, Darfur suddenly became a 
‘humanitarian crisis’ and domestic populations in the developed world began to put 
pressure on their governments to take action (Prunier, 2005:124). As Collins 
(2008:291) points out, “the political response from the West was ambivalent. With its 
armed forces ensnared in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was unwilling to 
commit its few remaining troops to a difficult military mission in yet another Muslim 
country. Although both Britain and France had regularly been involved in 
peacekeeping missions in Africa, neither was inclined to plunge into isolated Darfur”. 
Furthermore, the UN was faced with the dilemma of possibly having to recognize that 
genocide was occurring in Darfur and therefore obliging the organization to intervene, 
but without member states giving it the means to do so (Prunier, 2005:142). 
Consequently, the AU became peacekeeper and peacemaker by default, because no 
other actor would take on the challenge (Flint & de Waal, 2008:173). 
 
4.3.1 AMIS I 
 
The catalyst for AU involvement in Darfur was the signing of the Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur (HCFA) in N’djamena on 8 April 
2004. Agreed between the GoS, SLA/M, and JEM and negotiated by host Chadian 
leader President Déby, the HCFA (2004:Art. 1; Art. 6) represented an agreement in 
principle on the part of the parties to cease hostilities, facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the region, combine their efforts to establish a global and 
definitive peace in Darfur, and committed the GoS to neutralize the Janjawiid militia. 
Provision was also made for the establishment of a ceasefire commission (CFC) 
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composed of two high ranking officials from each of the three parties, Chad, as well 
as the international community, mandated to operationalize the ceasefire mechanisms 
on the ground (HCFA, 2004:Art. 3). During this initial phase the AU was first drawn 
in as a witness to the negotiations, then as a co-mediator and, finally, it was tasked 
with bringing the proposed CFC to life (Flint & de Waal, 2008:173). To this end, the 
chairperson of the AU Commission, former President of Mali Alpha Omar Konaré, 
dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur from 7 – 16 May 2004 in order to assess the 
security situation on the ground and advise him on the establishment of the CFC 
(Appiah-Mensah, 2005:8). 
 
Following the reconnaissance mission’s recommendations, at its 10th meeting on May 
25 2004 in Addis Ababa, the PSC authorized the chairperson of the AU Commission 
“to take all steps deemed necessary to ensure an effective monitoring of the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, in particular through the deployment of an AU 
observer mission, with the required civilian component and, if necessary the 
protection element” (AU, 2004b:Art. A.6). To this end, the AU entered into a major 
agreement with the GoS and the other Sudanese parties to the conflict, which cleared 
the path for the smooth deployment of AMIS I. On 28 May 2004, in a meeting 
convened in Addis Ababa, the Agreement with the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities 
for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers 
in the Darfur was signed. The AU was acknowledged as the lead international body in 
the region as well as the operational arm of the earlier N’djamena agreement and it 
was further agreed that AU Military Observers (MILOBs) and a small protection 
force drawn from AU TCCs would be deployed in order to monitor the HCFA in line 
with the earlier PSC decision of 25 May (AU, 2004c:Art. 2.4; Art. 2.6). 
 
The first point worth noting in regard to AMIS I was its size. Initially, the AU 
observer mission was composed of the twelve members of the CFC and 132 
MILOBS, 60 of which were from the AU member states, 36 from the three Sudanese 
parties, 18 from Chad and the rest provided by the international community (Toga, 
2007:219). Moreover, the proposed protection force was limited to a maximum of 300 
troops (AU, 2004c:Art. 2.6). Secondly, the AU mission was further limited to 
conducting a traditional peacekeeping-type role. As the Status of Mission Agreement 
(SOMA) on the Establishment and Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the 
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Darfur Area of the Sudan (SOMA, 2004:Para. 5) notes, the mission was mandated to 
“coordinate investigations, verifications, monitoring compliance in accordance with 
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and Implementation Modalities, and also 
report violations of the Agreement”. Moreover, the protection force was limited to 
protecting the MILOBs and not the civilian population (Prunier, 2005:144). As 
Collins (2008:292) argues, AMIS I simply “was not a peacekeeping force”. 
 
On 2 June an advance mission composed of AU officials and six MILOBs from 
Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria and Senegal deployed to Sudan with a mandate of securing 
and establishing the mission HQ in el Fashir. AMIS I formally commenced its 
operations on 9 June with the arrival of a further three MILOBs from Kenya, 
Mozambique and Nigeria and a modest ceremony symbolized by the hoisting of the 
AU flag at its HQ (Toga, 2007:219). Characteristically, the MILOBs were deployed 
with only one Thuraya satellite phone to link them with the AU in Addis Ababa and 
nothing else – not even their own vehicles, so crucial for conducting patrols and 
displaying a presence on the ground. Although mission strength slowly built-up from 
this point, AMIS I was only fully operational by the end of July. Sector commanders 
were appointed and assigned to the six newly created sectors – el Fashir, Nyala, el 
Geneina, Kabkabiya, Tine, and Abeche in Chad – on 22 July and were deployed by 25 
July. Due to a distinct lack of civilian administrative support, commanders were 
issued $5000 each for essential logistical needs. Moreover, each sector was only 
allocated four vehicles – a Toyota Hilux pick-up and three Toyota Land Cruisers – 
and two Thuraya satellite phones. Once in the field, commanders rented civilian 
accommodation in order to establish sector HQs. Following a decision adopted at the 
AU Summit from 6 – 8 July (AU, 2004d:Para. 7) the first detachment of force 
protectors, consisting of an infantry battalion from Rwanda, had arrived in Darfur by 
the end of the month, followed shortly thereafter by an additional company from 
Nigeria – bringing the total number to 300 (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:8 - 9). 
 
The problems that bedevilled the AU’s mission, which ultimately earned the scorn of 
both Darfuris and the international community, were foreshadowed in those early 
days. According to Flint & de Waal (2008:174), “the N’djamena Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement signed on 8 April was a fatally flawed document”. For one 
thing, it had no maps and professional military officers on both sides warned that a 
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ceasefire without maps was totally unworkable. Furthermore, the document itself 
existed in two versions. A typewritten text was originally signed by the belligerents 
on 8 April, but later that same day the GoS delegation approached the Chadian 
mediators and insisted that an extra sentence be added to Article 6 of the HCFA. On 
the instructions of the Chadian foreign minister the AU representative, Sam Ibok, 
hand-wrote the following addition: “the forces of the armed opposition should be 
assembled in clearly identified sites” – something that the two rebel groups never 
agreed to (Flint & de Waal, 2008:175). What is more, despite previous experience in 
Burundi, in the barely one month between the AU’s decision to deploy a presence on 
the ground and the arrival of the first personnel very little pre-deployment assessment 
and training was possible – a fact compounded by continuing human resource 
limitations and a lack of institutional capacity and expertise at the AU (Appiah-
Mensah, 2005:9). 
 
In spite of the enormous strain the establishment of AMIS I had already placed on the 
limited operational and logistical resources of the AU, the organization was at the 
time contemplating enhancing the mandate and size of the force in order to enhance 
its effectiveness on the ground. Indeed, in the light of continued attacks by the 
Janjawiid militia against the civilian population, as well as other human rights abuses 
and violations of the N’djamena ceasefire by all concerned, the PSC requested that the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission table a proposal to “transform the said mission 
into a fully-fledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite mandate and size, to 
ensure the effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement, with particular 
emphasis on the disarmament and neutralization of the Janjawiid militia, the 
protection of the civilian population and the facilitation of the delivery of the 
humanitarian assistance” (AU, 2004e:Para. 9). 
 
Somewhat predictably, however, Khartoum fervently resisted the AU’s attempts at 
both deploying a larger force and enhancing the mandate of the operation. In its bid to 
undermine such efforts, the GoS actively solicited and received the political backing 
of sympathetic AU member states such as Egypt and Libya and also rallied a number 
of weaker African states behind its cause. Consequently, the PSC backed down from 
its campaign to enhance AMIS I into a robust Chapter VII-type peacekeeping 
operation (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:6). As O’Niell & Cassis (2005:13) argue, a 
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fundamental challenge to the AU mission has been the organization’s position that 
“Khartoum’s cooperation and consent are required … The African Union, with its 
binding decisions through the PSC, could have ‘coerced’ Sudan to allow greater 
freedom of action for AMIS. Yet the AU chose not to try and therefore severely 
limited the scope of AMIS’ activities”. Indeed, it would seem that despite the rhetoric 
the AU prioritized respect for Sudan’s sovereignty over the protection of the people of 
Darfur. 
 
4.3.2 AMIS II 
 
In the meantime, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur continued to 
deteriorate. By October 2004 all parties to the conflict were dragging their feet on the 
diplomatic front; while attacks on and killings of civilians and policemen by 
government-backed militia and rebel fighters increased, as did incidences of highway 
robbery and banditry (Adebajo, 2008:137). Indeed, despite the presence of AMIS I, 
GoS troops, the Janjawiid as well as the two rebel groups continued to violate the 
terms of the HCFA with impunity and it became patently clear that such a small and 
under-resourced operation simply could not carry-out its mandate effectively and 
proved incapable of deterring the belligerents. According to Flint & de Waal 
(2008:175), “the AU monitors, the weakest of all the parties on the ground by far, 
could only watch and complain”. 
 
On 20 October the PSC authorized an expansion of AMIS I that also included a more 
comprehensive mandate. However, this expanded operation was smaller than that 
which had earlier been proposed by the AU and did not include an explicit provision 
for the protection of civilians. Unsurprisingly, a triumphant regime in Khartoum 
welcomed this development (Kagwanja & Mutahi 2007:6). It was agreed that AMIS II 
would be comprised of 3,320 personnel, including a 2,341-strong military force, up to 
815 civilian police, as well as the appropriate civilian component (AU, 2004f:Para. 7). 
The strengthened mission was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the 
HCFA; assist in a confidence-building capacity between the hostile parties; contribute 
to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; as well as oversee 
the safe return of refugees and IDPs (AU, 2004f:Para. 4). Within the framework of 
this mandate AMIS II was tasked with, inter alia, performing the following two tasks: 
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(a) protecting static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent 
threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities; and 
(b) protecting civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the 
immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood 
that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the 
GoS (AU, 2004f:Para. 6). (emphasis added) 
 
Despite the urgent operational requirements of this reinforcement, it took over six 
months for AMIS II to be deployed – hampered by a failure once again to devise a 
sound logistics plan; a lack of vehicles, oil, furniture, stationary and communications 
equipment; bureaucratic red tape at AU HQ; a lack of strategic intelligence and clarity 
regarding the use of force; a lack of linguistic and driving skills; as well as difficulties 
acquiring accommodation (Adebajo, 2008:137). These problems were further 
exacerbated by a power struggle between TCCs, especially Nigeria and Rwanda 
(Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7). Consequently, in January 2005 the Darfur Integrated 
Task Force (DITF) was established by the AU with the specific purpose of 
streamlining the planning, force generation, procurement of logistics and 
administrative support, as well as liaise with AU HQ in Addis Ababa and 
international partners (AU, n.d.). By end April just less than 2,500 personnel had been 
deployed on the ground – a figure far short of the proposed force strength (Powell, 
2005:44). 
 
Against the background of this extremely slow build-up the security situation in 
Darfur became increasingly fluid. As Appiah-Mensah (2006:4) notes, the situation 
was characterized by: increasing infiltration of Chadian rebels into the AU Area of 
Responsibility (AOR); a dramatic escalation in the number of ceasefire violations; 
attacks upon, and hijacking of, non-governmental organization (NGO) vehicles; 
continued attacks on civilians and the burning of villages; collection of illegal tolls at 
makeshift checkpoints; and, most significantly, attacks on, and harassment of, AU 
personnel by the Janjawiid and breakaway factions of the rebel movements. Indeed, 
deliberate targeting of and firing at AU personnel added a new dimension to an 
already tumultuous security situation. As Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:7) note, “the AU 
had come to be viewed by protagonists in Darfur as a partisan player … in an ironic 
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twist, the AU’s protection force itself needed protection as it came under increasing 
attacks from the state-backed militias and rebels alike”. In one of the first incidences 
an AMIS investigation team was attacked between Khor Abeche and Niteaga on 28 
March 2005. The team leader was shot in the neck, while both the driver and civilian 
guide suffered similar injuries (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:11). Other reported incidents 
include: an attack on an AMIS patrol outside Harafa; the shooting of two Rwandese 
soldiers; the death of five Nigerian troops and two civilian support staff, as well as a 
further three troops who were seriously injured near Kourabishi; and, the abduction of 
an entire 18-strong AMIS patrol team, an American advisor and a rescue team of 20 
in west Darfur (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7). 
 
This is not to say, however, that the AU operation was completely impotent. In the 
face of these increasing challenges, from 10 – 22 March an AU-led Joint Assessment 
Mission (JAM) deployed to the region with a view to enhancing the operation’s 
capacity. At the end of the visit, the assessment mission (AU, 2005:Para. 17) observed 
that, “AMIS is making a significant difference in those areas in which it is deployed”. 
According to Fabrice Weissman, head of mission for Médecins Sans Frontières (cited 
in Flint & de Waal, 2008:176) there were “some good African Union commanders 
[who] really made a difference locally – when they organized patrols to go with the 
women to collect firewood; when they would try to defuse conflicts between some 
rebel groups and some Arab militias; to organize a migration, for instance, of cattle 
along certain roads”. For the most part, local people reported that AMIS patrolling did 
indeed reduce attacks on their camps. However, many of the operation’s successes 
came down to dynamic leadership more concerned with results than rules. For 
example, General Festus Okwonko of Nigeria, AMIS’ first force commander, 
breached protocol and pushed the limits of his mandate on a regular basis whenever 
he thought there was likely to be trouble and in order to protect civilians (Flint & de 
Waal, 2008:176). 
 
The overwhelming reality, however, was that AMIS was weak and appallingly 
resourced and neither its leadership nor its capacities could sustain its early successes. 
Indeed, despite the sterling work being done at grassroots-level, the AU assessment 
mission also found that: 
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(a) there remain large areas that are beyond the operations’ reach on all but an 
occasional basis; 
(b) the assumption on which the operation was planned and the overall level 
of compliance with the HCFA have not been borne out; 
(c) notwithstanding the fact that AMIS II has nearly reached its authorized 
troop ceiling, it remains well short of being fully operationally effective; 
and 
(d) while there is no need to change the existing mandate, the tasks within this 
framework should be reprioritized, with greater emphasis on creating a 
secure environment (AU, 2005:Para. 17). 
 
It was therefore recommended that AMIS II itself be further strengthened initially in 
two phases, with a possible follow-on operation to be decided upon in September 
2005. The first phase aimed to increase the mission’s strength to the existing 
authorized ceiling of 3,320 personnel as soon as possible. The second phase was to 
expand AMIS II to a total of 5,587 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and 
support staff. These recommendations were reviewed by the MSC; and the PSC, at its 
28th meeting held on 28th April 2005, requested that the AU Commission increase the 
mission to its authorized strength by the end of May and further increase AMIS II to 
6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police and support staff by end September 
of that year (AU, 2005:Para. 18; Para. 19). 
 
While this proposed doubling in force size was no doubt perceived by the AU itself as 
being indicative of the organization’s commitment to resolving the situation in Darfur 
and reflected a major step in this regard, O’Hanlon & Singer (cited in Williams, 
2006:176) make a significant point with regards to technical capability. That is, two 
rules of thumb are commonly used when calculating the necessary force size for 
civilian-protection operations. The first is based on the assumption that 2 – 10 troops 
are required for every 1,000 inhabitants within the crisis zone. The second method is 
based on the protection force being at least the size of the largest indigenous armed 
force. Therefore, given the approximately 6 million people living in Darfur as well as 
estimates that place GoS forces in the region at 40,000 - 45,000 and the Janjawiid 
militia at 10,000 – 20,000 strong, AMIS should have been comprised a minimum of 
12,000 and potentially 45,000 troops (Williams, 2006:177). 
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Nonetheless, by July 2005 the AU operation had successfully commenced its second 
enhancement exercise, known as AMIS IIE, and by October 6,773 personnel of the 
projected 7,731 strength deployed in country (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:7). The full 
complement of military personnel was expected to comprise three Nigerian battalions, 
three Rwandan battalions, one South African battalion, a South African engineer 
company, a South African Forward Headquarters (FHQ) reserve, a Senegalese 
battalion, a Kenyan military police (MP) detachment, and a Gambian FHQ company 
(Appiah-Mensah, 2006:4). As Appiah-Mensah (2006:4) goes on to argue, however, 
“contrary to expectations ... this significant increase in numbers [did] not necessarily 
translate proportionally to the operational efficiency and effectiveness on the ground, 
mainly because of the lack of appropriate equipment”. Arguably the most glaring 
shortcoming of the AU operation has been its total and utter dependence on the 
international community’s support. Indeed, although AMIS IIE should be commended 
for its rapid deployment, the same cannot be said of the arrangements for the logistics 
and funding so crucial to such an operation. The mission has had to operate with 
approximately half of its critical force enablers, such as vehicles and information and 
communication equipment, all of which is supplied by the AU’s international partners 
(Appiah-Mensah, 2006:5). 
 
Throughout this period the AU and international community at large, most notably the 
United States and Britain, were actively engaged in diplomatic measures aimed at 
securing a political settlement to the crisis in Darfur. In late 2005, under the auspices 
of the AU mediation team, the seventh round of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which 
had initially begun in July 2004 commenced in Abuja, Nigeria. Led by Salim Ahmed 
Salim, former Secretary-General of the OAU, the talks aimed to broker a 
comprehensive peace agreement between the GoS and the various rebel groups. By 5 
May 2006 the so-called Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed (Nathan, 
2007:245). However, only the government in Khartoum and one of the SLA/M 
factions, led by Minni Arkoy Minawi, put pen to paper; the JEM, Abdel Wahid al 
Nur, leader of the other SLA/M faction, and the newly formed Sudan Federal 
Democratic Alliance (SFDA) rejected the terms of the DPA (Adebajo, 2008:137). 
Three primary dynamics conspired to undermine this process: first, the belligerents 
themselves were unwilling to engage in negotiations and failed to forge agreements; 
the AU and its international partners were desperate for a quick accord and pursued a 
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counter-productive strategy of deadline diplomacy; and, consequently, the mediators 
were unable to embark upon effective arbitration (Nathan, 2006:3). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the accord was soon rendered a dead letter and failed to bring about 
peace, and in certain respects heightened the conflict. Shortly after the Abuja 
agreement was signed violence, insecurity and forced displacements rose in Darfur – a 
result of both renewed Janjawiid and GoS attacks on the rebel groups, as well as 
fighting between the non-signatories and the newly formed government of national 
unity (GoNU) comprising Khartoum and the Minawi SLA/M faction (Fadul & 
Tanner, 2007:284). In the aftermath of the DPA, Khartoum condemned the non-
signatories as terrorists and in August of that year successfully pressured the AU to 
expel these parties from the CFC (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:9). According to Flint & 
de Waal (2008:179), this move all but “destroyed what remained of the AU’s 
impartiality and with it the troops’ security and ease of movement”, as the 
organization was no longer perceived to be an honest broker. 
 
Subsequently, attacks on AMIS personnel escalated, leaving more than 40 
peacekeepers dead by the time their mandate ended on 31 December 2007. Indeed, by 
the beginning of 2006 the situation in the borderlands had continued to deteriorate as 
an increasing number of deserters from the Chadian army as well as rebels crossed 
into western Darfur, where they joined the ranks of Sudanese rebels and the Janjawiid 
operating as bandits preying on NGOs, all but brining a stop to humanitarian aid. This 
tragic set of circumstances produced an even more strident outcry from the 
international community to transform AMIS from essentially a monitoring operation 
into a robust UN peacekeeping force (Collins, 2008:295). 35 
 
                                                 
35 Towards the end of 2005, the second Joint Assessment Mission, comprised of AU, UN, US and EU 
personnel, travelled to Darfur in order to determine the way forward. In light of the continued 
insecurity in the region at that time and AMIS’ manifest shortcomings, it was proposed that the AU 
hand over its operation in Darfur to the UN – reflecting calls that had begun as far back as 2004. 
Consequently, and after protracted negotiations between the AU, UN and GoS, on 31 July 2007 the 
Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1769, formally establishing the hybrid African 
Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. At full 
deployment, UNAMID, which was to be managed by the AU at ground level and backstopped 
financially and otherwise by the UN, would consist of 19,555 military personnel, 360 MILOBs and 
liaison officers, 3,772 civilian police, and appropriate support staff to begin deployment by October 
2007 and assume authority from AMIS no later than 31 December. Crucially, UNAMID was to 
incorporate existing AMIS personnel as well as give preference to African TCCs for the provision of 
the remainder. 
 - 78 - 
 
4.4   LESSONS FROM THE SUDAN ENDEAVOUR 
 
In evaluating the AU’s operation in Darfur it is important not to be bogged down by 
focussing on specific, performance-related issues. Whether or not AMIS was 
successful in achieving its mandate, for instance, is not the overriding concern in 
terms of the scope of this study. In the words of O’Niell & Cassis (2005:6), the AU 
“could not have chosen a more daunting conflict for such an operation. Darfur is as 
large as France, with few passable roads, rudimentary communications systems and 
feeble power and water resources … This scenario would challenge the most 
seasoned, best trained and well-equipped peacekeepers”, let alone those of a newly 
established organization. Nonetheless, appraisals of AMIS have in general been 
exceptionally critical. Appiah-Mensah (2005:7), the former special representative of 
the Chairman of the AU Commission and head of AMIS HQ in Khartoum, described 
the operation as “spineless and ineffective”, while a western officer (cited in Flint & 
de Waal, 2008:177) who liaised with AMIS for a number of years said the operation 
“was weak and appallingly resourced. It neither had the capacity to ask for what it 
needed nor the ability to manage what it had”. 
 
Rather, the manner in which this operation was conducted is significant in terms of its 
wider implications. That is to say, the process of moving from the declaratory stage to 
an operational domain is a poignant test of the AU’s conflict management 
mechanisms and undoubtedly holds some clues as to how the organization is likely to 
conduct itself in this regard in the future. Indeed, a number of fundamental issues – a 
lack of political will, financial constraints, weak institutional capacity, and the limited 
scope of the operation – conspired to undermine AMIS’ effectiveness. What remains 
to be determined, however, is whether or not these challenges are significant enough 
to warrant concern and whether or not they will have an adverse effect on any future 
AU peacekeeping operations given the ambitious ASF model that is currently under 
development. Neethling (2006:108), for one, speaks of a so-called “declaration-reality 
gap” and argues that the process is still “something in the realm of a paper, or a 
wishing phase, and could even become derailed or stalled”. 
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4.4.1 Lack of political will 
 
Perhaps the most pertinent issue is that of political will and the distinct lack thereof 
shown by African leaders and the AU more specifically with regards to the crisis in 
Darfur. As has already been observed, the Constitutive Act (AU, 2000:Art. 4.h; AU, 
2003:Art. 4.h) empowers the organization to intervene in the internal affairs of a 
member state in order to restore peace and security in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to 
legitimate order. If ever a case existed where this provision could be employed 
without hesitation, it is in Darfur. As Slim (2004:812) vociferously argues: 
 
“The government of Sudan must take primary responsibility for what has 
happened and continues to happen in Darfur. It has both perpetrated 
atrocities and then blocked the humanitarian response … Such obstruction 
and denial are typical of those seeking to mask orchestrated killing, 
terrorizing and forced displacement of civilians, and should have been 
recognized for what they were by powerful states much earlier”. 
 
In reality, however, the international community was very slow to react and the 
response by the AU was less than forthcoming and extremely disappointing when it 
eventually materialized. Throughout the duration of the AU’s involvement in this 
crisis, and despite the GoS’ clear complicity in the human tragedy that has unfolded in 
Darfur, the organization has been at pains to respect the sovereignty of Sudan at the 
expense of those on the ground. The disjuncture between the proclaimed stance of 
‘non-indifference’ and the R2P doctrine that ostensibly underpins the AU’s peace and 
security architecture on the one hand and the organization’s willingness to actually 
take action in this respect on the other hand is extremely evident (Williams, 
2006:169). For instance, whether or not the conflict in Darfur, given its ethnic 
dynamic, constitutes genocide is one of the most contentious issues surrounding the 
current crisis. It is telling, however, that while former US President George W. Bush, 
former Secretary of State Colin Powell and Senator John Kerry all eventually 
concluded that genocide had occurred and the personal representative of former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Sudan, Jan Egeland, referred to ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
the AU was unwilling to condemn the situation as such. Had it done so, this would 
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have necessitated a much stronger response on the part of the continental body than 
was actually witnessed (Collins, 2008:292; Prunier, 2005:157). 
 
However, the most striking example of the AU’s lack of political will in engaging the 
conflict in Darfur is evidenced by the extremely restrictive framework within which 
AMIS was forced to operate. Even in the expanded guise of AMIS II, the 
approximately 7000-strong operation was hard-pressed to make any significant impact 
– the mandate clearly confining troops to: investigating ceasefire violations; 
conducting regular patrols in order to build confidence and act as a visible deterrent; 
as well as, protect NGO and humanitarian agencies in order to facilitate the delivery 
of aid (AU, 2005:Para. 16). Indeed, Khartoum’s key condition in permitting the 
deployment of the AU mission was that it would not be a robust peacekeeping force. 
The AU simply conceded far too much to the GoS in negotiating the modalities for 
the operation (Collins, 2008:298). As Grono (2006, 626) argues, “a critical limitation 
of the AU mission is its mandate. It is largely an observer mission. It does not have a 
mandate to go out and proactively protect civilians. In fact, it can only protect 
civilians when they are being attacked in its presence, and only then if it feels it has 
enough troops to intervene – and too often it does not”. 
 
Despite these limitations, the international community still expected that AMIS would 
play a meaningful role in bringing about peace, stability and security in Darfur 
(Clough, n.d.:8). The second JAM report (cited in Appiah-Mensah, 2006:10) observed 
that the operation’s mandate was adequate, but merely needed to be “interpreted 
flexibly and robustly in order to maintain the force credibility, and provide the 
necessary degree of protection to civilians”. Simply put, field commanders were asked 
to interpret the mandate in line with their capabilities and resources in order to 
compensate for the shortcomings of their political masters – a totally unacceptable 
state of affairs, as operational requirements should be matched to the conditions on 
the ground and not the other way round. Rather damningly, Prunier (2005:145 - 146) 
asserts that, “the AU had been scheduled for a ‘Mission Impossible’ type of situation. 
It was supposed to substitute itself to the coalition of the unwilling, to stop what it was 
only mandated to observe, to operate on a shoestring and to keep the pretence of 
serious international involvement … Predictably all it achieved was a token 
presence”. 
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At the level of member states, substantial commitment to the operation has also been 
rather hard to come by, as the enthusiasm displayed when authorizing AMIS did not 
translate operationally. This point is echoed by Grono (2006:624), who notes that “it 
is in Darfur where the gap between formal recognition and implementation is at its 
greatest”. Indeed, troop contribution or a lack thereof has been one of the most 
persistent problems delaying deployment and ultimately undermining AMIS’ 
effectiveness, with only Nigeria and Rwanda initially contributing sizeable 
contingents and without whom it is unlikely that AMIS would ever have been able to 
achieve anything near its authorized force strength. As the International Crisis Group 
(2005a:8) notes, “African militaries are stretched thin, with approximately 18,600 
personnel assigned to UN peacekeeping operations” and, given the often tenuous 
security situation most African states face at home, are hard-pressed and rather 
unenthusiastic about contributing to AU operations as well. Such a state of affairs is 
particularly concerning in the light of the organization’s attempts at establishing a 
continental peacekeeping force. 
 
4.4.2 Weak institutional capacity 
 
As both Neethling (2006:101) and Williams (2006:172) point out – and was observed 
in Chapter 3 – “the process of establishing the ASF is still very much in the 
declaratory and macro-political phase” and “was not even remotely operational during 
the early stages of the Darfur crisis”. Indeed, when the AU authorized the deployment 
of AMIS I in mid-2004 the organization had yet to celebrate its second anniversary 
and many aspects of its comprehensive peace and security architecture, such as the 
CADSP, were still in the process of being conceptualized let alone implemented. For 
Mtimkulu (2005:35), however, “when violent conflict erupts, it holds no sympathy for 
an institution still learning to walk the rough terrain of resolving conflicts relying on 
armed forces as a cardinal instrument of displaying resolve”. The point being that ‘we 
are not ready’ is a totally unacceptable excuse when people are dying and one is in a 
position to take action – no matter how small such action may be. 
 
Nonetheless, AMIS has suffered from a number of significant capacity-related issues 
that do not bode well for the future of African peacekeeping operations. Before 
continuing in this vein it is worth recalling that, according to the AU’s own policy 
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framework, by the time AMIS I had been authorized the organization should have 
been more or less capable of managing a scenario 3-type stand-alone observer 
mission, while the RECs should have been close to finalizing their standby brigade 
arrangements (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6; Para. 3.11). In reality, however, there was a 
distinct lack of planning on the part of AMIS prior to the operation commencing 
(Bogland et al, 2008:40). For instance, the UN had to send an assistance cell to Addis 
Ababa to work with the AU in planning the military mission to Darfur as only one 
full-time professional staff member was dedicated to this task at AU HQ36 (Adebajo, 
2008:137); while, the AU’s Early Warning System lacks skills and expertise in 
political analysis and, according to Mwanasali (2008:48), this unit “simply relays 
information provided by member states and the international media”. Moreover, 
AMIS itself was comprised of a coalition of militarily powerful African states from 
across the continent rather than representing one of the five RECs. 
 
Predictably, these shortcomings were reflected at operational level. As was mentioned 
earlier, AMIS I deployed with insufficient transportation, and communication 
equipment and no prearranged accommodation. In light of these arduous operational 
conditions and apparently as an afterthought, the AU eventually secured the services 
of Pacific Architectural Engineers, contracted through the US State Department, for 
the most basic logistical support, including: camp construction, the provision of food 
and water, as well as laundry services (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:9). Furthermore, office 
equipment, stationery, furniture and sufficient petroleum, oils and lubricants to 
support the operation were not supplied until late November 2004; while it is only 
thanks to the generous donations of international partners, such as the UK, Canada 
and Holland, that AMIS has had the vehicles and air support so crucial to the 
operation (Appiah-Mensah, 2005:16).37 
 
                                                 
36 The PSOD, the unit within the AU responsible for the strategic and operational planning of 
peacekeeping missions, has a full-time staff of only 8 individuals. Compare this to the 630 staff within 
the UN DPKO, which is itself expected to increase by a further 295 as a result of the recent 
establishment of the Department of Field Support (DFS). 
 
37 Significant individual contributions to AMIS include: communications equipment provided by 
Germany; 3 helicopters and fuel from the Netherlands; 25 helicopters and 105 Armoured Personnel 
Carriers (APCs) from Canada; office equipment, construction and maintenance services provided by 
the USA; as well as air transport from NATO and the EU. 
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Over and above the issue of securing troop contributions discussed in the previous 
subsection, AMIS has been plagued by a number of other force generation-related 
challenges. Firstly, the quality of the troops supplied by TCCs has been poor and 
undermined the effectiveness of the force. Indeed, Appiah-Mensah (2005:17) claimed 
that “few people carry out the job of monitoring, investigating and reporting, while 
the majority assume the role of operational ‘passengers’ … and sector commanders 
have repeatedly expressed their frustration with the continuous influx … of personnel 
who cannot communicate and write in the operational language … [while] a good 
number of these ‘passengers’ have no driving skills whatsoever”. Secondly, before the 
formation of the DITF, things were done haphazardly and the information flow on 
personnel movements to and from the mission was virtually non-existent. This led to a 
situation in which there were neither AU reception parties to meet personnel arriving 
in the AOR nor sufficient resources to accommodate the new arrivals. Finally, in a 
bizarre bid to allow more Africans to benefit from the experience of this operation, a 
strict ban was put in place that forbade extended tours of duty. The unintended 
consequence being most of the pioneer principal commanders and key staff officers 
who made such an impact in the early stages of the operation were rotated and 
replaced (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:13). This problem is clearly highlighted by the 
successor to AMIS’ highly praised first force commander. Although enjoying the 
benefit of a far superior force, an international observer had this to say: 
 
“He was horrific. He had a totally different perspective. We got cut off 
from the humanitarian convoys. He wouldn’t allow us to meet with the 
humanitarian organizations … Under this new commander we weren’t 
permitted to share [security] information. But we did it anyway” (cited in 
Flint & de Waal, 2008:178). 
 
Training is another area where the AU’s limited capacity has once again been laid 
bare. Observers point to AMIS’ apparent inability to derive maximum benefit from 
the innumerable capacity-building programs that the AU’s international partners have 
brought to the mission. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of training and assistance 
packages for the troops in Darfur were put together by the international community 
themselves, with little or no input from the AU because it simply does not state its 
requirements or know exactly what it wants (Appiah-Mensah, 2006:13). A further 
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problem has been the under-utilisation of the various training centres that have been 
setup around the continent at enormous cost. These include the previously mentioned 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre in Accra, Ghana as well 
as the Kenya Peacekeeping Training Centre (KPTC) in Nairobi (Appiah-Mensah, 
2005:17). 
 
4.4.3 Financial constraints 
 
Despite the deteriorating security situation in the region, a lack of political will and 
weak institutional capacity that conspired to undermine the effectiveness of AMIS at 
ground-level, the troops managed to achieve some remarkable successes (ICG, 
2005b:4). As Williams (2006:178; 179) argues “these problems do not mean that 
AMIS personnel performed poorly as individuals”. Rather, “AMIS did protect the 
AU’s military observers … in the areas where it established a presence, both the 
security and humanitarian situation improved”. That being said, the AU’s operation in 
Darfur would not have been even remotely feasible without substantial financial 
backing from the international donor community, including: the UN, EU, NATO, the 
United States, Japan and South Korea (Gomes, 2008:127). According to Neethling 
(2006:99), “it should be noted that one of the realities of peacekeeping experience in 
Africa relates to financial constraints. In the past years, the extent of African 
peacekeeping was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but rather 
by insufficient funding”. 
 
At the time that the AU and the international community at large was proposing 
AMIS as a solution to the crisis in Darfur, the director of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Directorate (PSD), Sam Ibok, noted that the organization spent only $1.6 million – 
less than $31,000 per member state – a year on resolving conflicts throughout the 
entire continent (Williams, 2006:179). Indeed, in 2003 the organization’s entire 
proposed budget had been a meagre $43 million, of which member states neglected to 
pay a staggering $26 million. The following year the budget was revised upwards to 
$158 million38, a sum far smaller than the estimated $250 million required for AMIS 
                                                 
38 $68 million was to be financed by obligatory payments from member states and the remaining $95 
million was to come from so-called ‘voluntary contributions’. Given the poor track record of African 
states in paying their obligatory dues, such voluntary payments are almost certain to come from 
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I; while the expansion of the operation to AMIS II the following year was expected to 
cost over $450 million for just twelve months (Neethling, 2006:103; Prunier, 
2005:144; Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:9). In a report produced by the AU Commission 
in July 2005, it was revealed that only seven of the 53 member states had paid their 
basic contributions in full, thus leaving the organization with a budgetary shortfall of 
approximately $35 million. What is more, a pledging conference for AMIS co-chaired 
by the AU and UN in late May 2005 only managed to raise promises, not actual 
donations, of $291 million; thus presenting the operation in Darfur itself with a $200 
million shortfall (Williams, 2006:179). 
 
Perhaps most concerning is the fact that when money is donated rather than 
equipment, the AU lacks the procurement capacity to spend these funds efficiently. 
This issue was acknowledged by the Chairman of the AU Commission (cited in 
Appiah-Mensah, 2006:5), who admitted that, “in the area of procurement the AU 
neither has the logistical infrastructure nor the experience to handle bulk and urgent 
purchases, worth millions of dollars, for such large operations”. In fact, donor funding 
has had to be returned on several occasions when the AU Commission has not had the 
staffing capacity to accept and administer these financial contributions (Bogland et al, 
2008:42). Such concerns have also trickled-down to ground-level, where it is claimed 
that many of the AU’s soldiers have gone unpaid while on deployment as part of 
AMIS (Grono, 2006:626). It has been reported that South African soldiers serving in 
Darfur earned far less than their colleagues serving as UN ‘blue berets’ in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi, a fact that has clear ramifications 
in terms of force morale. Also, in August 2005, the South African contingent was 
reportedly informed that their daily allowance would be cut from $25 per day to a 
meagre $1 per day – the UN’s measure of absolute poverty – in view of the AU’s 
extreme financial problems (Neethling, 2006:106). 
 
The AU’s admitted inability to effectively and efficiently manage such large sums of 
money has itself exacerbated the financial constraints experienced by the organization 
during the deployment AMIS. While substantial financial support to AMIS had been 
                                                                                                                                            
international donors. Indeed, the international community supports virtually all of the AU’s programs 
and the deployment of both AMIB and AMIS would not have been possible without funding from 
external actors. 
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forthcoming from the international community during its initial deployment, this 
enthusiasm waned drastically from mid-2006 as the operation dragged ahead and the 
organization’s shortcomings became apparent (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:12). As 
O’Niell & Cassis (2005:37) assert in reference to the mission in Darfur, “there is no 
audit trail for expenses, no spreadsheets showing money coming in and how it is 
spent”. Indeed, one senior UN official (cited in O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:37) described 
the AU’s handling of finances as “money going into a black hole”. This apparent lack 
of accountability and transparency prompted the donor community to push for the 
transition of AMIS to the UN, as they simply were not willing to support a further 
enhancement of the AU operation in the light of its limited effectiveness (ICG, 
2006:16). Such a state of affairs has led observers to conclude that, from a financial 
perspective, the only viable peacekeeping operations in Africa are those supported by 
the UN (de Coning, 2004:23; Neethling, 2006:100). Indeed, one western official 
involved with AMIS made this observation: 
 
“As a few, non-African countries paid for absolutely everything – from 
helicopters to food to knives and forks to sandbags, to vehicles, to wages, 
to beds – the AU preferred to blame these countries rather than take 
responsibility … And money was involved. Lots of it. The majority of the 
mission was … made up of determined, dedicated and capable people. But 
people who are unpaid, unfed, under-armed, unvisited … with a 
meaningless mandate, being shot at, with no idea what is going on, are 
unlikely to make a difference in Darfur” (cited in Flint & de Waal, 
2008:177). 
 
4.4.4 Limited scope 
 
A further factor likely to impact upon the AU’s future peacekeeping capability, 
evident during the Darfur operation, is AMIS’ rather narrow scope. It has been argued 
in this study and by others that the overwhelming emphasis placed on the purely 
military aspects of the AU’s peace and security architecture is short-sighted and 
belies, at best, a fundamental misunderstanding of peacekeeping’s contemporary role 
and the multidimensional nature of security or, at worst, a conscious decision to 
ignore these realities (de Coning, 2205a:91). Neethling (2005:18), for example, argues 
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that “the multidimensional notion of security will require that peacekeeping forces not 
only be combat capable, but to undertake training on issues related to HIV/AIDS, 
gender issues, children’s rights, civil-military coordination, respect for human rights 
and international humanitarian law”. The reality clearly highlighted in Darfur, 
however, is that AU is very far implementing such a broad peacekeeping capability. 
 
One of the key remaining challenges facing the operationalization of an African 
peacekeeping capability is the need to equally develop the civilian support and police 
dimensions of the ASF concept so that the multidimensional nature of contemporary 
peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU framework (de Coning, 2006:41). 
Indeed, AMIS suffered from an extremely slow build-up of civilian staff and was an 
entirely military operation for months. Civilian police (CIVPOL) only began to arrive 
in very small numbers in early 2005 and, as one UN official familiar with AMIS 
stated, “the AU had no clue on police issues. They said there was no major role for 
police and they never even would have considered a police component if the UN had 
not recommended it”. Even once the CIVPOL units eventually arrived in theatre they 
faced a logistical nightmare. Not only did they have nowhere to go when they arrived 
in Darfur, but the first 250 police had only four cars between them and there was only 
one police officer at AU HQ responsible for every aspect of police deployment, 
recruiting, contracts, transport, lodging, communications and equipment (O’Niell & 
Cassis, 2005:18; 40). 
 
Over and above the force-orientated aspects of the operation, AMIS ostensibly also 
comprised political and humanitarian affairs sections, was required to operate 
alongside a substantial international humanitarian effort, and was meant to have a 
civilian-led management structure (de Coning, 2005b:15). According to O’Niell & 
Cassis (2005:41), however, “while civilians [were] in charge of this mission, this 
[was] not apparent from either the mission’s structure or its ethos” and Vogt 
(2005:26) goes as far as to criticise the extremely evident “civilian capability gap”. 
Firstly, despite the scale of the humanitarian crisis, there were no civilian-military 
coordination officers or a strong civilian component with expertise in humanitarian 
assistance and human rights within AMIS. Indeed, only three such experts were 
eventually deployed to the capitals of Darfur’s three states in late 2005. The mission’s 
leadership apparently did not perceive NGOs and their work as a critical component 
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or colleague in Darfur and thus these organizations found it exceptionally difficult to 
liaise with the AU on issues of concern. Secondly, the operation suffered from a lack 
of political advisors to assist senior military officers in developing effective 
relationships with the GoS and other belligerents. Thirdly, AMIS had only two public 
information officers in country – in el Fasher and Kahrtoum – with sector 
commanders lacking guidance on political and public information strategies. Finally, 
despite extremely high incidences of sexual and gender-based violence and the 
intentional use of rape as a weapon, no gender experts were included within AMIS’ 
structures (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:38, 40, 41). 
 
Such a state of affairs should come as no surprise. As Fanta (2009:13) points out, “the 
ASF has no capacity for peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction. Even during an 
operation it is envisioned that it would eventually hand over to UN … stabilisation or 
country teams”.39 The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby 
Force and the Military Staff Committee (AU, 2003) goes to great length to set out the 
precise structure of the AU’s military response capacity, yet mention of the civilian 
and humanitarian aspects is limited to a few broad sentences. Although 
multidimensional peacekeeping is identified as one of the key tasks to be undertaken 
by the AU, the policy framework argues that “the UN is the most experienced 
organization” in terms of the non-military components of multidimensional operations 
(AU, 2003:Para. 1.6.e; 2.7). The implication being that the world body would likely 
be called upon to provide these services to an AU-led operation. Indeed, Paragraph 
3.14 (AU, 2003) merely states that “the AU should establish and centrally manage a 
roster of mission administration, plus a roster of civilian experts to fill the human 
rights, humanitarian, governance, DDR and reconstruction component”; while it is 
further suggested that these capabilities could be procured through partnerships with 
other organizations that have relevant expertise, such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations High Commission for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR) and the World Bank. 
 
                                                 
39 As was discussed in Chapter 2, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction is the vital final cog in 
the broader conflict management framework. Peacebuilding necessarily represents peacekeepers’ exit 
strategy. As such, it would seem that the AU’s is to hand over responsibility to the UN. The problem, 
however, is that there is currently no formal structural relationship or clear approach to burden-sharing 
between the AU and UN. The consequences of this can be seen in Somalia, where the UN has remained 
steadfast in rejecting calls to deploy a peacekeeping force to relieve the embattled AU mission. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The significance of AMIS and the subsequent implications for the future prospects of 
African peacekeeping more broadly cannot be overemphasized. As Ndinga-Muvumba 
(2008:177) rather succinctly argues, “the AU’s peace operation in Darfur … is the test 
case for the continent’s new security architecture” – a point echoed by Prunier 
(2005:144), who notes that “since the old OAU had decided to shed its skin and be 
reborn as the African Union, it had known that it would be by its competence in 
conflict management that the world, from its member states to the broader 
international community, would judge it”. Indeed, although the previous mission in 
Burundi had been the first of its kind undertaken by the AU, Darfur presented a far 
sterner challenge for the organization while also allowing it time to possibly build on 
the lessons learned during the deployment of AMIB. Yet, according to Adebajo 
(2008:138), “in trying to prove to the world that it had become a transformed 
organization, the AU may have bitten off more than it could chew”. 
 
As such, this chapter sought to provide a critical analysis of the AU’s operation in 
Darfur and in so doing highlight the fundamental challenges that are likely to 
undermine the organization’s ambitious peacekeeping aspirations. The chapter 
therefore began with a brief discussion of the basic elements of the people and history 
of the region; the most significant finding in this regard being the extremely complex 
nature of the conflict. Indeed, the current crisis is merely the latest phase in Darfur’s 
long history of resource-and development-related inter-ethnic rivalries, fuelled by 
regional politics, in which the government itself is unquestionably complicit in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (Sharamo, 2006:51). If ever there was a situation 
requiring a robust, multidimensional peacekeeping operation in the contemporary 
mould, Darfur is it.40 However, the AU’s response in this regard left something to be 
desired. 
 
Despite an extremely strong peace and security architecture and the fact that the 
atrocities in Darfur coincided with the 10-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, 
                                                 
40 Indeed, on 31 August 2006 the UN Security Council invoked the R2P principle for the first time ever 
in its country-specific resolution concerning Darfur and the R2P has continued to be cited by the UN in 
relation to Darfur. 
 - 90 - 
 
AMIS was cruelly exposed. Firstly, African leaders showed a distinct lack of political 
will. Due to a fear of negative reactions from key member states the AU never 
effectively dealt with the GoS and allowed the Sudanese to dictate the terms and size 
of the operation (Sharamo, 2006:53). Secondly, the organization’s weak institutional 
capacity severely undermined whatever good the troops may have achieved at ground-
level. For example, insufficient pre-mission planning as well as command and control 
shortcomings resulted in unclear SOPs and Rules of Engagement (ROE). If soldiers 
do not understand something as basic as the right to return fire in self-defence, then 
they have been failed fundamentally (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:36). Many Darfuris 
came to pity the AMIS troops, asking, “what soldiers cannot even defend themselves” 
(cited in Flint & de Waal, 2008:179). Over and above these operation-level 
challenges, AMIS also faced organization-level issues. Not only was the AU 
completely incapable of funding the operation, but it was also unable to manage the 
overwhelming donations that poured in from the international community at the outset 
(O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:36). Finally, as Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:5) point out, 
“Darfur’s overarching impact on Africa’s security system has been a trend of giving 
much weight to the military capabilities to the utter neglect of the capacity for non-
military options” so crucial to successfully addressing such a crisis. 
 
Even though the overarching strategy may have been poorly conceived, the AU 
undoubtedly enjoyed a number of successes at the tactical level. These include, inter 
alia: preventive deployments deterring attacks on civilians; mediation and conflict 
resolution between local leaders; flexible patrolling, answering as many requests as 
possible; as well as an overwhelming sense of motivation shown by AU troops to the 
task at hand (O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:24 - 25). Jan Pronk (cited in Sharamo, 2006:51), 
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Sudan, reported 
in mid-2005 that “the AU force has helped to establish more stability. They have done 
an admirable job, highly professional, with much dedication”. Concurring, Susan Rice 
(cited in Sharamo, 2006:52), a former US diplomat, commended the role played by 
the organization: “where it has deployed, the AU has performed heroically and greatly 
increased the security for civilians”. Indeed, the AMIS’ shortcomings were related to 
politics and capacity rather than to its conduct within the AOR. 
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However, the operation ultimately proved unsuccessful in bringing about a more 
stable and secure environment within Darfur in general; while, despite the best efforts 
of those troops deployed on the ground, the extreme levels of violence seemed to 
continue unabated. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (cited in Williams, 
2006:179) claimed at the time that “the decrease in attacks [on civilians] may … be a 
function of a reduced number of targets”. Or, as the head of the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Andrew Natsios (cited in Williams, 2006:179), 
put it: “the major reason for that, frankly, is there are not many villages left to burn 
and destroy”. Indeed, a number of commentators are of the opinion that the decision 
to transfer AMIS to UNAMID and subsume the operation under a UN umbrella was 
long over due (Adebajo, 2008:139; Gomes, 2008:127). Reflecting international 
opinion at the time, Murithi (2008:77) has argued “the AU’s monitoring mission [left] 
much to be desired and a more robust peacekeeping force [was] required to effectively 
dissuade the silent genocide … taking place in Darfur” (emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore the prospects of an effective African 
peacekeeping capability by means of assessing the various challenges that have 
impeded the AU’s efforts towards establishing such a continental capacity. This 
purpose was formulated against the backdrop of violent conflict and political 
instability that has plagued Africa since the mid-20th century and which has come to 
be viewed in common discourse as synonymous with the continent. Indeed, 
determining whether or not Africa is likely to succeed in establishing its own self-
sufficient and successful continental peacekeeping force is important for three key 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, as has already been mentioned, conflict arguably poses the most significant 
threat to Africa’s future prosperity. One must consider not only the direct 
consequences thereof – the visible and immediate death, injury, destruction, and 
displacement – but also the innumerable negative knock-on effects associated with 
war – the distant and indirect repercussion for families, communities, local and 
national institutions and economies, and neighboring countries. Secondly, although 
the international community continues to offer financial and matériel support, 
enthusiasm to intervene in and take direct action on the continent suffered a major 
blow after the peacekeeping debacles in Somalia and Rwanda in the 1990s. The 
resultant Africa fatigue has meant that the continent has been more or less left to its 
own devices, thus necessitating that the continent’s leaders devise African solutions to 
African problems. Finally, given that the AU itself has chosen to prioritize 
peacekeeping as its primary conflict management tool within the overarching peace 
and security architecture – as indicated by the overwhelming emphasis placed on the 
development of the ASF concept – the importance of the organization’s peacekeeping 
capacity cannot be overstated. Simply put, the AU has chosen to place all its eggs in 
one basket and should this endeavour fail the consequences for peace, security and 
stability in Africa are likely to be disastrous. 
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The research question for this thesis was therefore formulated as follows: in light of 
the many potential challenges facing the organization, what is the likelihood that the 
AU will be able to implement an effective African peacekeeping capability? In 
seeking to address this issue, however, it was first necessary to discuss three separate 
yet intimately related questions. First, what is the role of peacekeeping in conflict 
management? Indeed, understanding how and why the practice emerged, what it 
entails and how exactly it is practiced at present bear both contextual and analytical 
importance for a study aimed at critiquing the AU’s peacekeeping capability. Second, 
how does the AU plan on implementing peacekeeping to tackle the scourge of 
conflict? Understanding how the organization’s peace and security architecture is 
intended to function and why this is the case is a fundamental requirement. Finally, 
how have the organization’s structures and strategy fared during an actual 
peacekeeping operation? Comparing actual performance against the envisioned 
standards is the clearest method of determining the nature and gravity of those 
challenges that face the AU’s ambition of addressing conflict in Africa. 
 
As such, the study commenced by first conceptualizing what is understood by the 
term peacekeeping. The problem in attempting such a feat, however, is that 
commentators are hard-pressed to agree upon a single, clearly defined definition and 
the plethora thereof presented within the literature merely reflects the fact that 
peacekeeping has been used as somewhat of an umbrella term for an exceptionally 
wide spectrum of activities. Nonetheless, peacekeeping was conceptualized in this 
study as: any international effort involving an operational component – i.e. putting 
boots on the ground – that aims to prevent or terminate any conflict or dispute. Again, 
this definition is intentionally broad as it seeks to incorporate the variety of tasks that 
contemporary peacekeepers are required to undertake, while also reflecting the reality 
that peacekeeping necessarily entails deploying troops and other individuals in-
country so-to-speak and therefore differs from internal law enforcement and similar 
activities undertaken by governments. 
 
Having determined what is understood by the term, the origin and development of 
peacekeeping were then discussed. It was shown that the practice ultimately emerged 
as an ad hoc response to particular problems of peace and security facing the 
international community during the Cold War, which led to the establishment of the 
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traditional or first generation peacekeeping model under the auspices of the UN. 
Indeed, peace enforcement, supported by other peaceful alternatives, had initially 
been envisioned as the means by which the international community would resolve 
conflicts in the post-war era. However, the rivalry between East and West during this 
period soon undermined the ambition of a global security arrangement and 
necessitated that an alternative approach be developed. As a somewhat awkward 
compromise between peaceful and force-orientated methods, peacekeeping provided 
the international community with a relatively successful conflict management tool – 
as epitomized by the first three operations UNTSO, UNMOGIP and UNEF – capable 
of diffusing hostilities and avoiding direct confrontation between the two 
superpowers. 
 
It was further argued that peacekeeping is ultimately a matter of security, as the 
practice can best be described as precautions or measures taken to provide security 
and thus ensure peace. Central to such efforts is one’s understanding of the notion of 
security as well as the normative debate regarding how this can best be achieved. As 
the Cold War wound down and the dynamic processes of globalization began to 
accelerate during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nature of the security threat 
facing states and their citizens also underwent a transformation. It was previously 
taken for granted that external aggression, an attack by one state against another, 
would constitute the most serious threat. In recent decades, however, far more people 
have been killed in civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide; while 
technologies of mass destruction circulate in a netherworld of illicit markets, and 
terrorism casts shadows on stable rule. As such, the notion of security was forced to 
evolve from the longstanding model dominant during the Cold War, which perceived 
the state as the appropriate subject of security concerns, to a far more holistic concept 
that prioritized the, predominantly non-military, security concerns of individuals and 
communities. 
 
Reflecting this shift in focus, at the dawn of the 21st century the question arose: when, 
if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action 
against another state for the purpose of protecting human security? In response to this 
challenge, the ICISS developed the R2P doctrine. Briefly, the R2P redefines state 
sovereignty from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility. The 
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implication being: firstly, the state and its agents are responsible for the functions of 
protecting the safety and lives of citizens and the promotion of their welfare; 
secondly, national political authorities are both responsible to their citizens internally 
as well as to the international community externally; and finally, state authorities are 
responsible for their actions and can be held accountable for both their acts of 
commission and omission. It was further argued that, although primary responsibility 
for the protection of its citizens is vested in the state, the international community 
bears a residual responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild should the state fail in this 
regard. 
 
The net effect of the changing security threats, human security, the R2P doctrine and 
other associated developments in the aftermath of the Cold War has been the 
expansion of peacekeeping into a multidimensional activity and one of the primary 
tools used by the international community to manage and resolve complex crises. 
Indeed, whilst peacekeeping may have initially been developed as a means of dealing 
with inter-state conflict, the international community simply could not ignore the 
realities on the ground and was forced to take action. Central to this new approach are 
the so-called Five P’s: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Significantly, it was further highlighted that the 
distinctions between these tasks are in fact rather blurred and a number of linkages 
and so-called grey areas do exist. While peacekeeping operations are, in principle, 
deployed to support the implementation of agreements achieved by peacemakers, they 
are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts as well as further 
peacebuilding activities. Indeed, the Five P’s rarely occur in a linear or sequential 
manner. Rather, they are mutually reinforcing and if used in isolation fail to provide 
the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict. 
 
The study then turned towards addressing the long and rather torturous development 
of an African peacekeeping capability. One of the hallmarks of the post-Cold War era 
has been the devolution of responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security from the UN to a host of regional and other similar actors. Indeed, the 
sheer number of conflicts and calls for UN assistance that emerged since the 1990s 
have stretched the organization’s resources to the limits and seen the likes of NATO 
and ECOWAS taking a leading role in conflict management. While the world body is 
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tasked with the primary responsibility in this regard, the kind of burden-sharing that 
has become characteristics of contemporary peacekeeping is in fact provided for with 
the UN Charter and, given the organization’s limitations, has further been encouraged 
by the UN itself. 
 
It is in this light that AU came to being in 2002. Significantly, however, the new 
continental organization is not the first all-African attempt at addressing the 
challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent. In the post-colonial era, 
Pan-Africanism and decolonization played a critical role in bringing states together 
and culminated in the formation of the OAU in 1963. With the continent seemingly 
ravaged by one conflict after another, early African leaders took some action towards 
addressing this issue under the auspices of the new body. Although a number of 
conflict management mechanisms – most notably the Defence Commission, CMCA 
and MCPMR – were established, the organization proved unsuccessful in this regard. 
Critically, the OAU was undermined by the organization’s limited financial, logistical 
and structural competence, while its political and institutional authority was hampered 
by dissent, the restrictive terms of its own charter and the qualified support of member 
states. 
 
Recognizing these shortcomings and the ever-increasing need for viable conflict 
management structures on the continent – as well as spurred on by the political 
ambitions of Mbeki and Obasanjo – the OAU was ultimately revitalized in the form of 
the AU. With the formation of the new organization, African leaders sought to put to 
bed the inability of its forerunner, in order to deal with continental instabilities by 
adopting new approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. Central to this 
new African vision was the AU’s groundbreaking Constitutive Act, which adopted a 
distinctly human security-orientated approach and even went as far as to assert the 
right of the organization to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of member states 
pursuant to acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to legitimate 
order. Moreover, in the AU the continent now has a more comprehensive peace and 
security architecture in place than at any other time since regional cooperation started 
on the continent in 1963. Indeed, the CADSP, PSC, ASF and other related 
components – on paper at least – represent a significant conflict management and 
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peacekeeping capacity capable of making a significant contribution to peace, security 
and stability in Africa. 
 
The CADSP is an umbrella concept envisioned to promote a common understanding 
among African states regarding their numerous defence and security challenges. It 
further establishes a strategy based on a set of principles, norms, objectives and 
mechanisms aimed at harmonizing the continent’s collective responses to these 
challenges and eventually eradicating the scourge of violent conflict from Africa. This 
goal is to be achieved through the PSC, the decision-making organ responsible for 
preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, and is to be assisted by a Panel of the 
Wise, Military Staff Committee, Continental Early Warning System, and Peace Fund. 
In essence, the PSC is authorized to undertake a variety of peace enforcement, 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding operations to be carried out by the 
ASF. 
 
The ASF is ultimately an intricate standby system that attempts to employ and 
coordinate the peacekeeping capabilities of Africa’s five sub-regions. Briefly, each 
region is to earmark a brigade-sized contribution of military personnel, as well as 
trained military and civilian observers, supported by small full-time PLANELMs. 
Supplemented by a sixth High Readiness Brigade based in Addis Ababa, it is 
envisaged that this structure would provide the organization with a combined capacity 
of 15000 – 20000 soldiers and 500 military observers. It was further recommended 
that the ASF include a centrally managed standby roster of at least 240 police officers, 
two company strength gendarmerie police units, as well as civilian specialists in 
mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance and DDR. 
However, it was further highlighted that apart from SADC and ECOWAS progress in 
developing the ASF model has been extremely slow and, despite significant support 
from the international community, it is almost certain that the scheduled 30 June 2010 
deadline for the finalization thereof will be missed. 
 
It was further argued that drafting policy documents and formalizing standby 
arrangements are by far the easiest aspects in establishing such a plan of action. The 
real test of the organization’s capacity for ensuring peace, security and stability in 
Africa is that of implementation. Therefore, in order to better assess the prospects of 
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an effective African peacekeeping capability, the study further evaluated how the 
AU’s peacekeeping structures have performed at ground level during the deployment 
of an actual peacekeeping operation. 
 
The conflict in Darfur and subsequent AU mission was selected as a case study for a 
number of reasons. First and foremost, the magnitude of the conflict is virtually 
unprecedented and is often labelled the worst humanitarian and human rights 
catastrophe in the world. Second, the level of human suffering and credible 
allegations of government complicity in this regard in particular highlight two 
important issues: the responsibility to protect and intervene for humanitarian 
purposes, as well as the deployment of a military operation in order to create 
conditions conducive to conflict resolution. Third, AMIS was faced with a far more 
complicated and daunting task than the organization’s previous outing in Burundi and 
is the most recently completed AU operation. Finally, the response to the conflict in 
Darfur has seen substantial interaction and cooperation between the international 
community, the AU and the UN and therefore provided a unique opportunity to 
examine the relationship between Africa and its partners in an actual peacekeeping 
environment. 
 
The purpose in this regard was to determine the practicality of the AU’s proposed 
peace and security architecture by exploring what, if any, challenges have impeded 
the organization’s deployment of AMIS. The study found that the AU operation in 
Darfur has faced a number of pressing issues that not only undermined its own 
performance, but are also likely to have a significant impact upon any future 
operations. Most notable among these are: a lack of political will shown by African 
leaders; the organization’s extreme financial constraints; weak institutional capacity in 
core management, operational and administrative areas; and the limited scope of the 
AU’s peace and security architecture – as highlighted by the overwhelming emphasis 
placed on the military components of the ASF concept. 
 
5.2 KEY FINDINGS 
 
Given the research question – in light of the many potential challenges facing the 
organization, what is the likelihood that the AU will be able to implement an effective 
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African peacekeeping capability – the introduction to this study posited that three 
related points would need to be addressed. Firstly, can the AU give substance to what 
it has committed itself to in principle? Secondly, the AU’s peace and security 
architecture is grounded on the notions of African leadership and ownership. 
Therefore, can this be a truly African endeavor free of dependence on the 
international community? Finally, in light of the answers to the first two questions, 
can the ASF and related structures live up to their mandate and provide the 
organization with a truly effective peacekeeping capacity capable of successfully 
tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent? These three issues represent the key 
findings of this study and are discussed below. Significantly, the findings up to this 
point have further highlighted the importance of political will – and the lack thereof – 
with regards to Africa’s peacekeeping prospects and as such will also be addressed. 
 
5.2.1 The declaration reality-gap 
 
The AU, having only been established in 2002, is a relatively young organization and 
its peacekeeping mechanisms are still in the process of being developed. The question 
thus arises as to whether or not the organization will be able to successfully 
implement the extremely ambitious peace and security architecture that is called for 
within its Constitutive Act and the CADSP. The unfortunate reality is that the actual 
implementing structures within the AU framework do not match up to the theory. As 
this study has shown, one of the AU’s major shortcomings to date has been that of 
weak institutional capacity and the organization needs time to develop these structures 
before its peacekeeping missions are to have any realistic hope of success – a fact that 
has severely undermined the operational effectiveness of the organization’s mission in 
Darfur. 
 
According to the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby 
Force and the Military Staff Committee (AU, 2003:Para. 1.6), by the time that the 
deployment of AMIS had been authorized by the AU, the organization should have 
been more or less capable of managing a scenario 3-type stand-alone AU/regional 
observer mission, which is ultimately what the operation amounted to. Moreover, the 
individual sub-regions should have been extremely close to finalizing their standby 
arrangements. Arguably one of the greatest strengths of the AU’s proposed peace and 
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security architecture is its multilayered, decentralized method of security cooperation 
that builds upon the core competencies and relative experience of the sub-regions - 
particularly SADC and ECOWAS. 
 
In reality, however, the ASF was not evenly remotely operational during the early 
stages of Darfur as three of the five proposed regional brigades which constitute the 
ASF model missed their Phase 1 targets, whilst it is virtually certain that the 30 June 
2010 deadline for the implementation of the ASF will not be met (Williams, 
2006:172). What is more, despite the emphasis placed upon the development and 
empowerment of these sub-regional structures – they form the mainstay of the AU’s 
peace and security architecture – the overwhelming bulk of AMIS’ strength was 
provided by a loose coalition of TCCs from three different regions of the continent 
operating under the auspices of the AU. Namely: Nigeria belonging to ECOWAS; 
Rwanda, a member of East Africa’s EASBRIG; and, South Africa from SADC. 
Finally, as has already been discussed, the operation itself was characterized by a host 
of administrative and logistical deficiencies. 
 
This point is most clearly highlighted by the fact that the advance party of MILOBs 
arrived in Darfur with only one satellite telephone and had no vehicles of their own; 
while sector commanders were required to rent civilian accommodation for their 
troops as the AU had not made any arrangements in this regard. Indeed, there are no 
ready structures within the AU for strategic and operational command and control, the 
result being an ad hoc organization that does not have the capacity to command 
missions effectively (Bogland et al, 2008:40). 
 
The answer to the question posed at the beginning of this sub-section, then, is yes. 
The AU will undoubtedly proceed in this vein and should eventually succeed in 
establishing the various components of the peace and security architecture that it has 
committed itself to – although only ostensibly. Indeed, this study has shown that the 
AU is severely understaffed and under-funded; while those structures that are in place, 
such as the Early Warning System, do not function as they should. It would seem that, 
in reality, the AU is an extremely weak organization and will likely experience great 
difficulty in integrating Africa’s myriad conflict management structures in a logical 
and efficient manner at the continental level. Such a scenario clearly does not bode 
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well for the organization’s peacekeeping capability nor peace, security and stability in 
Africa in general. As the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security (cited in 
(Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2007:5) argues in reference to the organization’s experience in 
Darfur, “the AU was being asked to provide shelter when its house had no roof”. 
 
5.2.2 Striking a balance between African ownership and external funding 
 
In light of these glaring shortcomings it is abundantly clear that more attention and 
resources need to be dedicated to the development of the AU’s structures if it is to 
have any hope of becoming a truly competent organization capable of effectively 
managing conflict in Africa. As Bogland et al (2008:42) echo, “lack of economic and 
material resources is one of the biggest problems that all peace and security initiatives 
contend with on the African continent”. Such support, however, has not been very 
forthcoming from within the organization itself and so the AU has had to look 
elsewhere. As was shown in Chapter 3, partnering with more experienced and better 
managed and resourced international actors – the UN, NATO, EU and individual 
states – forms part and parcel of the AU’s plan of action in this regard.41 
 
This state of affairs highlights two important points that pertain directly to the notion 
of African ownership and ‘African solutions to African problems’ that was identified 
as a key driving force behind the AU and its desire to play a meaningful role in 
addressing the scourge of conflict on the continent. Firstly, the study found that the 
AU operation in Darfur was wholly dependent upon the support of external donors, a 
fact which also applies to the operationalization of the ASF and related structures with 
the organization’s peace and security architecture. In terms of the organization’s 
legitimacy and credibility on the continent, however, it is vital that external funding is 
not accompanied by undue influence on decision-making processes or leadership. In 
the words of Thobane (2007:109), “theoretically, as long as the AU cannot fund its 
own peace missions independently, it will never be in a position to determine the 
course of its missions”. The likelihood of developing an effective African 
peacekeeping capability simply cannot be realized if the AU is wholly dependent 
                                                 
41 The most recent figures available estimate the AU’s peace and security budget at $62 million (out of 
a total institutional budget of $160 million). In contrast, the EU budget in 2007 was a staggering €129 
billion. 
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upon the international community. Yet, given the dire economic conditions on the 
continent and the fact that member states have been less than forthcoming in terms of 
paying their compulsory contributions, the AU’s ability to cover its own costs in the 
short- to medium-term is highly unlikely. 
 
The second point worth noting is that continued international support for the AU is 
not necessarily a given. Indeed, despite the significant financial, matériel and other 
assistance provided by these partners in terms of both developing the organization’s 
institutional capacity and supporting peacekeeping operations directly, the AU 
remains a relatively weak body and has proved rather unsuccessful in the field. It has 
already been mentioned that one senior UN official (cited in O’Niell & Cassis, 
2005:37) described the AU’s handling of finances as “money going into a black hole” 
and this lack of accountability and transparency not only prompted the donor 
community to push for the transition of AMIS to the UN, but is also likely to deter 
unqualified support for the AU looking ahead. Given the organization’s utter 
dependence on the international community, the withdrawal of such assistance would 
no doubt severely undermine the prospects of an effective African peacekeeping 
capability. As de Waal (2007c:379) notes in reference to the mission in Darfur: 
 
“The morale of the AMIS troops suffered as soon as the UN handover 
proposal was floated ... Even before the AU had approved the transition [to 
UNAMID] in March 2006 … AMIS funds began to dry up … Instead of 
the AU PSC discussing how to improve AMIS’ mandate and operations, it 
was asked to discuss its demise. Rather than being expanded and made 
more effective, the mission began to whither”. 
 
Can the AU’s peacekeeping capability therefore be truly African owned? In light of 
the above the answer is, unfortunately, more than likely no. The key consideration, 
then, is striking an effective balance between African leadership on the one hand and 
external funding on the other – a relationship based upon cooperation and mutual 
benefit rather than dependence and a negative hierarchical structure. Although the UN 
may assume primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, the AU necessarily assumes a secondary responsibility in this regard while 
also bearing the responsibility to augment the UN’s capabilities within Africa itself 
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(Thobane, 2007:63). Indeed, the AU is undoubtedly the appropriate mechanism 
through which Africa’s challenges, most notably in the area of peace and security, can 
be addressed. As such, the international community should not write-off the 
organization, but rather they should continue to encourage and support it as has been 
the case to date. 
 
5.2.3 Potential in the long-term 
 
Having concluded that the AU is currently not well positioned to provide an effective 
peacekeeping capability on the continent and that any hope of the organization ever 
doing so is wholly dependent upon continued support from the international 
community, the AU is nonetheless capable of playing a meaningful role in ensuring 
peace, security and stability in Africa in the long-term. It is important to note, 
however, that attempting to both develop one’s capacity to deploy peacekeeping 
operations and actually deploying such operations simultaneously is rather 
problematic. As LtCol Percy Hansson (cited in Ekengard, 2008:41) points out, “in 
some instances resources were diverted from the development of the regional brigades 
to AMIS, and later to UNAMID. This is evident in the case of EASBRIG … from 
which command and control resources were diverted”.42 It is vital, therefore, that the 
AU adopt a pragmatic approach and commit itself to bringing the ASF and related 
structures fully online before agreeing to any further operations. Should the AU be 
faced with yet another conflict and take the premature decision to intervene, this 
would surely strike a death blow to the organization’s stuttering peace and security 
architecture which is already overburdened by ongoing commitments in Darfur and 
Somalia. 
 
However, as Bogland et al (2008:38) argue, “the institutional framework, as well as 
the doctrines and concepts for AU-led peace support operations are in place and are of 
a relatively high quality”. Thus, should the organization manage to literally get its 
house in order, the AU’s proposed structures represent an extremely strong platform 
from which to pursue the goals of peace and security on the continent. Firstly, the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union is groundbreaking in that it is the first 
                                                 
42 LtCol Hansson is the Swedish military attaché at AU HQ in Addis Ababa. 
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international treaty to assert the right of a regional organization to intervene in the 
internal affairs of member states. Secondly, the CADSP and ASF concept have the 
potential to contribute to the promotion of continent-wide security cooperation in at 
least two ways. For one thing, the CADSP represents a common goal for member 
states, a political framework for peace and security, which increases the opportunity 
for channelling resources, initiatives and programs in a common direction. What is 
more, the ASF’s decentralized structure emphasizes the responsibility of the sub-
regional organizations – thus retaining interest and promoting capacity development 
at the level of RECs – while the AU contributes the strategic framework, continental 
legitimacy and important conceptual and institutional link with international actors 
(Bogland et al, 2008:38). Indeed, it can be argued that the AU’s peace and security 
architecture is a natural and practical solution to the challenge of establishing 
integration and cooperation over such a large and heterogeneous continent as Africa. 
 
A further point worth mentioning is that, in the case of AMIS at least, AU troops have 
tended to make a significant positive contribution towards ensuring peace and security 
at ground-level. As has already been mentioned, such successes include: preventive 
deployments deterring attacks on civilians; mediation and conflict resolution between 
local leaders; flexible patrolling, answering as many requests as possible; as well as 
an overwhelming sense of motivation shown by AU troops to the task at hand 
(O’Niell & Cassis, 2005:24 - 25). As Ekengard (2008:41) notes, despite the extremely 
evident lack of civilian capacity within the ASF, commentators have “generally given 
credit to AMIS’ work at the tactical level and below”. Indeed, in October 2006 a host 
of senior military and police officers, currently or formerly serving with AMIS, 
gathered at a seminar arranged by the International Peace Academy. Reflecting on 
what the experience in Darfur meant for the continued development of the AU’s peace 
and security architecture, the participants concluded that weaknesses at the higher 
levels of AMIS and AU hierarchy were the most serious shortcomings constraining 
further progress (Ekengard, 2008:40 - 41). 
 
Thus, in response to the question can the ASF and related structures live up to their 
mandate and provide the organization with a truly effective peacekeeping capacity 
capable of successfully tackling the scourge of conflict on the continent, the answer 
would be yes. However, in light of the above findings the most likely and viable 
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scenario is sure to diverge rather significantly from the highly ambitious framework 
originally envisioned by the AU. Indeed, it would seem that large-scale 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations sustained over a prolonged period of time 
will remain beyond the AU’s limited financial and institutional capabilities. On the 
basis of the Darfur experience, Neethling (2006:108) has suggested that it would be 
advisable for the AU to rather plan for the successful deployment of military observer 
missions and short-term stabilization operations consistent with scenarios 1 through 4 
of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the 
Military Staff Committee. 
 
By prioritizing the development of a robust, rapid-reaction force, the AU could 
potentially deploy its troops in order to monitor and stabilize the situation on the 
ground for a limited period of time prior to the arrival of a more comprehensive UN 
operation. As has been discussed elsewhere, the UN is ultimately the only institution 
capable of co-ordinating the various multidimensional components needed to form as 
well as sustain a complex peacekeeping operation and peacebuilding system. 
However, in order for such a partnership to prove feasible, the AU must first 
formalize its relationship with the UN and adopt an integrated approach with regards 
to burden-sharing (Thobane, 2007:110). Key issues in this regard would include 
whether or not the UN should place its assets at the disposal of the AU and sub-
regional bodies and vice versa; reaching agreement as to what partners such as the EU 
and NATO or any other bilateral donors could provide; as well as establishing clear 
lines of communication and command and control from the regional to global level. 
The alternative, as evidenced by the case of Somalia, would be nothing less than 
disastrous. 
 
This, then, is where the significance of the current AU-UN hybrid operation in Darfur 
comes to the fore. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the hybrid operation concept 
in general and the strengths and weakness of UNAMID in particular is beyond the 
scope of this study.43 Suffice it to say that UNAMID represents an evolution in the 
relationship between the two organizations and hints at a possible alternative to the 
current AU framework. As such, further research on this developing partnership 
                                                 
43 For an introduction to this concept and the technical aspects of UNAMID, see Aboagye (2007). 
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should be conducted as a matter of urgency. This point is echoed by Bogland et al 
(2008:45) who argue that, “future studies need to put the AU in a wider political 
perspective. At a global level, this should include relations with the EU, the UN and 
the great powers ... where are the boundary-defining factors and where should support 
thereby be prioritized”? For one thing, it is important to interrogate what this new 
development represents. As Murithi (2009:16) warns, “the AU has to remain vigilant 
to ensure that it does not descend into a form of hybrid paternalism” where AU troops 
and personnel do the basic and dangerous work on the ground while guided by the all-
wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of UN advisors. 
 
5.2.4 Political will: the missing link 
 
In reality, talk of an African peacekeeping capability – be it African owned or simply 
part of a broader, integrated global conflict management network – will remain 
nothing more than a Pan-African ideal unless the continent’s leaders undergo a 
dramatic change in attitude with regards to the AU and its role in Africa. The 
underlying issue which has undermined the organization’s effectiveness thus far has 
been the lack of political will displayed African elites. It can be argued that weak 
institutional capacity, financial constraints and a lack of progress in implementing the 
various elements of AU’s peace and security architecture are merely symptoms of this 
more fundamental challenge. Indeed, if only the major oil producing states in Africa 
took just 10 US cents a barrel the sum would cover the whole African Union budget 
in less than a month (Evans, 2004).44 
 
As an organization that is very much the sum of its parts, African states will first have 
to pull together in order to imbue the AU with the necessary strength to live up to the 
weight of expectation and assume its envisioned role on the continent. This point is 
echoed by Bogland et al (2008:44) who argue that: 
 
“like all international organizations, the AU suffers from the great breadth 
of national and regional interests … the political support of the member 
states is required in each individual case and, in particular, contributions in 
                                                 
44 Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria. 
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the form of troops, matériel and diplomacy. The AU will never be more 
effective than the sum of its members’ will. A triangular are of tension has, 
thereby, arisen between the AU’s ambitions, the organization’s resources 
and capacity and the member states’ political interests and will”. 
 
Unfortunately, this is somewhat of a ‘catch 22’ scenario as the AU’s development and 
potential is largely dependent upon its ability to exude confidence and command 
respect both in Africa and internationally. It is therefore crucial that the AU make the 
latest wave of Pan-Africanism, which led to the establishment of the organization in 
2002, tangible in a credible form and thereby act as a catalyst for further continental 
integration. This ability rests on member states’ perception of the AU’s capacity vis-à-
vis the membership cost, which, in the end, will either generate political will and drive 
or an implementation and credibility crisis where financial, personnel and matériel 
contributions quickly disappear (Bogland et al, 2008:41). Indeed, until the AU is 
capable of presenting a strong and unified front, member states will remain unwilling 
to forsake their own selfish national interests and invest their faith and resources in 
the organization. This point is driven home by the Botswana Ambassador and 
Permanent Representative to the AU, Zibane Natkhwana (cited in Thobane, 2007:92), 
who asserted that, “Botswana will only send troops to assist or quell conflicts in war 
torn areas if under the auspices of the UN”. 
 
However, in the absence of both Mbeki and Obasanjo, it would seem that the dynamic 
leadership, drive and out-and-out rivalry which gave impetus to the AU in its early 
days is now gone. As Kagwanja & Mutahi (2007:5) point out, “a fundamental re-
configuration of power in the AU in the first half of 2004 cleared the way for Africa’s 
intervention in Darfur. In March 2004, South Africa and Nigeria, the two principle 
prompters of the new-look AU, were elected to the PSC on a three-year term … With 
Africa’s two most powerful nations at the helm of its power, the AU was emboldened 
to take a larger role in Darfur”. Indeed, given his dubious reputation, it remains 
uncertain whether or not Libya’s Gaddafi, the newly elected Chairperson of the AU, 
and his vision of a United States of Africa will prove to be a strong directing force 
within the organization looking ahead. 
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It is more likely that the AU will remain fractured, perceived as little more than a 
token organization in the eyes of African leaders, who themselves are unwilling to 
promote a strong continental body capable of meddling in their affairs and 
undermining their interests. Rather cynically, it could be argued that the AU is 
nothing more than a trade union for the protection of African elites. In the case of the 
Darfur crisis, for example, Prunier (2005:125) notes that, the AU went as far as to 
coach the Khartoum government on how to “handle the whites”. The resultant effect 
of such a scenario on the AU’s capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping 
operations is clear enough not to require a detailed discussion. Suffice it to say, while 
the political rhetoric will continue, very little is likely to change at the organizational 
and operational level. Indeed, AMIS is likely to be as good as it gets in terms of an 
African peacekeeping capability for the foreseeable future – a fact supported by the 
debacle that is AMISOM. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Number and type of conflicts and peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Linkages and grey areas in peace operations 
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Figure 3: Number of intra-state peacekeeping operations, 1948 - 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 4: African Standby Force approved order of battle 
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Figure 5: The African Union’s peace and security architecture 
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Figure 6: African Regional Economic Communities 
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Figure 7: Map of Sudan and surrounding states 
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Figure 8: Map of Darfur, western Sudan 
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